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This thesis examines the influence of the two major priestly colleges in late republican Rome, the 
pontificate and the augurate, and aims to explain why membership was valued so highly by 
members of the Roman élite.  
 
Chapter one discusses the exclusive selection process for the priests and the aristocratic 
prerequisites for membership. In light of the changes to the way priests were selected, resulting 
from the lex Domitia in 104 BC, this chapter explores the extent to which these offices can be 
seen as either inherited family rights or political prizes granted through the support of powerful 
figures like Sulla or Caesar. The second and third chapters consider whether the pontiffs and 
augurs respectively had significant constitutional ‘hard powers’, comparing their influence to the 
central religious authority of magistrates and the senate. The collective influence of the pontifical 
college is examined in the second chapter by assessing their involvement in the decision to 
reverse the dedication of a shrine on the site of Cicero’s house in 57 BC. This discussion will 
also analyse the influence of the young individual pontiff, L. Pinarius Natta, who assisted the 
tribune Clodius at the dedication ceremony in 58 BC. In the third chapter, the individual powers 
of the augurs are compared to the imperium of magistrates by analysing seven cases of 
obnuntiatio between 59 and 44 BC, and examining Mark Antony’s use of augural obstruction in 
his capacity as augur in 44 BC. The chapter also discusses the collective influence of the augurs 
through the promulgation of decrees and their role during the religious controversies of Caesar’s 
first consulship in 59 BC. The final chapter suggests that these priesthoods were a means of 
social advancement, offering young political hopefuls a productive entrée into élite society. This 
discussion utilises prosopographical data to analyse the extent to which becoming a pontiff or 
augur at the start of a political career increased an incumbents chances of reaching the 
consulship. Following this the chapter considers how these positions provided networking 
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Throughout Roman history, the functions of the state cult were inseparably bound with 
politics, military activity and public life in Rome. Consultation of the auspices, for example, a 
means to discern the will of the gods, was not simply a private affair concerned with the 
conduct of individual Roman citizens, but a public affair intent upon protecting and 
preserving the res publica. Perhaps it should come as no surprise then that membership in the 
two greatest priestly colleges, the pontificate and the augurate, came to be valued as esteemed 
and influential positions in Roman society. Indeed, by the Late Republic, members of the 
nobility went to great lengths to obtain priesthoods for themselves or their sons. Caesar is 
said to have engaged in extensive bribery in his election campaign for the position of pontifex 
maximus in 63 BC, with almost catastrophic consequences (Suet. Iul. 13).
1
 Cicero’s friend P. 
Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57) had his adolescent son adopted into another gens in 
order to circumvent a rule which prohibited two members of the same gens from becoming 
augurs at the same time (Dio Cass. 39.17). Furthermore the novus homo Cicero was 
especially proud of his election to the augurate, regarding the achievement as second only to 
the annus mirabilis of his consulship (Cic. Fam. 15.4.13). Evidently there was considerable 
value in these positions, but what was it that inspired these men to vie so eagerly for priestly 
office? Did such an office confer concrete political advantage upon these ambitious 
aristocrats, or were there other reasons for their pursuit of such offices? These are the 











                                                 
1
 All following dates are BC unless otherwise stated. 
2
 Note a similar question was posed by North (1990c) 524 in conclusion to his paper on the family strategy of 
priesthoods in the Late Republic: ‘To make real sense of any of the transactions discussed in this paper, we need 




i. Approaches to Roman Priesthoods 
Over the past two centuries there has been a great deal of interest and discussion on the 
functions of the pontificate and the augurate in republican Rome from a sociopolitical 
perspective.
3
 However, there does not exist a communis opinio on what motivated men to 
seek out these offices; nor is there a clear understanding of the extent to which these priests 
exerted influence in public affairs. In fact, many scholars have tended to focus on the effect 
that some political controversy of the Late Republic has had on the priests or Roman 
religious practice, as opposed to focussing on how the priests themselves exerted influence. It 
is possible though to broadly discern three schools of thought on the practical value of 





The first approach discussed in chapter one suggests that these offices were in most cases 
either hereditary rights passed down from succeeding generations of the most aristocratic 
Roman families, or prizes awarded by exceptional political figures like Sulla or Caesar.
5
 In 
many ways this approach views priesthoods as exclusive distinctions which complemented, 
rather than defined, a successful political career. Thus the positions could be perceived as 
badges of honour granted to both men of promise and to those who had already achieved 
great success in the world of affairs. In his analysis of late republican politics Sallust 
similarly had reckoned priesthoods as political prizes, not as levers of any significant power 
or influence (Sall. Cat. 21.2; Iug. 31.10).
6
 Many scholars of the twentieth century who 
                                                 
3
 A detailed bibliography of discussions on the pontificate and the augurate would be vast. The major older 
works (dominated by German scholars) which are still of great value are: Marquardt (1881) 3. 234-415; 
Mommsen in RSR I. 104-16, 2. 18-73, 3. 110-11, 1049-62; Bouché-Leclercq (1886) 510-62; Wissowa in RKR 
479-549; Taylor (1942a); Latte in RRG 195-212, 394-411; and Hahm (1963). Discussions on priesthoods of the 
last fifty years include Szemler (1971); (1972); (1974); (1986); Wardman (1982); Scheid (1984); (1985); 
(1993); Beard (1990); North (1990a); (1990c); Orlin (1997); and Rüpke (2007) 20-4, 212-35; (2012) 24-34, 62-
81. Three major prosopographical analyses focussing on priests are Bardt (1871); Szemler (1972); and now 
most recently Rüpke in FS. Two concise and informative introductions to Roman religion are Potter (1999) 
(esp.134-44 with a discussion on priests) and North (2000). 
4
 It must be noted that these three approaches are not clearly defined or set out in the scholarship; they are a 
construct of this thesis to help myself and the reader to understand the existing scholarship on the perceived 
value of these priesthoods. In many cases these three approaches are also not mutually independent; they 
overlap and combine to form a broad understanding of the pontiffs and the augurs. 
5
 Proponents of this view would appear to include Münzer (1920); Syme (1939) 381; Scullard (1973); Hoffman 
Lewis (1955) 10-1, 18-9, 22-3; and Wardman (1982) 19. 
6
 Likewise, Sulla’s increase in the membership of the colleges, listed in Rüpke, FS 1639-1640, could have been 




adopted this view saw these priesthoods in the Late Republic as a tool to embellish ‘party 
positions’ of the aristocracy. In a brief paragraph of Ronald Syme’s influential study on the 
final years of the Roman Republic, The Roman Revolution (1939), priesthoods are dismissed 
as ‘trifles’, ‘favours in the hands of the party dynasts,’ and positions with little scope for 
political influence.
7
 The first chapter will examine this approach closely in relation to the 
introduction, repeal, and re-introduction of the electoral process for priests in the Late 
Republic. This will provide an opportunity to examine membership in the colleges and detail 
the exclusive selection process in place for these priests. In this discussion it will also be 
possible to compare the family nature of these priesthoods with the assertion that political 
patronage could often determine membership. 
 
A second and perhaps more complex approach shared by many scholars suggests that 
members of the pontificate and augurate especially were granted impressive constitutional 
powers to disrupt and influence public affairs in Rome.
8
 Cicero himself in his constitutional 
treatise De Legibus declared that: maximum… et praestantissimum in re publica ius est 
augurum cum auctoritate coniunctum (the greatest and most important authority of the State 
is that of the augurs, who are bestowed with great powers) (Cic. Leg. 2.31). Perhaps 
somewhat misled by Cicero’s remarks, the augurs were especially singled out by many late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars as having an impressive overarching capacity 
to intervene in public affairs. This view has been adapted more recently by the work of John 
Scheid, Mary Beard, and John North, who all moderate this approach to priesthoods by 
situating the functions of priests within a complex hierarchy of religious authority.
9
 These 
latter scholars recognise how difficult it is to deduce what ‘hard powers’ the priests had in 
light of two central interrelated features of Roman priesthood: 1) that there was no separate 
priestly caste in Roman society; membership in the pontificate and augurate was dominated 
by men who had, or more often would go on to have, successful magisterial careers; and 2) 
                                                                                                                                                        
motivated by a desire to allow greater access to these exclusive priesthoods rather than a preoccupation with 
control (cf. similarly Dio Cass. 42.51.3-4; 43.51.9 on Caesar). 
7
 Syme (1939) 381. 
8
 Mommsen in RSR I. 109; Valeton (1891) 94; Warde-Fowler (1901) 305; Greenidge (1901) 172; Wissowa in 
RKR 457-8 (cf. RE XVII. I. 2334); Denniston (1926) 182; Taylor (1949) 83-4; and Liebeschuetz (1979) 13 form 
a large part of this approach to the constitutional powers of priests. Thomas (2005) 225-58 greatly overestimates 
the powers of the pontiffs. Broughton in MRR I. x also remarks that ‘priesthoods were positions of considerable 
political influence.’ 
9
 Or what Orlin (2007) 60 calls ‘a diffusion of religious power.’ See Scheid (1993) 55-84; Beard (1990) esp. 25-




that statesmen (magistrates and the senate) also had their own distinct religious 
responsibilities which they could utilise for the sake of political expediency; for example it 
was magistrates with imperium (vested authority), not the augurs that were required to 




This approach on the constitutional powers of priests will form the basis of chapters two and 
three of this project. Chapter two will focus on the political influence of the pontiffs during 
the most well-documented and studied incident involving the pontifical college in the Late 
Republic: the dedication of a shrine to Liberty on the site of Cicero’s house in 58 and 
resulting pontifical inquiry in 57. This analysis will first assess the influence of the individual 
pontiff that presided over the dedication ceremony, L. Pinarius Natta (FS 2711).
11
 Given that 
Natta was young and not yet a senator, his case will offer a rare opportunity to examine the 
distinct functions and powers of an individual pontiff, and compare his role to the magistrate 
that orchestrated the dedication, P. Clodius Pulcher (tr. pl. 58). The second section will 
examine the collective role of the pontifical college and the influence of their decretum which 
recommended to the senate the removal of the shrine. This again will provide a unique 
opportunity to isolate the role of the pontiffs from the role of the senate whilst comparing 
their influence.  
 
Chapter three will focus on the political powers of the augurs, but given the greater breadth of 
ancient evidence on the auspices, will not be confined to one case study. This discussion will 
first explore the function and importance of the auspices in public affairs, establishing clearly 
the different roles of the magistrates and the augurs. The discussion will then take a similar 
                                                 
10
 Mommsen (1887) II. 18-73 perceptively noted in relation to the pontificate that the religious functions of 
magistrates and priests were distinct, even though these offices were often held by the same individuals. 
Mommsen’s work has been advanced by Scheid (1984); (1985) 36-57, 66-74; and (1993), who undertook a 
comprehensive study of priestly and magisterial power. He argued that the functions of priests and magistrates 
were mutually interdependent in the Roman political order, but at the same time, profoundly separate. Like 
Mommsen and Scheid, I believe that priests performed distinct tasks and worked within a republican 
constitution that systematically divided their powers from the religious roles of magistrates and senators. This 
approach will enable a comparison of the influence held by members of the pontificate and the augurate to the 
constitutional powers of magistrates and the senate (another focus of this project). However, it is also possible 
that on occasion priestly status and magisterial influence could be combined (see discussion on pg. 44-5 in 
relation to the pontiffs; and pg. 68-76 in relation to the augurs). See North (1986) 257-8; and Beard (1990) 25-
30 for a discussion on some of the problems in Scheid’s work. 
11
 Throughout this work the abbreviation FS will denote the priest number (not page number) in Rüpke’s 





approach to the analysis of the pontiffs, assessing the influence of individual augurs and the 
collective augurate separately. Through close examination of multiple case studies where 
individuals utilised the obstructive force of the auspices for political gain, it will be possible 
to compare the influence of the augurs to the imperium of magistrates. Like the pontificate, 
the augurate on occasion could also be summoned by the senate and asked to issue a decree 
in order to help resolve some religious controversy that related to their field of expertise. This 
collective role of the augurate is less clearly defined by the ancient evidence, as there is very 
little commentary on what few augural decrees of the Late Republic are preserved in the 
ancient evidence. Therefore this section will also examine the role of the augurs during the 
controversial abuse and flagrant disregard of the auspices in 59, the year of Caesar’s 
consulship. 
 
The third and final theoretical approach suggests that membership in the pontificate and the 
augurate was an accepted means of social advancement, which facilitated a kind of ‘soft’ 
political influence. This approach has developed out of the prosopographical studies of David 
E. Hahm and Georg Szemler, which both indicated that priests tended to be co-opted (or 
elected) at a young age, and had an increased chance of reaching a higher magistracy.
12
 The 
fact that a large majority of the augurs and pontiffs received their priesthoods early in life, 
before they had achieved any great distinction for themselves, indicates that these positions 
were not normally regarded as an honour or reward for outstanding public service. Rather, 
since new priests were usually young men about to embark on a career, it may be inferred 
that a priestly office was considered primarily a means of assistance for political 
advancement. And yet, the precise ways in which these men accrued political support and 
influence through membership in a priestly college remain relatively unexplored. Therefore 
chapter four of this thesis examines Hahm’s claim that these priesthoods may well have been 
a form of political patronage, in which a new priest was bound to friendship with men already 
in the college.
13
 According to Hahm, in exchange for the support of fellow-priests in the 
comitia and on the senate floor, a new priest might expect backing when his own turn came to 
run for office. With some of the most influential men of the Roman nobility supporting him, a 
newcomer to a priestly college could have utilised his position as priest to boost his chances 
of having a successful political career. Thus this chapter will explore the possibility that 
                                                 
12
 Hahm (1963) 73-85; and Szemler (1972). 
13
 Hahm (1963) 82-3; in n. 30 Hahm also demonstrates how the results of these friendships can be seen in the 




priesthoods operated as training grounds for prospective consuls, providing young men with 
an opportunity to establish their own public profile and perhaps most importantly to cultivate 




This project aims to encompass a vast and expansive study of the pontificate and the augurate 
throughout the Roman Republic; however, clear boundaries need to be set. As has already 
become clear, this thesis focuses on the role and membership of the two major priestly 
colleges in late republican Rome, the pontiffs and the augurs. The ancient sources attest to the 
existence of quattuor amplissima collegi (Suet. Aug. 100). The pontiffs and the augurs were 
the two most significant priestly colleges, followed by the quindecemviri sacris faciundis and 
the tresviri (later septemviri) epulones. The epulones, which were formed in 196 to help the 
pontiffs perform the increasing number of cult-oriented ceremonial duties (Livy 23.42), were 
not positions of any considerable influence when compared to the other colleges.
14
 However, 
the quindecemviri (originally duumviri, later decemviri) sacris faciundis had the major duty 
of guarding and interpreting of the Sybilline oracles, which were consulted by the senate at 
times of great danger to the State (Cic. Div. 1. 2, 4; 2.11, 12; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.62).
15
 
There are two main reasons for their exclusion in this study. Firstly, the pontificate and the 
augurate are comparably better documented in the ancient evidence and hence more 
commonly discussed by modern scholars. Secondly, due to a lack of ancient evidence, 
membership in the quindecemviri throughout the Republic is more difficult to reconstruct. 
This makes it harder to examine patterns in membership or specific ways in which individual 









                                                 
14
 RRG 251; and Szemler (1971) 112-3 provide some brief discussion on the role of the epulones. 
15





     
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY AND POLITICAL PATRONAGE  




Et, quoniam Nepos proficiscitur, cuinam auguratus deferatur, quo quidem uno 
ego ab istis capi possum – vide levitatem meam! 
 
And, since Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos [close relative of the deceased augur 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer] is leaving Rome, who is being granted the vacant 
position in the augurate? That’s the one bait they [the triumvirs] might catch 
me with – you see how irresponsible I am! 
Cic. Att. 2.5.2. 
 
The above letter from Cicero to Atticus manages to neatly capture two important aspects 
regarding the pursuit of membership in a priestly college. First, it stresses the expectation that 
priesthoods tended to be kept in the family, that the sensible choice to replace Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Celer (cos. 60) (FS 980) as augur in 59 would have been his close relative, Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Nepos (cos. 58).
16
 Two eminent scholars of the twentieth century, 
Friedrich Münzer and H. H. Scullard, both worked under the assumption that throughout 
much of the republican period, priestly offices were controlled by a narrow hereditary 
oligarchy which rarely admitted new families to its ranks; thus priesthoods (even more so 
than political offices) came to be viewed as heritable rights, usually allocated to the sons, 
grandsons, and great-grandsons of former priests.
17
 Prosopographical studies certainly 
                                                 
16
 Shackleton Bailey (1976) 19-20 suggested that the deceased Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer was son by birth of 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos (cos. 98) and adopted by L. Caecilius Metellus Celer (tr. pl. 90), perhaps making 
him the adopted brother of the Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos (cos. 58) mentioned in Cicero’s letter. 
17
 Münzer (1920) and Scullard (1973). For more on this traditional hereditary approach towards priesthoods, see 
Bardt (1871) 37: ‘vor allen Dingen aber vornehme Geburt eröffneten den Zutritt zu den erlauchten 




support this family dynamic to an extent; however, this approach is complicated by another 
important factor: political patronage.
18
 Cicero also suggested in the above letter to Atticus 
that he might be won over by the triumvirs in exchange for membership in the augurate. 
Although this comment was not meant to be taken seriously, Cicero exposes the kind of 
skulduggery that could go on behind the scenes when priests were vying for office, especially 
during the Late Republic when the pontiffs and augurs were elected.
19
 The patronage of Sulla 
and Caesar became an important factor in the pursuit of membership in these colleges during 
their respective tenures as dictators, as the two started granting priesthoods as a means to 
reward their most loyal supporters. Another factor that disrupted the family succession of 
priesthoods was the unpredictability of the election process. Sacerdotal elections were in 
place between 104 and 81, then reinstated between 63 and 48, and naturally had the potential 
to disrupt the monopoly held by select families in the priestly colleges.  Developing out of the 
exclusive selection process for priests has emerged a traditional school of thought that 
suggested these offices were baubles of power, valued by the political élite in the competition 




This chapter will examine the extent to which positions in the pontificate and the augurate 
were either a family right, or granted as prizes by leading members of the political order. For 
much of the republican period a select few powerful aristocratic families retained these 
offices, passing them down from one generation to the next. These prominent Roman 
families must have held onto these offices for good reason, seeing value in preserving their 
control over the great colleges. However, this power balance came under threat during the 
Late Republic when a series of innovations changed how priests were selected. First this 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘sons often sought the places made vacant by the death of their fathers’; Taylor (1949) 3, 32: ‘The other great 
distinction of Rome, coveted by all the high nobility and limited almost exclusively to them, was membership in 
the great colleges of priests… men of the most distinguished houses were apt to be chosen when they were very 
young’; Gelzer (1969) 35, 50-2; and Scullard (1973) 11: ‘…unennobled families seldom climbed to highest 
office.’ These scholars are often very careful to avoid making any absolute conclusions on this family dynamic, 
since they tend to acknowledge that exceptions to this principle did exist; however, they often fail to find an 
acceptable balance between those with family connections to priestly office and those without. For by far the 
best modern treatment on the family strategy of membership in priestly colleges during the Late Republic, see 
North (1990c) 527-43. 
18
 Syme (1939) 382 claimed that admission of priests to the various colleges, whether they were co-opted or 
elected by the people, was based on their privileges of birth, influence, but especially patronage from leading 
political figures; cf. Wiseman (1971) 170. 
19
 Taylor (1949) 93, goes so far as to assert that the triumvirs were more successful in bringing their candidates 
for priesthoods to victory than they were in the contests for the consulship. 
20




section will discuss how mos maiorum regulated the distribution of priesthoods for much of 
the republican era through a co-optation process. This will include an analysis of the custom 
that appears to have become law sometime during the Late Republic, a practise which 
forbade two members of the same gens holding the same priestly office at the same time. 
Following this there will be an analysis of the lex Domitia which in 104 transferred to a 
special assembly of the people the right to elect new members to the pontificate and the 
augurate (Cic. Leg. agr. 2.18-9; Suet. Ner. 2.1).
21
 This discussion will explore the possible 
motives for the introduction of an electoral process, and attempt to establish why membership 
in a priestly college mattered so much to the law’s architect, the populist Cn. Domitius 
Ahenobarbus (cos. 96) (FS 1475). With the unpredictability of the election process also came 
the potential to disrupt the monopoly held by the select few families in priestly colleges. Thus 
this section will also review the extent to which the measure made priesthoods more 
accessible, especially for those candidates without family ties to priesthoods. Following this 
there will be a similar discussion on the effect of Sulla’s temporary repeal of the lex Domitia 
in 81, which lasted until its reintroduction in 63 with the lex Labiena. To conclude, this 
section will address the extent to which these priesthoods were mere baubles of power, 
valued for the political edge they gave in the highly competitive family and party politics of 
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1.2.  Co-optation: A ‘Pre-Republican’ System 
In the Early Republic, whilst the choice of magistrates was rapidly subjected to strict control 
and procedures after the expulsion of the kings, the exclusive selection process for priests 
preserved a system of recruitment which one might be tempted to call ‘pre-republican’.
22
  
Moreover, the fact that initially these offices were exclusively held by patricians, and then 
equally divided between patricians and plebeians following the lex Ogulnia in 300, 
perpetuated a system that ensured family connections would always matter (Livy 10.6.6-7). 
Until 104, the augurs and pontiffs (as well as presumably the decemviri sacris faciundis and 
epulones) were elected by co-optation from within the colleges themselves, and therefore 
became self-perpetuating entities with complete control over membership. This process of co-
optation operated without external control, and was also never subject to the same age 
restrictions which regulated access to magistracy.
23
 Although we cannot be certain, 
candidates probably required a majority vote from the priests that made up the college.
24
 The 
co-optation would also likely have occurred as soon as practically possible following the 
death of a serving priest, since these posts were held for life (Plut. Quaest. Rom. 99).
25
 Cicero 
also reminisced in a letter to his fellow augur Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54) (FS 1226), with 
whom he had recently been publically reconciled, that it was not customary in antiquity for 
augurs to co-opt a member qui cuiquam ex collegio esset inimicus (who was a personal 
enemy of anyone from the college) (Cic. Fam. 3.10.9). This procedure effectively allowed 
existing members of the college to blackball candidates; however the custom was likely 
abolished by 104 with the introduction of the sacerdotal elections.
26
 It is not difficult to 
imagine how these religious offices became exclusive clubs, maintaining the solidarity of 
amicitia between members. Such a system was also clearly exploited by some families to 
ensure that one gens retained continual membership in the great colleges; for example the 
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 On the recruitment process for priests in general, see RSR II. 24-36, where the ancient evidence is cited in full. 
For the best accounts of the co-optation process in English, see Taylor (1942a) 387-8; Szemler (1972) 28-31; 
Beard (1994) 745-8; and Scheid (1993) 62-4. 
23
 Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (cos. 177, 163) (FS 3009) was only admodum adulescens (very young) when 
elected augur in 204 (Livy 29.38.7) and his son of the same name (tr. pl. 133) (FS 3011) was co-opted ἐκ 
παίδων γενόμενος (out of boyhood) (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 4.1). 
24
 Taylor (1942a) 387, based on RSR II. 24-6. 
25
 Cic. Orat. 127 seems to imply that when a priest was condemned in a public criminal court, he automatically 
lost his priestly status. However, Plut. Quaest. Rom. 99 notes in the case of the augurs (and fratres arvales) that 
even after prosecution and exile, their priestly competence remained until death. 
26




Caecilii Metelli, Mucii Scaevolae, Servilii Vatiae (Isaurici) and Sulpicii Galbae repeatedly 





Priest lists of the Middle Republic indicate that leading aristocratic families distributed 
membership in priestly colleges amongst themselves relatively well, preventing one gens 
from accumulating multiple places at the same time in a particular college.
28
 This distribution 
of priesthoods may well be linked to a νόμος (law) attested by Cassius Dio, which expressly 
forbade two men of the same συγγένεια (gens) from holding the same ἱερατεία (priesthood) at 
the same time (Dio Cass. 39.17).
29
  Such a law certainly appears to have existed in 57 and 
restricted membership to the augurate: according to Dio the regulation would have prevented 
P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (quaest. 44) (FS 1354), son of the pontiff of the same name 
(cos. 57) (FS 1353), from becoming an augur. Another Cornelii, the son of Sulla C. (Faustus) 
Cornelius Sulla Felix (quaest. 54) (FS 1388), was already an augur, thus Spinther’s son was 
adopted into the plebeian gens of Manlius Torquatus in order to circumvent this law: καὶ 
οὕτως ὁ νόμος ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ῥήμασι μείνας ἔργῳ κατελύθη (thus, although the letter of the 
law was observed, its spirit was broken) (Dio Cass. 39.17). However, it is not clear when this 
law was carried, the extent to which it had a binding statutory nature, or whether it applied to 
all major priestly colleges as Dio suggests.  
 
Ancient evidence indicates where two gentiles did hold positions simultaneously during the 
Middle Republic, these instances were usually in the pontificate, not the augurate.
30
 This 
                                                 
27
 On the Caecilii Metelli’s affinity with priesthoods, see Shackleton Bailey (1976) 19-20; see also the family 
tree in Hölkeskamp (2010) 109; and for a discussion of the augural symbols on the coinage of Caecilii Metelli, 
see Taylor (1944) 352-56. On the active role in priesthoods played by the Mucii Scaevolae, see Cancik (1991) 
413; on the Servilii Vatiae (Isaurici), see Rüpke (2008) 891-3; and on the Sulpicii Galbae, see Rüpke (2008) 
908-11. 
28
 A well preserved snapshot of membership in the augural college of 217 demonstrate this point. See MRR I. 
245-6, 252-3, 283 and Rüpke (2008) 80-1 on the priest list of 217. Scullard (1973) 49-50, n.6; Gruen (1978) 61-
74, esp. 72, n. 38, 40 provide some compelling discussion on the political agenda of the augurate during 
controversial consular elections of 216. 
29
 For discussions of the law see Rüpke (2008) 883, n.2, who does well to briefly survey modern discussion of 
Dio’s rule, and Drummond (2008) 367-407, who provides the most comprehensive overview of the ancient 
evidence and modern discussions of the law. 
30
 There are three clear instances in the third and second centuries of two members of the same gens overlapping 
in tenure as pontiffs: 1) M. Cornelius Cethegus (cos. 204) (FS 1317) was co-opted pontiff in 213 (Livy 25.2.2) 
whilst Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus (cos. 176) (FS 1377) was co-opted in 199 (Livy 32.7.15); Cethegus did 




trend caused the pioneering seventeenth century cardinal Enrico Noris to originally speculate 
that Dio’s law applied only to the augurs, a theory that was transformed by Theodore 
Mommsen into an established rule.
31
 Based on his view that the early republican Roman state 
consisted of a community of gentes, and that religious fraternities like the augurate originated 
as gentilician cult associations, Mommsen suggested that Dio’s law was of considerable 
antiquity.
32
 Livy’s remarks on the early formation of the augurate certainly appear to 
corroborate this gens dynamic, since he indicated that the number of augurs was bound to 
consist of threes ut tres antiquae tribus, Ramnes, Titienses, Luceres, suum quaeque augurem 
habeant aut (so that the three ancient tribes, the Ramnes, Titienses, and Luceres, might each 
have their own augur) (Livy 10.6.7-8). However, the more recent work of John North has 
taken the crucial step of challenging the Noris-Mommsen hypothesis, rightly emphasising 
that there is nothing in Dio’s account to suggest that the rule was restricted to the augurate 
alone.
33
 Furthermore, such a rule for the augurs alone would not explain the tendency for 
priesthoods in general to be relatively well distributed between the ruling élite. Given the 
invariable case examples for members of the same gens holding a place in the same college 
before 104, North also argues that Dio’s νόμος was a likely provision first introduced through 
the lex Domitia, which was also temporarily repealed by Sulla in 81.
34
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(FS 3056) was co-opted pontiff in 213 (Livy 25.2.2) whilst his cousin C. Servilius Geminus (cos. 203) (FS 
3066), whom he served alongside as consul, was co-opted in 210 (Livy 27.6.15). However, the former was a 
patrician, whilst the latter was from a plebeian branch of the family. This raises the issue of whether both 
families could be deemed to belong to the same gens: see Bardt (1871) 34-6, Szemler (1972) 105, 108-9, and 
Drummond (2008) 372-3 on the problem. And 3) Ser. Sulpicius Galba (cur. aed. 209) (FS 3188) was co-opted 
pontiff in 203 (Livy 30.26.10) whilst an otherwise unknown C. Sulpicius Galba (FS 3183) was co-opted in 202 
(Livy 30.39.6). Both died in 199 (Livy 32.7.15).  
31
 Noris (1681) 167-9; Mommsen (1864-79) I. 80-90 (although without acknowledgement to Noris’ earlier 
work); see also Badian (1968) 26-46; (1969) 201. Mommsen (1864-79) I. 83-4, n. 25 noted one instance in 
Livy’s text where two Sempronii appear to have been augurs at the same time: Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (cos. 
177, 163) (FS 3009) became augur in 204 (Livy 29.38.7), whilst Ti. Sempronius Longus (cos. 194) (FS 3014) 
had already been co-opted as augur and decimvir in 210 (Livy 27.6.15). However, in 174 Livy reports the deaths 
of both Gracchus (calling him an augur) and Longus (only calling him a decimvir, not an augur) (Livy 41.21.8-
9). See Badian (1968); Szemler (1972) 137-8; and North (1990c) 530-531, n. 9, on attempts to resolve this 
identification problem. Mommsen tentatively suggested that Livy was mistaken, and that it was actually the 
dictator M. Cladius Marcellus (FS 1206) (not Ti. Sempronius Longus) who replaced T. Otacilius Crassus (FS 
2594) as augur in 210. For a convincing defense of Livy’s account, see Drummond (2008) 368-7; followed also 
by Rüpke (2008) 616, 883, n.2.  
32
 Mommsen (1864-79) I. 80-90. 
33
 North (1990c) 528-31; accepted by Rüpke (2008) 645, n.4 (but ignored at 883, n.2). 
34
 North (1990c) 530-1: this would perhaps explain the three clear cases of priests from the same gens holding 
office at the same time between 81 and 63: 1) the pontiffs Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69) (FS 981) and 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica (cos. 52) (FS 986) (it is also likely that Creticus overlapped in tenure 





The theory of North is compelling, however, it fails to address why we so infrequently see 
two members of the same gens becoming priests in one college at the same time throughout 
much of republican history. Thus it would be reasonable to propose that originally, around 
the time both the augurate and pontificate were formed, there existed an unwritten rule that 
formed part of mos which prevented more than one gentile from becoming priests in the same 
college. Given the flexible nature of mos, such a custom would explain why exceptions 
existed. From their early formation, these colleges were always to some extent intent upon 
distributing priestly authority amongst the upper-most echelons of the ruling élite, as opposed 
to centralising such authority in the hands of one family alone; such was the nature of the 
Roman oligarchical system. Such a principle seems more likely when we consider how 
commonplace it was for fathers in one college to have their sons co-opted into a different 
college.
35
 Had such a rule not existed then would it not have been easier for a father to have a 
son co-opted into the same college during his lifetime, since he would have been able to 
nominate him?
36
 This custom could then have later inspired the established and inflexible law 
mentioned by Cassius Dio that had to be abided to in 57.
37
 This approach therefore suggests 
that the general rule and Dio’s law were separate but related regulations, the former a general 
rule that was usually respected, and the latter a binding statute that certainly applied to the 
augurate, and may have even replaced the more general rule.
38
  
                                                                                                                                                        
pontiffs M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 46) (FS 508) and M. Aemilius Scaurus (pr. 56) (FS 528); and 3) the augurs 
C. Claudius Marcellus (pr. 80) (FS 1204) and Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54) (FS 1227), however, once again, 
since the former was a plebeian, whilst the latter was a patrician, the extent to which they belonged to the same 
gens is arguable: see Drummond (2008) 372-3. North (1990c) 540, n. 26 argues that these men would have 
likely been co-opted under Sulla’s expansion of the college, at a time when the rules on co-optation were 
considerably relaxed. 
35
 A pattern noted (but not explored in any detail) by North (1990c) 533-4; cf. Hahm (1963) 37. 
36
 Only once does the ancient evidence indicate that a father and son could have been members in a college at 
the same time: P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum (cos. 162, 155) (FS 1379) was pontifex maximus from 
about 150 (Cic. Sen. 50), whilst his son P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio (cos. 138) (FS 1380) was certainly 
pontiff maximus by 133 when leading opposition against Ti. Gracchus. North (1990c) 533-4, n. 16 therefore 
figures that Serapio was probably co-opted into the pontificate during the lifetime of his father Corculum. 
However, Rüpke (2008) 643 suggests that it is much more plausible to assume the son was co-opted in place of 
his father in direct succession then immediately elected pontifex maximus; co-optation during his father’s 
lifetime into the same college would have been quite exceptional. 
37
 North (1990c) 530-1 argues that Dio’s νόμος was a provision first introduced through the lex Domitia of 104. 
Drummond (2008) 367-407 suggests Dio’s law was first carried not long before 57 (perhaps in conjunction with 
Labienus’ bill restoring the election of priests in 63). However, his conclusion speculatively relies on the dating 
of Sulla’s augurate. 
38
 North (1990c) 527-43; Drummond (2008) 367-408; at 405, Drummond appears not to be against the idea that 




1.3.  Ancestry and Political Patronage: modes of priestly recruitment 
 
 
1.3.1. The lex Domitia of 104 
Atavus eius [sc. Nero] Cn. Domitius in tribunatu pontificibus offensior, quod 
alium quam se in patris sui locum cooptassent, ius sacerdotum 
subrogandorum a collegis ad populum transtulit. 
 
Nero’s great-great-great grandfather, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, while 
tribune of the people, was enraged at the pontiffs for co-opting someone other 
than himself in his father’s place to the pontifical college; and so he 
transferred the right of filling vacancies in the priesthoods from the colleges 
themselves to the people. 
  Suet. Ner. 2.1.  
 
The old co-optation process for priests was first formally challenged (as far as we know) in 
145 by the people’s tribune and plebeian-populist C. Licinius Crassus (tr. pl. 145). 
Unfortunately very little is known about the initiative, which appeared to propose the 
involvement of the people in electing sacerdotes (although which priesthoods are not 
specified).
39
 However, the praetor and close friend of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus 
Aemilianus (cos. I 147), C. Laelius (also probably an augur: FS 2164) successfully opposed 
the initiative. Thus it was not until 104, when the tribune Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 
96) (FS 1475) sponsored a similar law, that the right to elect new members to the pontificate 
and the augurate was transferred to a special assembly of the people: cooptatio… collegiorum 
ad populi beneficium transferebatur (co-optation into the priestly colleges was transferred to 
the control of the populace) (Cic. Amic. 96).
40
 This election process would replicate the one 
                                                                                                                                                        
own partisan interest by their (repeated) co-option of gentiles of existing members. However, he does not 
speculate any further on the possibility of a general rule pre-dating Dio’s law. 
39
 Cicero provides the only primary evidence on the proposal: Cic. Amic. 96; Brut. 83; Nat. D. 3.5. No detailed 
modern analysis of the law exists but Rüpke (2012) 118-9 attempts to determine what motivated the proposal. 
40
 The best modern discussions of the law include: Linderski (1972) 191-3; North (1986); Rüpke (2012) 118-23; 
and Drummond (2008). Mercklin (1848) 136-7 originally inferred from Cic. Leg. agr. 2.18-19 (quite 
reasonably) that the other two great priestly colleges (quindecimviri sacris faciundis and epulones) were also 
included under the law. That the quindecimviri were elected by 51 is clear (Cic. Fam. 8.4.1), but beyond that 




already in place for electing the pontifex maximus, who was selected by a special assembly of 




Despite the lex Domitia introducing popular participation in the appointment of priests, 
Domitius’ reform was careful to ensure existing members retained some control over 
membership. His law granted to existing members of a college the exclusive right to 
nominate those candidates who would run in the elections.
42
 Members of a college would 
offer ‘nominations’ by issuing proclamations in contione, and under oath would name 
candidates they judged worthy of religious office (Rhet. Her. 1.20; Cic. Brut. 1; cf. Suet. 
Claud. 22).
43
 Domitius probably also put in place measures to ensure that more than one 
candidate was nominated for a vacancy.
44
 These restrictions are perhaps best attested by 
Cicero’s (FS 3290) account of his own candidature as augur in 53, when the augurs Cn. 
Pompeius Magnus (FS 2756) and Q. Hortensius Hortalus (cos. 69) (FS 1914) nominated him 
for the office, allowing him to run in the comitia sacerdotum of 52 (Cic. Phil. 2.4; cf. Brut. 
1). According to Cicero, each individual priest could nominate only one candidate, and no 
candidate could have more than two nominations at any one time; this meant that between 
104 and 81 when all nine members made their nominations, there could be anywhere between 
five and nine candidates running in an election.
45
 And whilst the old system of cooptatio 
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 The three candidates for the prized semi-magisterial office of pontifex maximus were still chosen by the 
pontiffs though, and the candidates were already pontiffs themselves. This allowed the priests to exercise a great 
deal of control in the election of the chief pontiff, whilst giving the impression of relinquishing control. This 
process is attested by our earliest record of the election process, where P. Licinius Crassus (FS 2235) was 
elected chief of the pontiffs in 212 (Livy 25.5.2-4; cf. 25.2.1). For a full list of ancient evidence on the election 
process of the pontifex maximus, see RSR II. 27-34; and Taylor (1942b) 421-4.   
42
 As North (1990c) 536 observes, it would be going too far to say that the bill recommended itself to 
conservatives, but at least it made some concessions to them.  
43
 Mommsen in RSR II. 30 also concluded from Rhet. Her. 1.20 that every priest was required to make a 
nomination, although this can surely only have applied to those priests who were able to make the public 
meeting. For example, if a priest was acting as governor overseas or on a military campaign there may have 
been no way to nominate a candidate in absentia. 
44
 Drummond (2008) 374, n. 36 points out a previously unnoticed difficulty concerning the election of the 
epulones (if these priests were included in the law). Since it is presumed there were only three of these priests at 
the time of the lex Domitia, the two surviving epulones could simply nominate the same individual for any one 
vacancy, and circumvent the whole electoral procedure. 
45
 Drummond (2008) 379-80 (wisely) estimates that the provisions in operation at the time of Cicero’s 
candidature were probably originally imposed by the lex Domitia in 104. These rules were obviously necessary 
devices put in place to prevent the colleges from agreeing on a single candidate in advance, making the elections 
a one-horse race and frustrating the purpose of the bill. Drummond further speculates that it would be little 
surprise (there is, of course, no evidence) if Domitius introduced restrictions on nominators, so that close kin 




probably saw vacancies filled as soon as possible, the comitia sacerdotum took place between 
the consular and praetorian comitia (between July and September) (Cic. Ad Brut. 1.5.4; Fam. 




The first priest to be chosen under the new election procedure was none other than its 
architect, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 96) (FS 1475), who was probably elected pontiff 
within a few months of the reform.
47
 The surviving ancient sources offer various 
interpretations of this measure. Suetonius stressed the personal motives of Domitius, 
suggesting that he was primarily motivated by a desire to attain his deceased father’s (FS 
1474) place in the pontificate, and his sense of grievance at being rejected by members in the 
college (Suet. Ner. 2.1).
48
 The suggestion that Domitius was prepared to go to such lengths in 
the pursuit of a priestly office also demonstrates the importance and the prized nature of these 
positions. There is an irony to Domitus’ election though. On the one hand, his law had the 
capacity to disrupt the monopoly held by certain families in priesthoods, ending the complete 
control of membership by those select few families already in the colleges. The 
unpredictability of the elections would potentially frustrate candidates from securing a 
vacancy created by the death of an ancestor or relative. However, Domitius himself 
descended from a household with strong ties to the pontificate, since both his father (cos. 
122) (FS 1474) and grandfather (suff. cos. 162) (FS 1476) had served as pontiffs before him 
in succession.
49
 Therefore, his own election as pontiff (indeed, perhaps his very reasoning 
behind the reformation of the recruitment process) was in part facilitated by his claim to the 
pontificate as an ancestral right. And so in order to promote nepotism, Domitius introduced 
democratic process. This sentiment that priesthoods were hereditary would also be preserved 
by the Roman electorate, which, as we will see in the following section, still tended to favour 
candidates with family ties to priestly authority. 
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 On the probable timing of the comitia sacerdotum, see Linderski (1972) 192-3. 
47
 Just one year later in 103 Domitius was also spectacularly elected pontifex maximus (Livy Per. 67).  
48
 Whilst Suet. Ner. 2.1 suggests that the college Domitius was rejected by was the pontificate, Asc. 21C instead 
suggests that the college was the augurate; hence the resulting diatribe against the augur M. Aemilius Scaurus 
(cos. 115) (FS 527) on religious grounds (Cic. Deiot. 31). See Rüpke (2008) 518, n. 8 for a review of 
scholarship on the problem; cf. Szemler (1972) 34; Rawson (1974) 208; Scheid (1981) 124-5, 168-71. Keaveney 
(1982) 152-3 argues that there is no need to identify one event with the other and I would be inclined to agree. 
Although Domitius was eventually elected pontiff thanks to his own law, and later elected pontifex maximus 
(Livy Per. 67; Val. Max. 6.5.5), this does not necessarily rule out Asconius’ version that he was first rejected by 
the augurate. He could have pursued the vacant augurate during the lifetime of his father, a strategy that was not 
unusual in the Late Republic, then on his father’s death sought the vacant position in the pontificate. 
49




1.3.2. The motives of the lex Domitia: populist shift or personal vendetta? 
John Scheid and Mary Beard both suggest that Domitius’ introduction of elections for places 
in the pontificate and the augurate was a successful assertion of popular control over religion 
and state offices in opposition to the dominance of the traditional élite.
50
 These scholars 
suggest that there must have been enough widespread public dissatisfaction with the existing 
system for the populist Domitius to incite the people to approve his measure. Jörg Rüpke 
proposes that the reform stemmed from polarisation between the optimates and the 
populares, which had arisen in the Gracchan period.
51
 Rüpke argues that a majority of 
pontiffs and augurs already in the colleges before Domitius’ reform were in the optimates 
camp, and so voted against the populist Domitius at the decisive moment when he was 
campaigning for priestly office. Thus Domitius may not have simply been concerned with 
saving face by recovering his father’s vacant place in the pontificate, but could also have 
been fighting for the hopes of future popularis politicians to obtain the benefits of these 
priesthoods. In retrospect, the lex Domitia had the potential to represent a fairly revolutionary 
shift. It is quite striking that in the years leading up to the lex Labiena of 63 (which re-
instated the lex Domitia) Cicero refers twice to the lex Domitia in contexts which suggest 
both that the bill was a popular cause, and that it may have even won support from within the 
political élite itself (Cic. Corn. 2.5-6; Leg. agr. 2.18-19). Nevertheless, despite the bill 
earning Domitius a great deal of public support, the limited popular control over membership 
did not result in a significant number of populist politicians attaining a priesthood, as 
suggested by the results of the elections between 104 and 81. 
 
Unfortunately, the priest lists from 104 to 81 are incomplete (and the dating for those we do 
have is not clear), making it difficult to draw any firm conclusions on the extent to which this 
new method for selecting priests may have disrupted the family nature of these offices or the 
struggle between optimates and populares. Of the five augurs and five pontiffs suspected of 
being elected under the lex Domitia between 104 and 81 (not including Domitius himself), 
half appear to have been from families which could be deemed as newcomers to priestly 
office: the augurs C. Marius (cos. I, 107) (FS 2389), M. Antonius (cos. 99) (FS 668) and L. 
Marcius Philippus (cos. 91) (FS 2381);
52
 and two pontiffs: M. Livius Drusus (tr. pl. 91) (FS 
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 Scheid (1993) 63; and Beard (1994) 746-7.  
51
 Rüpke (2012) 120-22. 
52
 Rüpke (2008) 112-7; the remaining two augurs with family connections were 1) L.Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes 




2271) and perhaps Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78) (FS 2308) (although he was a nephew to 
Domitius).
53
 Marius presents himself as a fairly exceptional priest: he was a novus homo 
elected in absentia but only after already having served as consul six times (Cic. Ad Brut. 
1.5.3). Thus he was co-opted in the twilight of his career, evidently as a reward for his 
distinguished service on behalf of the res publica; this basis for membership in a priestly 
college was certainly quite unusual.
54
 Antonius was also probably elected augur at the height 
of his career, after his consulship in 99. The other three newcomers to priestly office, 
Philippus, Livius and Catulus are estimated to have been elected in the context of their early 
magisterial careers (probably before they reached the praetorship), and so may have been 
reliant on their politically active fathers to secure their early nominations.
55
 Despite these 
men having no clear ancestral claim to priestly office though, the same pre-eminence and 
aristocratic criteria were expected as prerequisites for membership; old habits die hard. 
Existing priests also still retained limited control over membership in the colleges through 
their nominations. The political sentiment of these priests also appears to indicate that the 
populares made some more considerable gains in the augurate, with three out of the five 
augurs elected being three high-profile populist political figures: Marius, Philippus, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
(FS 2007), who had no known antecedents in the pontificate or augurate but belonged to a gens with 
longstanding ties to minor priesthoods. Asiagenes’ successor C. Cornelius Sulla (cos. 88, 82-79) (FS 1390) 
could also have been elected prior to departing in 88 in his military campaign against Mithridates, although this 
depends on whether he was elected to the office before becoming dictator, or proclaimed himself augur as 
dictator. I would lean towards the suggestion of Rüpke (2008) 645, n.1 that the priestly office which Sulla 
reclaimed on his return to Rome (Ap. B.C. 1.79) was the decemvirate, and that he made himself augur in light of 
his expansion of the colleges and reversal of the lex Domitia in 81 (as proposed by North (1990c) 540); cf. 
Badian (1968) 38. Contra Mommsen (1860) 593, 596, n. 386; Bardt (1871) 23; and Drummond (2008) 386-401, 
who all suggest that Sulla was already an augur before his return to Rome. 
53
 Rüpke (2008) 112-7; the remaining three pontiffs with family connections to priestly office were 1) C. Iulius 
Caesar Strabo (aed. 90) (FS 2013); 2) P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cos. 79) (FS 3072), whose filiation identifies 
him as the son of the augur C. Servilius Vatia (FS 3071), thus he is perhaps grandson to both the pontiff M. 
Servilius (trib. mil. 181) (FS 3053) and the augur Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus (cos. 143) (FS 983) (see 
family tree in Crawford (1974) 270); and 3) Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80) (FS 985), son of the augur Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Numidicus (cos. 109) (FS 984). Both the Servilii Vatiae (Isaurici) and Caecilii Metelli had 
strong ties to priestly authority. 
54
 The only other recorded instance of a novus homo being elected to one of the four major priestly colleges was 
Cicero, elected augur in 53 or 52 (see discussion on pgs. 47, 116. 121.). 
55
 The father of Livius had an outstandingly favourable position amongst the nobility (Plut. C. Gracch. 8.4); 
whilst Catulus was probably co-opted in the lifetime of his influential father, the consul of 102 who became a 






 Perhaps positions in the augurate were favoured more by the populists, given the 




1.3.3. The lex Cornelia of 81: Sulla’s expansion of the colleges and reversal of the lex 
Domitia 
 
Legibus novis rei pub. statum confirmavit, tribunorum pleb. potestatem minuit 
et omne ius legum ferendarum ademit, pontificum augurumque collegium 
ampliavit ut essent XV… 
 
With new laws, Sulla strengthened the Republic, diminished the powers of the 
tribunes of the plebs by taking away from them the right to introduce 
legislation, and expanded the number of priests and augurs to fifteen… 
Livy Per. 89. 
 
The lex Domitia may have been motivated by Domitius’ personal ambitions, but the 
innovations wider significance is evidently demonstrated by its repeal in 81. The conservative 
faction in the senate clearly felt they had lost some ground to the populares during this 
period, thus Sulla repealed the law and restored the old system of cooptatio, reasserting the 
traditionally aristocratic control of membership in the colleges (Dio Cass. 37.37.1; Jer. De 
vir. ill. 75.11). Evidently the popular election of priests was a controversial issue which had 
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 For a political biography of Marius, see Carney (1970); Philippus was a decided opponent of the reform laws 
of the people’s tribune and pontiff Livius which were supported by the conservative faction in the senate (Cic. 
De or. 1.24, 3.2; Leg. 2,31; Asc. Corn. 61 C) (discussed on pgs. 73-6) and initially sided with Marius after the 
Social War; and Asiagenes also belonged to the Marian faction, fighting against Sulla in the first (88-7) and 
second (82) civil war (MRR II.62).  
57
 The pontificate, however, appeared to remain a mainstay of conservative strength (in spite of Domitius’ 
membership) with four of the five elected clearly demonstrating their loyalty to Sulla and the conservative 
faction in the senate: 1) C. Iulius Caesar Strabo (aed. 90) (FS 2013) (whose nephew L. was elected augur) was 
killed in 87 alongside his brother fighting in the streets of Rome against supporters of Marius (Cic. Brut. 307); 
2) P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cos.79) (FS 3072) was supported by Sulla for the consulate of 87 despite defeat 
by the Marian and populist C. Cornelius Cinna (Plut. Sull. 10.3), and sided with Sulla in the Civil War; 3) Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80) (FS 985), elected pontifex maximus in 82 with Sulla’s support, was a follower 
of Sulla throughout the Civil War and became consul together with the dictator in 80; 4) and Q. Lutatius Catulus 
(cos. 78) (FS 2308) was also a supporter of the Sullan order, and considered to be the leader of the moderate 
optimates after Sulla’s death. Only the pontiff Livius could be seen as a populist figure: his controversial 
legislation as tribune sponsored by co-pontiff (and likely nominator L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95) fell short in its 




left a sour note with the conservatives, an issue that required their immediate attention.
58
 
Sulla’s law also extended membership in the augurate and pontificate to fifteen (Livy Per. 
89), rewarding the six new vacancies in each college to the most loyal of his supporters, and 




Despite the political patronage of Sulla being the essential component warranting the co-
optation of these men as priests, this did not discourage the tendency for these offices to be 
kept in the family, with many of those co-opted having a strong ancestral claim to their 
respective priesthoods. The Valerii were an old patrician gens with an illustrious history of 
serving as priests, hence M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 53) (FS 3417) was co-opted into 
the augurate and M. Valerius Messalla (Niger) (cos. 61) (FS 3411) into the pontificate under 
Sulla. C. Licinius Lucullus (tr. pl. 196) (FS 2247), who created the tresviri epulones (to 
relieve the pontiffs of having to organise feasts and public banquets) and was himself one of 
the first to belong to this new college (Livy 33.42.1), was an ancestor of the augur L. Licinius 
Lucullus (FS 2248) and his brother the pontiff M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (FS 3234), who 
were also both co-opted by Sulla. M. Claudius Marcellus (FS 1204) was a descendant of the 
celebrated dictator and augur of the same name (FS 1206), whose son (FS 1207) and 
grandson (FS 1208) both also became pontiffs. The Caecilii Metelli were also arguably the 
most prevalent family in priesthoods throughout the Late Republic both through strong 
family ties to these priesthoods and their loyalty the Sullan order.
60
 And finally, Mam. 
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 As suggested by Scheid (1993) 63, Beard (1994) 746-747 and Rüpke (2012) 120-22. For the full ancient 
evidence, and a list of Sulla’s other major administrative and constitutional reforms, see MRR II. 75. 
59
 See pgs. 17-82, n. 52 above on the problem of Sulla’s augurate. The other five newly promoted augurs 
probably included L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 64) (FS 2007), co-opted before 70; M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 
53) (FS 3417), whose father served under Sulla’s military command and whose sister Valeria was married to 
Sulla; L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74) (FS 2248), who served an impressive early military career under Sulla 
(Plut. Luc. 2.1); C. Claudius Marcellus (pr. 80) (FS 1204), who also served his military career under Sulla (MRR 
II. 47, 52, n.4, 55); Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60) (FS 980) whose family had strong ties with Sulla and 
priestly authority; and Cn. Pompeius Magnus (FS 2756), who was likely to have been somewhat reluctantly co-
opted on account of his extraordinary military track record. Adherents to Sulla’s regime elevated to the 
pontificate probably included: the younger brother of the augur Lucullus, M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73) 
(FS 3234), who was Sulla’s legate in Cispadana (Plut. Sull. 27.7; App. B. Civ. 1.424; Vell. Pat. 2.28); M’. 
Acilius Glabrio (cos. 67) (FS 432), who may have been co-opted as compensation for the loss of his wife 
Aemilia, after Sulla forced her to marry Pompey (Plut. Sull. 33.4); M. Valerius Messalla (Niger) (cos. 61) (FS 
3411), the nephew of Sulla’s last wife Valeria from 79 (Plut. Sull. 35); Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69) 
(FS 981); and possibly both Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus (cos. 77) (FS 514) and C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75) 
(FS 823), since both were certainly co-opted before Caesar in 73 (Macrob. Sat. 3.13.10-11). Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Pius (cos. 80) (FS 985), another one of Sulla’s most important commanders, was also elected pontifex 
maximus in 81, no doubt with Sulla’s support (Asc. 79C). 
60




Aemilius Lepidus Livianus’ (FS 514) ancestor famously served as pontifex maximus from 
180-152 (FS 507) (Cic. Phil. 13.15), whilst his brother by birth was probably also the pontiff 
M. Livius Drusus (FS 2271). Nevertheless, irrespective of the existing family ties these men 
had to religious office, Sulla’s expansion of the colleges for the most part evidently benefitted 
young men from the military sphere.
 
One (relatively unexplored) problem is whether or not 
Sulla’s selection of priests was based primarily on their family connections or their political 
support to the dictator. These men for the most part met the first criterion to attain priestly 
office because of their high positions in the Roman nobility; naturally they all presented 
themselves as worthy candidates precisely because they came from families of good stock 
with strong links to priestly authority. However, they were especially singled out because 
they were fortunate enough to have established themselves amongst inner circle of Sulla’s 
clique. 
 
This trend to co-opt ancestors of illustrious priests continued after the death of Sulla in 78, as 
the priests retained complete control over membership for the next fifteen years. Ap. 
Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54) (FS 1227), grandson to the consul of 143 (FS 1226) who was both 
a salius and an augur, was no doubt co-opted under the lex Cornelia.
61
 P. Servilius Isauricus 
(cos. 48) (FS 3067), the son of the senior pontiff (FS 3072) and grandson to an augur (3071), 
was probably co-opted as augur in ca. 64, prior to his quaestorship of 61.
62
 Members certainly 
co-opted into the pontificate before 63 included: C. Iulius Caesar (FS 2003) in 73, whose 
cousin Lucius (FS 2007) was already an augur; P. Mucius Scaevola Cordus (Monet. 70) (FS 
2481), identified as the son of the pontifex maximus Q. Mucius Scaevola (FS 2478); and P. 
Sulpicius Galba (pr. 66) (FS 3186).
63
 It is also highly likely that Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio 
Nasica (cos. 52) (FS 986) was swiftly co-opted in 64 or 63 in direct succession to his 
adoptive father, the recently deceased pontifex maximus Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80) 
(FS 985), before the lex Labiena in 63 re-established an election process for the priests. This 
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 He may have been the augur that refused to inaugurate a Ser. Sulpicius (FS 3175) as flamen (perhaps flamen 
Dialis) before 63, in a quarrel with the pontifex maximus Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (Festus, Gloss. Lat. 462.28-
464.3 L). Appius was certainly an augur by 63 though: he had acted in his capacity as augur during Cicero’s 
consulship, prompting the abandonment of the augurium salutis due to the pending threat of civil war posed by 
Catiline’s conspiracy (Cic. Div. 1.105). 
62
 The only other augur certainly co-opted under the lex Cornelia was the aristocratically orientated orator, Q. 
Hortensius Hortalus (cos. 69) (FS 1914), whose magisterial ascent advanced rapidly during the 70s. 
63
 All three gentes had a long-standing affinity with priesthoods in the Late Republic. On the Mucii Scavolae, 




was a period in which Sulla’s heirs desperately clung to the levers of power, and continued to 
appropriate these prized priestly offices. 
 
1.3.4. The lex Labiena of 63: the patronage of the triumvirs 
The selection process for priests was once again centre stage in a showdown between 
supporters of the old Sullan order and the populists. In 63 the tribune Titus Labienus, a well-
known radical and friend of Caesar, secured the passage of a law which revived the 
provisions of the lex Domitia, restoring the election of priests to a special assembly (Dio 
Cass. 37.37.1-2).
64
 Dio’s suggestion that Labienus carried this law in order to restore the 
election of the pontifex maximus to the people, so that Caesar could secure the high office, is 
without foundation.
65
 However, support for this popular reform may have been instrumental 
for Caesar’s successful campaign in 63.
66
 Cicero refers twice to the lex Labiena in contexts 
which suggest that the bill, like the lex Domitia was a ‘popular’ cause (Cic. Corn. 2.5-6; Leg. 
agr. 2.18-19). Presumably there were those who regarded the reversal of the lex Domitia as 
detrimental to the prospects of securing a priestly office for themselves or their sons, since 
the system of co-optation tended to favour the relatives of deceased individual that had 
created a vacancy. Taylor asserts that during the years the lex Labiena was in operation, the 
triumvirs held complete sway over the priestly elections, treating the offices as prizes to be 




Two letters from Cicero to Atticus from early 59, during Caesar’s consulship, indicate how 
the triumvirs became central figures in the distribution of priesthoods. First, in early April 
Cicero suggested that he might be won over by the triumvirs if he was rewarded the vacant 
seat in the augurate following the death of Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60) (FS 980) 
(Cic. Att. 2.5.2: cited at the start of this chapter). Second, in another letter from mid-April, 
Cicero anticipates that Caesar’s puppet in the tribunate, and a non-nobilis, P. Vatinius (cos. 
47) (FS 3439) will be awarded that same vacant seat in the augurate (Cic. Att. 2.9.2; cf. Vat. 
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 This is the only specific reference to the lex Labiena, although the re-establishment of the election procedure 
is confirmed by comments in Cicero’s defence of M. Caelius Rufus of 56, which refers to comitia pontificia 
(Cic. Cael. 19). 
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 Taylor (1942a) 421-4: there is no reason to think the lex Cornelia abolished the ancient privilege of the people 
to elect the pontifex maximus, a procedure that had been in place since the late third century. 
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 See Beard (1994) 747. 
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 Cicero’s young friend M. Caelius Rufus (pr. 48) was thinking of making an attempt 
in 50, after the death of Hortensius, but threw his support behind Antony when he saw the 
latter was being backed by Caesar (Cic. Fam. 12.1-2, 14.1). P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther 
(cos. 57) (FS 1353) also attributed his pontificate to Caesar’s support (Caes. BCiv. 1.22). Not 
only did Caesar’s position as pontifex maximus and Pompey’s place in the augurate ensure 
that the two men they were able to nominate their favoured candidates, but they could also 
had a lot of influence over the voting tribes and could sway the result of the elections through 
bribery. Thus according to Taylor’s perhaps outdated, and a little overly simplistic argument, 
the support of the triumvirs appears to have become the primary basis for membership in the 
great priestly colleges by 59. Chapter four will focus primarily on membership of the 
augurate and pontificate between 74 and 50, therefore an overview of the priests elected after 
the re-introduction of the electoral process is unnecessary at this point. However, it is worth 
drawing some conclusions on the changing constitution for the selection of priesthoods 
throughout the Late Republic and the extent to which this family and political patronage 
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 However, Vatinius was not elected until 47, during the year of his consulate and after Caesar had already 






This discussion has illustrated the highly exclusive nature of membership in the augurate and 
pontificate and the difficulties that prospective members faced in pursuit of these offices 
between 104 and 63. One commonly accepted way to campaign for membership throughout 
the Late Republic, whether through the co-optation process or an election, was for a young 
nobile to make use of his ancestry. Descending from an illustrious family with ties to priestly 
authority could be enough to convince an existing member to nominate you, or for the 
electorate to vote for you. The snobbery of existing priests, and even the Roman electorate, 
meant that candidates for a priestly college no doubt had to face the insistent question: quis 
homo hic est, quo patre natus? (Who’s this fellow? Who was his father?) (Hor. Sat. 1.6.29). 
The personal ambitions of Domitius to attain the vacant seat of his father also illustrates how 
political rivalries could also shape membership. It is interesting to note though that by 
initially rejecting Domitius’ bid for his father’s place in the pontificate, the priests were 
prepared to overlook impressive family credentials in light of a man’s political views. The 
lengths Domitius was willing to go to in order to attain a place in the pontificate also 
demonstrates what priesthoods meant to some prominent political figures; in his case he must 
have considered membership to be a birth right and an important titular role. Therefore, not 
only did these positions have the capacity to elevate and ennoble one’s family for those new 
to colleges, but they were also seen as a means uphold the reputation for those members with 
pre-existing family ties to priesthood. After Domitius introduced the popular election of 
priests, family association with priestly authority was still a determining factor when 
campaigning for a vacancy, however, it was less important than it once was. Patronage from 
powerful political figures of the time became an equally significant factor, especially during 




There is evidently value to this approach. The highly exclusive family nature and partisan 
basis of a candidate’s selection demonstrates that these positions were valuable tokens of 
illustrious ancestry and political favour. In a society where competition for personal glory 
mattered so much, attaining these exclusive and limited places in a priestly college could 
been understood as a way to outdo the achievements of your political rivals.
 
The oldest 
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 Later during his dictatorship Caesar would also grant himself the ability to both nominate and elect members 
to the priestly colleges; Cicero would mockingly called him the infector (dyer), relating to the different coloured 




purported fragments of a laudatio from the funerary speech of L. Caecilius Metellus (cos. 
251, 247) in 221 illustrates the kind of importance that was placed on being member of a 
priestly college. Despite having twice served as consul, and once served as dictator, the first 
office mentioned by L.’s son in this funerary speech is that of his father’s pontificate (Plin. 
HN 7.139-140). The proudest achievement of T. Annius Rufus (cos. 128) was commissioning 
the construction of a 321 mile road between Regium and Capua. This was not celebrating an 
exalted position in a priestly college, but comparable remarks on epitaphs were common in 
Roman society, and so it is important to note the great value placed on these sorts of 
achievements in the grand competition for recognition.
70
 Priestly office was not normally 
regarded as an honour or reward for outstanding public achievement though. This may have 
been the case for a select few priests, including the pontiff C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76) (FS 
2996) or the augur Cicero (FS 3290), who were both elected in the twilight of their careers, 
the latter becoming a priest ten years after his consulship and whose circumstances as a novus 
homo were particularly unusual. However, to suggest that membership in one of the two great 
priestly colleges of Rome was merely an honorary distinction and a position that presented 
little scope for political influence offers a very limited view on the functions and status of the 
priests in Roman society. The family and political patronage dynamic is certainly an 
important way of explaining how many men became priests in the Late Republic, but this 
theoretical approach does not explain why there was so often great competition between 
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 See Wiseman (1985) 3-19 for more examples of this sort of competition throughout the Roman Republic 





     
 
 
THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE PONTIFFS 




2.1. Introduction  
 
The pontiffs were interpretes religionum (interpreters of religious observances) (Cic. Dom. 2) 
and their duties as priests varied widely.
71
 Owing to their specialist knowledge through 
exclusive access to the libri pontificii (books of the pontiffs), the pontiffs were able to 
individually preside over and assist at the execution of many ritual ceremonies. Such rites 
included those performed at religious festivals (Dio Cass. 43.24.4; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
1.38.3; Ov. Fast. 2.21-2), the supervision of adoption ceremonies (Cic. Dom. 41), and 
presiding over dedications (Cic. Dom. 120, 122). This chapter examines the extent to which 
the actions of pontiffs (individually and collectively) could have significant political 
consequences in the Late Republic. The pontifical college, as a repository of religious 
knowledge, would often be called upon by the senate and magistrates to resolve pressing 
religious issues. Conventionally these problems arose due to the observation of prodigia 
(prodigies) or portenta (portents), which could range from showers of stones (Livy 34.45.8) 
or blood (Livy 40.19.2), a temple being struck by lightning (Livy 39.22.4), a statue sweating 
(Dio Cass. 40.47.2; Obseq. 70), or the disruption of a religious festival (often the Feriae 
Latinae) by a thunderstorm (Livy 32.1.9; 40.45.2; 41.16.2).
72
 The pontiffs were also often 
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 The best studies of the pontiffs are in French and German. Amongst the most noteworthy are Bouché Leclerq 
(1871) 267-318; RKR 513-18; Bleicken (1957) 345-66; and RRG 195-212, 400-2. Most recently Van Haeperen 
(2002) has provided an insightful work on the socio-religious functions of the pontifical college. However, there 
is no comprehensive treatment of the pontiffs in English. For general overviews on the roles of the pontiffs, see 
Szemler (1971) 106-8; (1972) 22-5; Beard (1990) 19-48; North (1990b) 585-9; and Scheid (1993) 55-84. 
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 The literature on prodigies in the Republic is extensive:  Bouché Leclerq (1882) IV 15-115, 175-317; RKR 
390-6, 538-49; RRG 157-61; North (2000) 27-9, 38-40; Rasmussen (2003) esp. 35–168; and Davies (2004) 27-





consulted regarding misconduct of magistrates in the performance of their religious duties on 
behalf of the Republic (Cic. Att. 4.2), or following sacrilegious behaviour (Cic. Att. 1.13; 
16.). After careful deliberation, the pontiffs would make their recommendations to the senate 
through decreta (decrees), which usually involved the performance of some expiatory rite, 
the repetition of a ritual ceremony, or the reversal of a decision to appease the angered god or 
gods. Although these decrees were not binding, the recommendations of the pontiffs were 
routinely followed, and appear to have influenced the senate’s final decision on such matters. 
 
The following discussion focuses on a notorious incident of the Late Republic involving the 
pontiffs. Between 58 and 57, a very public feud between two of Rome’s leading political 
figures, M. Tullius Cicero and P. Clodius Pulcher, culminated in a dispute involving a 
decision of the pontiffs. This incident is by far the most documented and detailed case study 
preserved on the consultation of the pontifical college, demonstrating the mechanisms that 
empowered the pontiffs in the Late Republic and stressing the integration of politics and 
religion in Roman public life.
73
 In mid-58 the tribune Clodius, with the assistance of a 
pontiff, orchestrated the dedication of the aedis Libertatis (shrine to Liberty) on the site of 
Cicero’s Palatine house, which had been destroyed not long after Cicero fled into exile. The 
shrine, erected in full view of the Forum (Cic. Dom. 100, 103), is readily construed as a form 
of anti-Ciceronian propaganda, an attack on the orator’s dignitas (social standing). It was a 
political gesture designed both to celebrate Clodius’ supposed achievements as tribune and to 
bring public disgrace upon Cicero’s actions as consul (when he ordered the execution without 
trial of several Catilinarian conspirators).
74
 As the one charged with vowing the new 
dedication, Clodius would have savoured the opportunity to have his name paraded as the 
dedicator of the shrine. We can expect his name to have been carved on its exterior, and the 
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 The following discussion of this episode is greatly indebted to the fastidious yet articulate work of Tatum 
(1993a) 13-20, (1993b) 319-28; and esp. (1999) 156-66, 187-93. His thorough account has been the basis for 
much of what follows. The scholarship on Cicero’s resulting speech De Domo Sua is vast, but the following are 
fundamental: Allen (1939); (1940); (1944); Nisbet (1939); Drumann and Groebe (1902) II. 216-24, 228-42, 253-
66; Lenaghan (1969); Gelzer (1969) 135-66; Berg (1997) 122-143. Bergemann (1992) (in German) explores in 
some detail the political backdrop to this dedication, although unfortunately she has little to say about how the 
dedication empowered the presiding pontiff. For the legality of Cicero’s exile, Greenidge (1901) 360-5 is still 
useful. Most recently Stroh (2004) 313-70 has provided a detailed commentary on the legal problems in De 
Domo Sua, although his chapter on the speech makes quite difficult reading. 
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 Cicero appears to have first earned Clodius’ enmity after shattering his alibi as a witness at the Bona Dea trial 
in 61: Cic. Att. 1.16.4-5. For a more detailed background on the origins of the great rivalry between Cicero and 
Clodius, see Gruen (1966) 120-30; Gelzer (1969) 135-66; Stockton (1971) 127-43, 188-96; and especially 




site even housed an honorific statue of Clodius, erected by Menulla of Anagnia in gratitude 
for an unrelated piece of legislation (Cic. Dom. 81). The testimonial inscription on the portico 
of Catulus (in which the shrine very likely stood)
75
 was also erased and replaced with his own 
epigraphic display of triumph (Cic. Dom. 102-3, 114, 116). For the Roman aristocrat, the 
domus (house) was more than just a residence; the space delineated the patris familias 
potestas (power of the patriarch), it housed the family’s genealogy, their accomplishments 
and trophies, and it was the site of the family’s cult, the sacrum gentis (the rites of their 
clan).
76
 It is little wonder that Cicero attached such importance to the recovery of the whole 
site when he returned from exile (Cic. Dom 146-7). Clodius as tribune had utilised a 
dedication as a tool for personal revenge to showcase his political triumph over Cicero, and 
the presiding pontiff to the dedication ceremony would have been well aware of this given his 
close political association with the tribune. 
 
Upon his return to Rome in September 57, Cicero contested the validity of the dedication. He 
claimed that the site had no special religious status and that the shrine should be demolished. 
The senate, acting on the advice of M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59), referred the matter to the 
college of pontiffs for investigation and counsel (Cic. Dom. 69). On 29
th
 September 57, 
Cicero delivered the speech On His House (De Domo Sua), imploring the pontiffs to 
recommend the annulment of the dedication so that the site of his house might be returned to 
him.
77
 Two features of this episode warrant detailed consideration: first, the role and political 
influence of the lone young pontiff who assisted Clodius with the dedication; and second, the 
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 It has generally been assumed that the shrine cannot have been an independent building: Shackleton Bailey 
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34), who were perhaps present in an official capacity. Pompey was also amongst the attendees, perhaps in his 
capacity as augur, likely as an interested spectator (Cic. Dom. 25). The incident certainly attracted a great deal 




2.2. The Powers of an Individual Pontiff     
 
2.2.1. Introduction: misrepresentation in Cicero’s version of events 
 
Vobis hodierno die constituendum est utrum posthac amentis ac perditos 
magistratus improborum ac sceleratorum civium praesidio nudare, an etiam 
deorum immortalium religione armare malitis. Nam si illa labes ac flamma rei 
publicae suum illum pestiferum et funestum tribunatum, quem aequitate 
humana tueri non potest, divina religione defenderit, aliae caerimoniae nobis 
erunt, alii antistites deorum immortalium, alii interpretes religionum 
requirendi… 
 
O, pontiffs, you on this day are called upon to decide whether from this time 
onwards you prefer to strip crazed and unprincipled magistrates of the 
protection granted by wicked and dastardly citizens, or actually to arm them 
with the religious awe of the immortal gods. For if that pest and devouring 
flame of the Republic [Clodius] should succeed in defending by means of 
divine religion his iniquitous and ruinous tribunate, which he cannot defend on 
grounds of human justice, then we shall have to seek new ceremonies, new 
ministers of the immortal gods, and new interpreters of religious 
observances… 
 
Cic. Dom. 2. 
 
Cicero’s claim in this passage seems clear enough: Clodius has exploited Roman religious 
ritual for political gain; the man has cynically utilised sacred lore in an attempt to uphold his 
political actions as tribune in 58. At first glance, then, this episode provides an excellent 
example of the way in which the spheres of religious and political influence could intersect 
and create significant conflicts of interest. It also provides an example of a single pontiff 
utilising his position as a priest to place himself at the centre of this controversy. But before 
addressing the role of the young pontiff presiding over the dedication ceremony, it is 




which is he distorting Clodius’ motives and actions for his own oratorical (and political) 
goals. 
 
There are certainly grounds for suspecting misrepresentation in Cicero’s account of this 
dedication. Towards the end of the speech, for example, it is claimed that Clodius had 
planned to construct a magnificent palace complex that combined the site of his own house 
on the Palatine with that of Q. Seius and Cicero (Cic. Dom. 115-6). Many scholars have 
accepted Cicero’s accusation as genuine.
78
 But in fact there is no other evidence to support 
this claim. All that can really be ascertained is that a buyer called Scato (whom Cicero 
depicts as a mere ‘front man’ for Clodius) acquired the upper sections of Cicero’s confiscated 
land, whilst the remaining lower sections were allocated to the gens Clodia (Cic. Dom. 116), 
although for what purpose is unknown. Certainly, the construction of a grand house would be 
consistent with Clodius’ grand political ambitions overall; but we should be wary of taking at 
face value the motives that Cicero attributes to Clodius, especially when these motives are so 
patently designed to discredit him. There is good reason then to exercise caution when trying 
to recover the facts of the matter from Cicero’s account. 
 
Nevertheless, two elements of Cicero’s version of events warrant close consideration. First, it 
is possible that this was the first time a tribune had presided over the dedication of an aedes. 
To be sure, there was a strong tradition of manubial building that celebrated military 
conquests; but usually these were performed by higher magistrates and triumphant generals, 
not by tribunes to boast of a personal political victory.
79
 Cicero makes reference to enemies 
of the Republic having their houses destroyed and shrines dedicated in their place, but he is 
careful to point out the differences in these previous cases: 1) these men had already been 
executed when a shrine was erected; 2) the construction of a shrine was by order of the 
senate, not the plebiscite; and 3) the shrines bore little or no symbolic reference to the actions 
of the former resident.
80
 Cicero therefore suggests that Clodius’ dedication is highly unusual 
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(and therefore possibly invalid). Secondly, the role of the particular pontiff in this case was 
curious. According to Cicero, the man acted alone and was inexperienced in the execution of 
religious duties. Who was this individual then who took upon himself such an apparently 
unusual – and potentially controversial – role?  
 
2.2.2. The role of the presiding pontiff L. Pinarius Natta 
The pontiff’s name was Lucius Pinarius Natta,
81
 and it would appear that he was elected to 
this post between July and September 58, only a short time before the dedication.
82
 The 
ancient origins of this priest’s patrician ancestry harked back to the days of Evander, and the 
family was known for its association with the gentilician cult of Heracles.
83
 By the Late 
Republic the Pinarii seem to have faded from the Roman political scene,
84
 however, this 
particular Pinarius seems to have forged some useful political contacts. Cicero avoids 
mentioning Natta by name throughout his speech (Cic. Dom. 118, 134-5, 139-41), an 
indication perhaps of the disgust he felt towards the young man’s role in the dedication 
ceremony.
85
 Instead he refers to him in the persona of Clodius using the phrase frater uxoris 
meae (the brother of my [Clodius’] wife) (Cic. Dom. 118), and later mentions that he was 
stepson to L. Licinius Murena (cos. 62) (Cic. Dom. 134). Thus he can be identified as the 
same influential L. Natta who was accused of bribing equites to vote for his stepfather in the 
consular elections of 62 (Cic. Mur. 73). Nevertheless, attempts to identify Clodius’ wife, the 
sister to our L. Pinarius Natta, have remained speculative. Lily Ross Taylor supposed that it 
was through Clodius’ well-attested marriage to Fulvia that he gained Natta as a brother-in-
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FS 2711. 
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 Cic. Dom. 134; Serv. Dan. 8.269. Based on this association it is possible that the family continued to be active 
in religious positions after their disappearance from public life. 
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 From our available records, a Pinarius had not reached the consulship since 472 (L. Pinarius – f. – n. 
Mamercinus Rufus Pat.: MRR I. 29) nor held a praetorship since 181 (M. Pinarius Rusca (or Posca?): MRR II. 
384).  
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 In 56 Cicero professes his hatred for Natta confessing oderam hominen (I detested the man) (Cic. Att. 4.8a.3), 






 However, despite the appeal of her suggestion, this identification remains inconclusive. 
Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that Natta had not yet gained significant office – a 
useful point for our study, since he is the only known pontiff in 58 who was not also a 
senator. This fact allows us to be sure that all his acts were carried out as a function of his 
religious office; we do not need to worry about distinguishing his role as the priest from the 
religious functions of the senator or magistrate. 
 
Natta’s precise ceremonial role in the dedication, however, is difficult to determine. Cicero 
implies that, with his head covered, the man grasped a door post and uttered a solemn 
formula (Cic. Dom. 120, 122).
87
 Natta’s presence at the ceremony was an important part of 
the dedications success, since the involvement of a pontiff enabled the ex-tribune to rather 
smugly declare: ‘dedicatio magnam… habe[vi]t religionem’ (this dedication… carried a 
grave binding force) (Cic. Dom. 127). Such appeals to the sanctity of the shrine would very 
likely have been the general thrust of Clodius’ defence.
88
 The ex-tribune claimed that the 
aedes Libertatis had been consecrated in proper accordance with Roman ritual because of 
Natta’s presence as pontiff, and it was on this point which the whole issue might be said to 
depend.
89
 Given the scrupulous nature of ritual performance in Roman religion and the 
potential anxiety such serious religious issues could cause, the binding and seemingly 
irreversible nature of this religious act left Cicero in an extremely awkward position. Despite 
Clodius’ incessant claim that his dedication carried religio though, there were a number of 
procedural issues which suggest that the Natta’s involvement could be perceived by the 
pontiffs as rather unusual. 
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Cicero frequently asserted that, owing to his inexperience, Natta probably made mistakes in 
ensuring the ritual correctness of the ceremony (Cic. Dom. 134-5, 139-41). These claims of 
course are questionable: Cicero can provide no proof of his assertions (since he was not 
there), and it seems unlikely that such arguments would have been enough by themselves to 
sway the pontiffs on this point.
90
 More problematic for Clodius perhaps was the fact that only 
a single pontiff was involved in the dedication. This was an irregularity that Cicero was able 
to exploit in his speech (Cic. Dom. 117): non te pudet, cum apud pontifices res agatur, 
pontificem dicere et non conlegium pontificum adfuisse (… are you not ashamed, when the 
matter has now been brought before the pontiffs, that you summoned one pontiff, and not the 
whole college?). Although consultation of the college was not an enforced legal requirement, 
it was customary for the college to collectively approve of and preside over such a 
ceremony.
91
 Whilst Natta technically satisfied the assent of the religious authorities, he was 
not yet of an age to carry the moral weight to perform such an unprecedented action. The 
pontiffs then may have felt that he had abused his power. That the young pontiff proceeded 
without knowledge, without precedent, and without the backing of the pontifical college, 
likely caused a stir amongst the pontiffs and invoked a degree of outrage that would certainly 




2.2.3. The political motives of the pontiff’s assistance 
The familial connections between Clodius and Natta provide an obvious explanation for their 
joint action in this affair. Indeed, Cicero directly accuses Clodius of pressuring Natta into 
providing his priestly assistance, suggesting that the young pontiff was acting against his own 
will. Cicero claims that adfuit is, si modo adfuit, quem tu impulisti, soror rogavit, mater 
coëgit (His presence, if he was present at all, was instigated by you [Clodius], by a sister’s 
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prayers, and a mother’s compulsion) (Cic. Dom. 118).
93
 By stressing the personal dimension, 
Cicero shrewdly undercuts the moral authority of the pontiff and suggests that the two 
conspired to undermine the spirit of pontifical lore: tamen quanta est in adolescente 
auctoritas, ea propter tantam coniunctionem adfinitatis minor est putanda (However, how 
much authority this young man possessed [is questionable], considering his close affiliation 
to Clodius through marriage) (Cic. Dom. 118). The tone of these passages implies that the 
pontiff was a mere puppet in Clodius’ scheme, that he was powerless to resist a demagogue’s 
provocation.  
 
Cicero even goes so far as to imply that Natta owed his election as pontiff to Clodius, who 
may have canvassed support for his brother-in-law at the comitia sacerdotum in 58. This 
could explain how this adulescens – from a politically obscure gens and with few evident 
qualifications aside from his membership in the waning patriciate – was able to attain such a 
distinguished social accolade. However, there are a number of difficult issues which prevent 
any definitive conclusion on this suggestion, foremost being that this suggestion relies solely 
on a tortuous passage of Cicero’s speech: 
 
qui etiam tibi erat magis obstrictus beneficio recenti, cum se fratrem uxoris 
tuae fratri tuo ge[r]mano*
94
 antelatum videbat; etsi in eo providisti ne frater 
te accusare possit. 
 
Moreover, Natta, the brother of your wife, was bound to you by recent 
kindness, since he saw that he himself had been preferred [to attain the vacant 
pontificate]*
95
 over your own brother by blood [Gaius]; although at least you 
have taken precautions that your own brother is not able to accuse you. 
Cic. Dom. 118. 
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There is little doubt that the ‘brother by blood’ Cicero introduces in the above passage that 
ran for the vacant pontificate in 58 is C. Clodius Pulcher, already one of the Salii (priests of 
Mars) by 76.
96
 However, as always with Cicero’s accusations, we cannot simply take this 
comment at face-value.
97
 To suggest that Clodius would not support his own brother’s 
campaign for the vacant pontificate, and let pass the opportunity to have himself and his two 
brothers hold membership in each of the three major priestly colleges of the day, seems 
incredible.
98
 Cicero’s justification, as illustrated in the above passage, is that Clodius wished 
to protect his brother Gaius from the invective that Natta had now exposed himself to. 
However, this is not a particularly convincing explanation. As praetor two years later in 56, 
Gaius supported Clodius in his feud against Cicero by attempting to prevent the removal of a 
tablet on the Capitol that recorded the law under which Cicero had been banished (Dio Cass. 
39.21.1-2; cf. Plut. Cic. 34). Evidently he did not fear being dragged into Cicero’s invective 
on this occasion. Cicero’s allegations here are again examples of the orator undermining the 
moral authority of the presiding pontiff, boldly implying that Clodius knew this dedication 
was doomed from the outset. Cicero would have his audience believe that Natta was in 
Clodius’ pocket, not just bound through family politics, but also greatly indebted to him for 
supporting his election over his own brother’s campaign. Thus the orator carefully depicts 
Natta’s assistance as an act of personal favour designed to curb the will of the pontificate. 
 
Given the likely manipulation in Cicero’s depiction of events it is difficult to ascertain 
whether Natta really owed his pontificate to Clodius’ support. If not Clodius though, who else 
could have been the benefactor to this little-known member of the Pinarii in his pursuit of 
such a prestigious religious office? Taylor suggests that Natta was related by marriage to the 
pontifex maximus, C. Iulius Caesar, thus Natta’s son may have been the mysterious L. 
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Pinarius Scarpus who became second heir to Caesar after Octavian.
99
 If true, this could 
indicate that the pontifex maximus, through the primacy of kinship, was probably in fact 
Natta’s chief benefactor to the vacant pontificate in 58. Caesar was after all accustomed to 
playing an instrumental role in the acquisition of priesthoods.
100
 Taylor also points out that of 
the nine men elected to the pontificate between 63, when the lex Labiena restored the popular 
election of priests, and Caesar’s dictatorship in 49, seven were adherents to the triumvirs and 
were from houses which held the consulship in these years.
101
 It is therefore possible, 
although tenuous, that Clodius’ support for Natta came at the request of Caesar. Thus the two 
great men could have worked together to orchestrate the young pontiff’s nomination and 
subsequent election. The fact that Cicero does not mention the pivotal involvement of Caesar 
in Natta’s election could be easily explained by the likelihood that he would not wanted to 
have unnecessarily invoked the wrath of Caesar within a matter of weeks of his return.
102
 
This hypothesis may even explain why Clodius, if he did support Natta’s campaign for the 
vacant pontificate, snubbed his own brother’s bid for the pontificate. With the weight of 
Caesar’s support more or less guaranteeing Natta’s election Clodius could have seized the 
opportunity to back a winning horse.
103
 Although this cannot be proven, opportunism and 
clever innovation fit well with what we know about Clodius. This reconstruction could also 
permit Cicero’s suggestion that Natta’s assistance was carried out as repayment for Clodius’ 
support, stressing the possible cronyism and expediency associated with becoming a pontiff 
in the Late Republic. 
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2.2.4. Concluding remarks  
In the wider context of the republican era, pontiffs do not appear to have exercised significant 
constitutional powers when compared to the role of magistrates. Magistrates were the ones 
that often executed the most important religious actions by performing state sacrifices, vows, 
and in this case dedications. The individual pontiffs like Natta acted as expert advisers 
assisting at ceremonies, or perhaps dictating the formula, but did not play the central 
coordinating role; they were never the ‘main actors’.
104
 By Cicero’s day, mos maiorum 
largely restricted dedications to be carried out by magistrates – praetors, consuls, censors, 
dictators, and the special duumviri aedi dedicandae – not the pontiffs (or tribunes for that 
matter).
105
 Even when a magistrate who was also a pontiff performed the consecration of a 




There are good grounds for seeing this episode as an example of cynical exploitation of 
religious ritual (and hence too Natta’s religious office as pontiff) for political ends. Despite 
the partisan nature of Cicero’s account, the precedents for Clodius’ dedication were 
questionable and Natta’s action independent of the rest of the college appears to have flouted 
custom and been designed to support the interests of familial and political allies. Natta’s 
assistance as pontiff would formed an important part of this scheme, however, he was not 
autonomous in the performance of his religious duties. As tribune, Clodius was the presiding 
magistrate orchestrating the dedication, whilst Natta was recruited behind the scenes to 
ensure the ritual correctness of the ceremony. Natta’s role was to give the impression that the 
procedure was ritually unassailable and that the blessing of the appropriate religious 
authorities had been affirmed, although this in itself may not have been compulsory. 
Whatever the precise political machinations behind Natta’s election, the episode 
demonstrates the importance of political patronage when competing for priestly office, an 
approach to the value of priesthoods discussed in the first chapter. His role also highlights 
one of the attractions of pontifical office for members of the younger generation that will be 
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discussed in the fouth chapter: the entrée that it provided into a clique of prominent and 
influential men. 
 
Natta’s unique involvement in the affair as pontiff did not make him especially powerful, nor 
did it grant him what we might call impressive constitutional ‘hard power’. Given the reality 
that the dedication was overturned by the pontifical college, it is quite clear that Natta’s part 
in Clodius’ scheme was not enough to uphold the sanctity of the aedes Libertatis. As we will 
see in the following chapters, the role of priest certainly required some degree of expertise in 
religious lore which could be utilised for personal gain on occasion; but we may wonder how 
significant a part this religious element played in the calculations of the ambitious Roman 
aristocrat and his family. To some extent, Natta was perhaps a pawn in the Clodius’ cynical 
schemes; but he may well have embarked on his course of action fully aware of its potential 












2.3.      The Pontificate and the Authority of their Decree 
 
 
2.3.1. Interpreting the pontifical decree: separating ius religionis and ius publicum 
After Cicero delivered his speech on the 29
th
 September 57, the pontiffs announced their 
recommendation through a decretum.
107
 According to Cicero, it read as follows: 
 
Si neque populi iussu neque plebis scitu is qui se dedicasse diceret nominatim 
ei rei praefectus esset neque populi iussu aut plebis scitu id facere iussus 
esset’ videri posse sine religione eam partem areae mihi*108 restitui. 
 
If that person claiming to have dedicated the site [P. Clodius] was not 
commissioned by name through an order of the people or resolution of the 
plebs, neither charged to do so by an order of the people or resolution of the 






Cicero claimed that there was no doubt the decree indicated that his house had been adjudged 
to him (Cic. Att. 4.2.3). However, it is not immediately clear that the pontiffs had ruled in his 
favour.
109
 In fact, the pontiffs hinged their recommendation on the interpretation of a legal 
problem, specifically whether or not Clodius had properly attainted popular authorisation for 
his dedication. Therefore, before attempting to understand both why the pontiffs ruled in 
Cicero’s favour and the weight of their recommendation on the senate’s final verdict, it is 
worth undertaking a detailed examination of the decree itself. In doing so, we can more fully 
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 Since the pontiffs explained their recommendation to the senate two days later on the Kalends (1
st
) of 
October (Cic. Att. 4.2.4), and Clodius had time to deliver a speech at a people’s assembly before the senate 
convened (Cic. Att. 4.2.3), the pontifical decree must have been presented either on the day of Cicero’s speech 
(the 29
th
 September), or the following day (the 30
th
 September). Note, therefore, the significantly short time-
frame the priests operated within. 
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 Cicero’s use of mihi here indicates that this is an adapted citation of the pontifical decree. It is therefore not 
certain if these were the exact words used by the pontiffs, or if this passage even represents everything that the 
pontiffs had to declare. See Tatum (1993b) 321, n. 10. 
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 For the best commentaries interpreting the technical issues with the pontifical decree, see Linderski (1985) 




appreciate the complexity of the college’s decision and the pervasive dualism between the 
role of the pontiff and the role of the senator.  
 
The first point to note from the decree is the verdict of the pontiffs on the religious issue. The 
pontiffs concluded that it was possible for the section of Cicero’s house to be restored sine 
religione (without sacrilege), thereby resolving the religious difficulty to overturning 
Clodius’ dedication (Cic. Att. 4.2.3).
110
 Given the difficulty that Cicero faced overcoming the 
scrupulous nature of Roman ritual, this verdict on the religious issue was surely a huge relief 
for the orator. However, it is interesting to note that the pontiffs made no effort to explain 
how they reached their verdict on the solemn scriptures of ius pontificum (pontifical lore). 
Even when summoned to explain their decree before the senate two days later on the 1
st
 
October, the senior pontiff speaking on behalf of his college, M. Terentius Varro Lucullus 
(cos. 73), drew attention away from the religious difficulty and towards an issue of ius 
publicum (civil law). The consul designate Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus asked the 
priests quid essent in decernendo secuti*
111
 (what they were driving at in their decision) (Cic. 
Att. 4.2.4).  Lucullus responded:  
 
religionis iudices pontifices fuisse, legis <es>se senatum; se et collegas suos 
de religion statuisse, in senatu de lege statu<tur>os cum senatu. 
 
The pontiffs had been judges of the religious issue, but the senate was the 
judge of the law; he and his fellow colleagues in the pontificate had decided 
on the religious issue [in their capacity as pontiffs], the legal issue would be 
adjudged by them as senators in the senate. 
Cic. Att. 4.2.4.  
 
In other words, it was not the senate’s business to enquire how the pontiffs had come to their 
decision on the religious issue. The pontiffs had their specialist domain of priestly 
competence, concerned with rigid points of pontifical lore and ritual formulae, whilst the 
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 Cf. Cic. Att. 4.1.7; religio here denotes the state of impediment which had resulted from Clodius’ violation of 
ius publicum (civil law) (OLD 1605-6). Thus the difficulty or inviolability of the religious ceremony needed to 
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senate was the judge of the law.
112
 The pontiffs decided that it was possible to sanction the 
removal of the shrine from the religious point of view. However, the senate still needed to 
determine whether Clodius had adequately obtained popular authorisation for his dedication, 
as he was required to by a little known tribunician law that the pontiffs isolated in their 
decree: the lex Papiria. 
 
A great deal of scholarship has attempted to reconstruct the provisions of the lex Papiria and 
how they applied to Cicero’s circumstances.
113
 The lex Papiria, as Cicero himself notes, was 
concerned with nec de pontificio sed de iure publico (not the rights of the pontiffs, but the 
rights of the people) (Cic. Dom. 128). Thus it would be for the senate to decide if there had 
been any contravention of this law (not the pontiffs). Cicero made it quite clear that the law 
was not precisely relevant to his own circumstances. The law had originally envisaged 
gaining popular authorisation for the dedication of temples, sites or altars carried out by 
imperatores (generals) upon lands of a conquered enemy sacrae nominatur (in the name of 
public religion) (Cic. Dom. 128).
 114
 The law also does not appear to have been intent upon 
regulating the dedication of shrines by tribunes on privata domicilia (private residences) (Cic. 
Dom. 128).
 
One of Cicero’s most difficult tasks in his speech was therefore to compel the 
pontiffs to accept that an application of the lex Papiria in this case was possible so that they 
could refer to the law in their decree. This explains Cicero’s reference to a decision of the 
pontiffs in 154 regarding the dedication of a statue by the censor C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 
171) (Cic. Dom. 130-138). The pontiffs on this earlier occasion chose to observe the spirit 
rather than the letter of the law, adapting their understanding of the law to include the 
dedication of a statue by a censor.
115
 Cassius was prevented from dedicating a statue to 
Concordia nisi eum populus Romanus nominatim praefecisset atque eius iussu faceret (unless 
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 Other scholars with a similar interpretation of the priests decree include Nisbet (1939) 183-4, who rightly 
separates the religious validity of the dedication from the question of legality (thus separating the priests realm 
of influence from the senate’s). See also Shackleton-Bailey (1999) I. 294-5; and Tatum (1993b) 327-8. Stroh 
(2004) 339-42 suggests that (to a certain extent) Cicero’s speech is itself divided between dealing with the 
religious issue and the legal issue.  
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 Tatum (1993b) 319-328 provides the best treatment of the law. For a full biography see Tatum (1993b) 319, 
n. 1. 
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 Livy originally envisioned that mos maiorum allowed only consuls and commander’s with imperium to 
dedicate a temple or other site (Livy 9.46.6). However, a special magistracy, the duoviri aedi dedicandae, was 
also established as early as 484 (Livy 2.42.5) for imperatores (generals) to perform dedications after their 
imperium had expired.  
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the Roman people expressly nominated him to carry it out) (Cic. Dom. 136).
116
 Cicero 
therefore compelled the college of his day to take similar steps, extending their own 
interpretation of the law to encompass the dedication of a shrine carried out by a tribune: 
quaeso, pontifices, et hominem cum homine et tempus cum tempore et rem cum re comparate 
(I beseech you, gentlemen of the pontifical college, compare man with man, period with 
period, and circumstances with circumstances) (Cic. Dom. 130).  
 
Naturally one may ask why the pontiffs felt the need to hinge their final verdict on the 
interpretation of a legal problem at all. Why could they not simply rule that they sanctioned 
the removal of the religio and the return of the site to Cicero? A likely answer is that the 
pontiffs needed to rely on some formal discrepancy in Clodius’ dedication to satisfy their 
own need for accountability, as well as the senate’s curiosity. There had to be a reason for 
their recommendation to carry any real weight, and the problems with Clodius’ legislation 
provided the pontiffs with the opportunity they needed to convince the senate of their verdict. 
In his speech Cicero even asks the pontiffs why he needs to prove that there had been 
mistakes in the ritual formula of the ceremony (the religious issue) if he could prove that 
there had been legal mistakes concerning Clodius’ dedication (the legal issue) (Cic. Dom. 
137-8). Cicero’s aim was to deliberately draw the pontiffs attention away from the religious 
issue and towards the legal issue, since he was fully aware that he has very little basis for an 
attack on the sanctity of the shrine from the viewpoint of pontifical lore.
117
 The pontiffs 
obliged Cicero’s request though, and drew the senate’s attention to Clodius’ apparent 
violation of the lex Papiria in their decree; however, Cicero’s legal argument did not stop 
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 Lange (1879) 2. 634; Willems (1879-1883) 305-9; and most recently Ziolkowski (1992) 219-34, all assumed 
that Papirian law was the same one that Livy mentions as being passed in 304 (Livy 9.46.6-7). The low-born 
novus homo, Cn. Flavius, as curule aedile, dedicated a temple of Concord in the Roman Forum, much to the 
annoyance of the nobility. The pontifex maximus, P. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (cos. 328), was forced to preside 
over the dedication by the people, even though Barbatus felt that mos maiorum only permitted a consul or a 
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Ziolkowski equated with the lex Papiria) that forbade anyone to dedicate a temple or altar without express 
authorisation of the senate or a majority of the tribunes of the people (Livy 9.46.6). Although the communis 
opinio now rejects that this was the lex Papiria (see Tatum (1993b) 319) the episode reveals how politically 
charged such dedications often became. Cf. also a case in 217 where the pontifex maximus L. Cornelius 
Lentulus indicated that a sacred spring could not be vowed without authorisation of the plebs (Livy 22.10.1). 
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 Tatum (1993a) 13-20 brilliantly sheds light on Cicero’s (philosophical) attempt to establish a link between 
personal morality and ritual correctness (expressions of thought that were ahead of their time and may well have 
risked backfiring).  By emphasising the immoral and spiteful intent of Clodius, Cicero hoped that the college 




there. As indicated by the conditional nature of the pontiff’s decree, it remained to be debated 
within the senate whether or not Clodius had contravened the lex Papiria (Cic. Att. 4.2.4).  
 
Clodius claimed that his dedication was authorised by the plebs through provisions enacted in 
the lex Clodia de exsilio Ciceronis: tuleram, inquit, ut mihi liceret (“I had carried a motion 
giving me legal powers [to perform the dedication]” he [Clodius] says) (Cic. Dom. 106). The 
lex Clodia had transformed Cicero’s exile into a legal and permanent banishment, indicating 
loss of property and (according to Clodius) permitting the dedication of a shrine. This motion 
was Clodius’ second law concerning Cicero’s exile and was promulgated immediately after 
Cicero had fled Rome in early March 58. Clodius (as the administrator of the law) 
confiscated the site of Cicero’s house (Cic. Dom. 44, 51) and perhaps even supervised the 
sale of the remainder of the site at auction (Cic. Dom. 48, 107-9, 116). Cicero clearly refuted 
throughout his speech any suggestion that Clodius had satisfied the requirements of the lex 
Papiria in the performance of his dedication. However, our knowledge of the law derives 
solely from Cicero’s extended criticism of it in his speech (Cic. Dom. 43-99); thus its exact 
provisions – and importantly the question of whether the legislation was in fact technically 
flawed – remain irrecoverable.
118
 All that can really be ascertained is that the tribune had 
included some mention of a shrine in the law, although the pontiffs were evidently not 
convinced that the law’s stipulations satisfied the specific requirements of the lex Papiria.
119
 
Why Clodius overlooked the need for exactitude in the provisions of the law has also been 
subject to some scholarly debate.
120
 However, Clodius and his advisor on legal drafting, Sex. 
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 Well noted by Tatum (1999) 156. 
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 Scholarly opinion varies in degree as to what was wrong with the law. Nisbet (1939) xxii, 175-7, 209-10; 
Gelzer (1969) 154; Lenaghan (1969) 19, 96-7; and Shackleton Bailey (1991) 38 (amongst many others) 
presumed that Clodius’ law did not expressly gain authorisation at all (however, comments at Cic. Dom. 51 and 
106 appear to make this unlikely). Moreau (1987) 468 figured that the law was lost by the time Cicero and 
Clodius were battling it out before the pontificate, thus they were arguing about what the law had once said. 
Stroh (2003) 323-332 in his legal reconstruction makes these legal mistakes so minor that he risks 
underestimating the very importance of ritual formula that he himself believes Cicero was constrained by: Stroh 
figured that Clodius, in the wording of his legislation, had said ‘dedicatio’, not ‘consecratio’, despite the fact 
that these two terms are often used synonymously (as suggested by Nisbet (1939) 209-10; and Tatum (1993b) 
319, n. 3). Stroh also suggests that the law did not expressly name Clodius (nominatim) as the dedicator. Stroh’s 
argument is very compelling, however, it does not hold some ultimate truth as the author seems to claim and is 
just as tenuous as other attempts to reconstruct the faults in Clodius’ law. Tatum (1993b) 327; and (1999) 157 
probably comes closer to the truth by proposing that Clodius had himself authorised to build a shrine in the law, 
but not to dedicate it. Suffice to say though there were inadequacies with the wording of Clodius’ legislation. 
120




Cloelius (Cic. Dom. 83, 129), probably enacted the law at a time when it was not possible to 
foresee it coming under such close scrutiny, and requiring such a detailed defence. 
 
Given our assessment of the legal problem, we can now better appreciate Cicero’s statement 
that the recommendation of the pontiffs was in his favour (Cic. Att. 4.2.3). The pontiffs had 
extended their interpretation of the lex Papiria to apply to the unusual circumstances of 
Clodius’ dedication, and must have had misgivings (political or religious) with Clodius’ 
legislation given the specifications of their decree. Why else would they have drawn attention 
to the legal requirements of the lex Papiria? However, given the conditional nature of their 
decree, the decision of the pontiffs was not conclusive. The legal issue now needed to be 
debated in the senate (Cic. Att. 4.2.4), and the senate still had to ratify their decree by ballot. 
It was the senate’s responsibility to decide whether or not the lex Clodia sanctioned the 
dedication in accordance with the lex Papiria.
121
 This uncertainty enabled Clodius to initially 
spin the pontifical decree in his favour. Immediately after the pontiffs had delivered their 
decree, Clodius – at his brother Ap. Claudius Pulcher’s invitation – addressed a people’s 
assembly and re-iterated his stance on the legal issue. Clodius was adamant that his 
legislation had sufficiently observed the lex Papiria and that his dedication was binding in 
the eyes of gods and men (Cic. Att. 4.2.3). This attempt by Clodius to portray the 
pontificate’s verdict as favourable in hindsight looks like a desperate last-ditch attempt to 
rally support; however, it was in fact a genuine attempt to sway the senate’s judgement of the 




2.3.2. The augmented authority of the pontiff-senator 
The pontiffs presented their recommendation to the senate on 1
st
 October, and Cicero leaves 
us in no doubt that they had adjudged in his favour. Following the senior pontiff Lucullus’ 
explanation of his college’s decree, each priest – in their capacity as senators, but with the 
augmented authority of their priestly status – gave their verdict on the legal issue. They 
concluded that the lex Clodia was insufficient to sanction Clodius’ dedication: itaque suo 
quisque horum loco sententiam rogatus multa secundum causam nostrum disputavit (And so 
each one of them [the pontiffs] discussed my case in turn, arguing [the legal issue] much in 
favour of my cause.) (Cic. Att. 4.2.4). This course of action by the pontiffs poses some 
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 Linderski (1985) 217. 
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interesting questions: to what extent did the duties of the pontiffs overlap with their duties as 
senators? Did those senators who were also pontiffs have more impressive authority as 
senators? And to what extent was this sequence of events determined by Cicero’s political 
supporters in the pontificate? 
 
With very few exceptions, all pontiffs were (or would become) senators. As such, their 
constitutional position as leaders of the community was not restricted to senatorial functions; 
rather, these duties were often combined with priestly responsibilities.
123
 Thus the senator 
who was also a priest appears to have been granted a certain pre-eminence in legal debates 
that overlapped with religious lore. The pontiffs were (or were at least perceived as) experts 
of the law and written word; their compiled decrees and responses in short formed an entire 
jurisprudence. Given this overlap between pontifical lore and public law, the priests must 
have been perceived as experts not just of ius sacrum, but also ius publicum.
124
 The pontifex 
maximus Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. was, for example, a renowned jurist of civil law having 
written iuris civilis libri XVIII (Dig. 1.2.2.41; Cic. Leg. 2.47, 52; Off. 3.70; Gell. NA 5.19.6). 
This perception that the pontiffs were also legal experts provided members of the pontifical 
college with the opportunity to debate the legal issue on the senate floor (as senators), much 
to Cicero’s advantage. It is still possible though to separate the collective role of the pontiffs 
from their role as senators. The pontifical college’s decree was able to reduce the problem of 
the aedes Libertatis to a legal issue, which then provided those pontiffs who were also 
senators with the opportunity to debate the legal issue in their capacity as senators. Whilst 
priestly prestige and senatorial pre-eminence were ‘interwoven’ here, the pontiffs were still 
able to draw a clear distinction between their role as a priestly college and their roles as 
senators (as shown by Lucullus’ comments quoted above).
125
 What remains an interesting 
problem though is why the priests chose to issue a decree in support of Cicero. It seems 
incredibly likely that the priests were in fact influenced by their political support for Cicero’s 
cause, as opposed to any particular genuine religious concerns with the propriety of Clodius’ 
dedication. 
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2.3.3. The political sentiment of the pontificate 
In a system of governance where political and religious offices were not separated, it would 
be naïve not to acknowledge the likelihood that political prejudices had some sway on the 
decision of the pontiffs. Given that Cicero also devoted over two-thirds of his speech to a 
political attack on Clodius’ motives, the orator clearly placed great importance on earning the 
political favour of the pontiffs.
126
 With all but one of the pontiffs being senators, Cicero’s aim 
was to utilise the wave of anti-Clodian political sentiment that swept the senate in 57. 
Amongst the pontiffs, including seven consulares (eight if we include the absent pontifex 
maximus Caesar) and two future consuls, were several members of the élite with good cause 
to dislike Clodius. The pontiff M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73) who delivered the 
pontifical decree to the senate may have been the clarissimum virum (most renowned man) 
whom Clodius had made an enemy of (Cic. Dom. 110). Many of the pontiffs, including M. 
Valerius Messalla Niger (cos. 61) and C. Fannius (tr. pl. 59), had also taken an active part in 
the famous prosecution of Clodius de incestu during the Bona Dea scandal of 61 (Cic. Att. 
1.13.3, 1.14.5-6). This explains why Cicero recurrently refers to the scandal throughout his 
speech (Cic. Dom. 105, 110, 136). Even if the nullification of the dedication was difficult 
from the viewpoint of pontifical lore, Cicero wanted to turn the decision of the pontiffs into 
means of halting Clodius’ political ascent after his controversial tribunate. Cicero would also 
have been relying on his close political ties with the most distinguished pontiffs. For 
example, the orator was close friends with the pontiff and consul of 57, P. Cornelius Lentulus 
Spinther (cos. 57), who was an influential spokesman for the orator’s recall (Cic. Red. sen. 
21, 24; Red. pop. 11; Dom. 30, 70). The pontiff P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cos. 79), perhaps 
the oldest consularis and princeps within the senate, had opposed the Catilinarian 
conspirators in Cicero’s consulship (Cic. Dom. 132; Att. 12.21.1) and aided Cicero’s 
restoration through initiating a reconciliation with the reluctant consul Q. Metellus Nepos 
(Cic. Fam. 5.4.2; Red. sen. 25; Sest. 130; Prov. cons. 22). Cicero may also have relied upon 
the goodwill of the pontiff Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nascia (cos. 52), whom he 
defended at trial in 60 against the charge of bribery (Cic. Att. 2.1.9).  
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 Cicero attacks the basis of Clodius’ tribunate (Cic. Dom. 32-42), challenges the legal basis of Clodius’ law 
on his exile (Cic. Dom. 43-99), and even felt the need to defend his support for Pompey’s appointment as 
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However, to assume that this political momentum guaranteed Cicero a favourable outcome 
would risk overlooking the complexity of the college’s decision. Some pontiffs may also still 
have remained on amiable terms with Clodius in 57. The father of the pontiff M. Licinius 
Crassus (quaest. 54) (the triumvir of the same name) had apparently assured Clodius’ 
acquittal in 60 through heavy bribery (Cic. Att. 1.16.5; Har. resp. 36; Schol. Bob. 85, 90) and 
may have felt obliged to defend him.
127
 Clodius would have been supported by his ‘partner in 
crime’, the pontiff L. Pinarius Natta that presided over the dedication with him. The pontiff 
C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76) (FS 2996) would have likely defended Clodius, having already 
defended him in the senate at his trial de incestu (Cic. Att. 1.14.5, 1.16.10; Schol. Bob. 85-6, 
89). Curio was himself also the subject of bitter words and humiliation in a pamphlet written 
by Cicero which circulated during his exile (Cic. Att. 3.12.2, 2.7.3, 3.15.3).
128
 Cicero was also 
ever mindful upon his return of the occultus irascus, aperte invidus (secret resentment yet 
obvious jealousy) (Cic. Att. 4.2.8) of those same men that defended him during his absence. 
The purchase of his imposing house on the Palatine from M. Crassus in 62 for HS 3,500,000 
(Cic. Fam. 5.6.2; Gell. NA 12.12) had caused a great deal of public displeasure. It represented 
a move so spectacularly upward that a few members of the pontificate probably thought the 
novus homo was living well beyond his means.
129
 Thus some members of the pontificate, 
overcome with envy and the great pride for their own illustrious ancestry, could have viewed 
the dedication of the aedes Libertatis as an opportunity to banish Cicero from Rome’s most 
fashionable neighbourhood. 
 
In a letter to Atticus written around 10
th
 September 57, the orator hardly inspires confidence 
in the pontificate’s impending verdict as he considers the distinct possibility that the pontiffs 
might rule against him: 
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 Chap. 122, n. 328 for a discussion on the identification of this pontiff as the son of the triumvir as opposed to 
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 Fragments of the speech survive: Schol. Bob. 85-6, 89. The publication of the pamphlet was according to 
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qui si sustulerint religionem aream praeclaram habemus, superficiem 
consules ex senatus consulto aestimabunt; sin aliter, demolientur*
130
 suo 
nomine locabunt, rem totam aestimabunt. 
 
‘If they remove the religious impediment, I will have a splendid open space 
and the consuls by senatorial decree will estimate the value of the building. If 
not, it [the current shrine] will be demolished; the consuls will let out a 
contract in their own name and make an estimate for the whole site.’  
Cic. Att. 4.1.7. 
 
Cicero here is facing the very real possibility that the pontiffs may prove too conservative, or 
even too scrupulous, to recommend overturning the dedication of an aedes.
131
 Testament to 
both Cicero’s fears and the importance of ensuring the political favour of the pontiffs is the 
weighty and seemingly off-topic introduction to his speech. Cicero begins by responding to 
Clodius’ provocation that he was a henchman of Pompey (Cic. Dom. 3-32) and that his 
ostentatious support for Pompey’s extraordinary appointment in charge of the corn-supply 
should offend the pontiffs (Cic. Dom. 31). That Cicero felt obliged to respond so forcefully to 
such accusations suggests that these measures were unpopular amongst a number of pontiffs 
and that some of these consulares did harbour suspicions against Pompey’s triumphant return 
to the political scene.
132
 The tribune Messius had even hoped to grant Pompey more 
extensive powers giving him control over the treasury, command of great fleet and army, and 
authority over provinces equal to that of governors (Cic. Att. 4.1.7). The consulares fremunt 
(consulars were seething) at this proposal and so Cicero had rather cautiously chosen to 
remain silent on the matter: ‘nos tacemus, et eo magis quod de domo nostra nihil adhuc 
pontifices responderant’ (I remain silent, and I would rather do so because the pontiffs have 
not yet given an answer about my house) (Cic. Att. 4.1.7). Cicero evidently attaches a great 
deal of importance to receiving a sympathetic hearing from the pontiffs, and holds genuine 
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fears that the priests might not rule in his favour based on political sentiment. Maintaining the 
goodwill of the pontiffs was therefore crucial if he wished to succeed and overcome the more 
perplexing issue at hand, the meticulous complexity of ritual technicality and religious 
scruple. 
 
2.3.4. The influence of the pontifical college’s decree 
 
At vero meam domum… causa cognita, duobus locis dicta, maxima frequentia 
amplissimorum ac sapientissimorum civium astante, omni religione una mente 
omnes liberaverunt. 
 
‘But in truth [the pontiffs]… having investigated the issue of my house on two 
separate occasions, in the presence of a great number of the noblest and wisest 
of the citizens, all unanimously pronounced my house free from all religious 
obligation.’ 




 October at the meeting of the senate, after each pontiff who was also a senator had 
debated the legal issue much in Cicero’s favour, Clodius launched a lengthy defence of his 
legal standpoint (three-hours long if we are to believe Cicero) (Cic. Att. 4.2.4). By this point 
it was probably quite clear that a majority of senators would rule in Cicero’s favour. The 
senators eventually cut short Clodius’ diatribe with shouts of disapproval. Despite the tribune 
Sex. Atilius Serranus Gavianus attempting to interpose a veto, cum sententiae gravissimae 
dicerentur, senatui placere mihi domum restitui (some very powerful speeches were 
delivered to the effect that it was the senate’s desire that [Cicero’s] house should be restored) 
(Cic. Att. 4.2.4). On the following day, the senate carried a senatus consultum which included 
provisions permitting the reconstruction of Cicero’s house on the Palatine, the restoration of 
the portico of Catulus, and the allotment of HS 2,000,000 to Cicero for damages (Cic. Att. 
4.2.4-5) (HS 1,500,000 less than he had purchased it for just five years earlier). Thereafter, 
Cicero could justly assert that his title was cleared by the voters of the comitia centuriata, by 
the decree of the pontiffs, and by a senatus consultum. The senate had acted in accordance 
with what the pontiffs had recommended in their decree. We have already seen how the 
pontiffs formulated their verdict, and what motivated them to rule in Cicero’s favour; it 




in the formal processes of their inquiry. Were the pontiffs really the final and binding 




Traditionally scholarship has tended to stress the structural supremacy of the senate in 
relation to the decrees of the three major priestly colleges. Johann Marquardt was one of the 
first to stress the overriding authority of the senate, and his view has continued to influence 
the communis opinio.
134
 The pontiffs certainly would not have been able to produce a decree 
had the senate not first taken the initiative and referred the matter to the college for 
investigation and adjudication. In the case of Cicero’s house, the senator and eminent 
consular M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59) first recommended that the senate consult the 
college before the official inquiry commenced:  
 
eodemque consilio M. Bibuli, fortissimi viri, senatus sententiam secutus est, ut 
vos de mea domo statueretis… 
 
And with the same idea the senate adopted the opinion of Marcus Bibulus, a 
most fearless man, that you pontiffs should decide the question relating to my 
house… 
Cic. Dom. 69. 
 
Cicero makes it quite clear that Bibulus petitioned the senate to refer the issue of the aedes 
Libertatis to the pontiffs. The senate, in the same mind as Bibulus, then acted upon the 
recommendation of Bibulus and officially consulted the pontiffs. W. Jeffrey Tatum 
perceptively notes that between Cicero’s departure in March 58 and the motion of Bibulus in 
July 57 (Cic. Dom. 69) the pontiffs almost certainly did not raise any public objection against 
the religious validity of the dedication.
135
 If they had, Cicero would surely have mentioned it 
in his speech. The formal process for consultation of the pontiffs may explain why the college 
raised no qualm publically with Clodius’ dedication. Only through a motion of the senate 
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Livy’s accounts on the pontiffs being consulted throughout the republican era also make this 
formal process quite clear. Only the senate could refer an issue to the pontiffs for 
adjudication, either by their own initiative, or at the direction of a magistrate or senior 
senator. In 217, a praetor was able to initiate an official inquiry of the pontiffs: consulente 
collegium praetor (a praetor consulted the college) (Livy 22.10.1). The preceding passages of 
Livy clearly indicate that the senate played a coordinating role in the affair: senatus... M. 
Aemilium praetorem, ex collegii pontificum sententia omnia ea ut mature fiant, curare iubet 
(The senate… ordered Marcus Aemilius the praetor, as the college of pontiffs had 
recommended, to ensure that all these measures were promptly put into effect) (Livy 
22.9.11). In 200 a consul was directed by the senate to consult the pontiffs: ad collegium 
pontificum referre consul iussus (the consul, having been ordered to [by the senate], referred 
the issue to the pontifical college) (Livy 31.9.8). The senate also consulted the college 
directly in 187: senatus pontificum collegium consuli iussit (the senate ordered for the 
pontiffs to be consulted) (Livy 39.5.9; cf. 41.16.2). We have no record of the pontiffs ever 
initiating this process; it always came at the behest of the senate, which played the central 
coordinating role in this process.  
 
There is also nothing to indicate from the incident surrounding Cicero’s house (or cases 
recorded by Livy) that the decrees of the pontiffs were ‘binding’ on the senate.
137
 The 
pontifical decree in the case of Cicero’s house only determined that it was possible (posse) to 
return the section of Cicero’s house in question, not that it had to be (Cic. Att. 4.2.3). The 
pontiffs declared that the religious impediment to overturning the dedication could be lifted, 
and that the site could be returned to Cicero sine religio; however, their decretum did not 
definitively state that the dedication was invalid or that the site must to be returned to 
Cicero.
138
 It was the senate who finally ruled (in accordance with priestly opinion) that the 
dedication had been invalid and that Cicero could reoccupy the site of his house (Cic. Att. 
4.2.4; Har. Resp. 13).
139
 Even the final words of Cicero’s speech to the pontiffs reiterated the 
influence of the senate in the affair:  
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quaeso obtestorque vos, pontifices, ut me, quem auctoritate studio sententiis 
restituistis, nunc, quoniam senatus ita vult, manibus quoque vestris in sedibus 
meis collocetis. 
 
I beg and entreat you, O pontiffs, now, since it is the will of the senate that you 
should do so, to place me, whom you have restored by your authority and zeal 
and votes to my country, with your own hands in my house. 
Cic. Dom. 147. 
 
The senate’s central coordinating role in decisions of the pontiffs is also demonstrated by an 
earlier incident of the Late Republic, the Bona Dea scandal.
140
 In the winter of 62, Clodius 
(again embroiled in a religious conflict) was said to have intruded upon the ceremonial rites 
of the Bona Dea dressed as a woman. He was supposedly intent upon seducing the hostess 
Pompeia, the wife of Caesar (the pontifex maximus). In January 61 a senatorial decree 
referred the matter to the pontiffs (Cic. Att. 1.16). The pontifical college pronounced that 
Clodius’ behaviour was nefas (a sacrilege), thus the consuls chose to act upon this by 
promulgating a bill which instituted a formal trial against Clodius (Cic. Att. 1.16.4-5). In this 
case the senate directed and coordinated attempts to resolve the rupture between the human 
and divine whilst the pontificate acted in an advisory, subordinate role. In the end, the 
college’s recommendation was not acted upon because Clodius (through heavy bribery 
according to Cicero) was able to secure acquittal in the trial (Cic. Att. 1.16.11).  
 
Livy’s accounts and terminology also support the supremacy of the senate as the final 
authority on the decision-making process. In 187, senatus pontificum collegium consuli iussit 
(the senate ordered the pontifical college to convene) to decide if it was permissible for M. 
Fulvius Nobilior (Cens. 179) to spend a hundred pounds of gold on the games for his lavish 
triumph (Livy 39.5.7-10): 
 
cum pontifices negassent ad religionem pertinere, quanta impensa in ludos 
fieret, senatus Fuluio quantum impenderet permisit, dum ne summam 
octoginta milium excederet. 
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When the pontiffs had replied that from the point of view of religion it was 
immaterial how much should be spent on the games, the senate granted 
permission to M. Fulvius for whatever amount he should spend, provided that 
he did not exceed a total of eighty thousand sesterces. 
Livy 39.5.9-10. 
 
The senate asked the pontiffs whether there was an issue from the viewpoint of pontifical lore 
for so much to be squandered on a triumph. The pontiffs refrained from passing judgement 
though, likely because nothing in their books determined it to be any sort of violation. 
Nevertheless the senate put a cap of eighty thousand sesterces on the games. Thus the senate 
chose to make a decision to limit the amount Fulvius spent on his games in spite of the 
pontifical verdict that no cap was necessary. We also have record of a responsum of the 
pontiffs being ignored by the senate in 113 (Livy Per. 63).
141
 In this case, the pontiffs had 
absolved the Vestal Virgins of any wrong-doing following accusations of sexual promiscuity. 
However, the comitia tributa (Tribal Assembly) ignored their verdict and condemned three 
Vestal Virgins to death. Although this is the only known instance in Livy of a decision of the 
pontiffs being completely ignored, the advice of the decimviri sacris faciundis (another of the 
three most coveted priesthoods) was ignored in both 144-3 and 140. The priests attempted to 
declare it to be nefas for Q. Marcius Rex to construct an aqueduct that would carry water to 
the Capitol.
142
 The senate though, influenced heavily by Q. Marcius Rex’s entourage, rejected 
the advice of the decimviri, and the Aqua Marcia was constructed against their will (Frontin. 
Aq. 1.7). Since the ancient evidence only provides an incomplete picture, these rare instances 
of the senate rejecting priestly advice are enough to indicate that the senate could make a 
decision contrary to the priests’ recommendation.  
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Despite the authority of the senate in this decision-making process, the recommendation of 
the pontiffs still must have had some influence on the final verdict of the senate though. 
Recent scholarship has tended to stress the importance of sacerdotal colleges and how the 
priests of the three major colleges were empowered (albeit only slightly) through this 
consultation process.
143
  There are at least seventeen examples preserved by Livy of the 
senate having consulted the pontiffs in an official capacity throughout the Early and Middle 
Republic.
144
  It would appear from the cases documented by Livy that it was customary to 
follow the recommendations of the college (Livy 24.44.9; 27.4.14; 27.37.4, 7; 34.45.8; 
39.22.4; 40.45.2). Thus the advice of the pontiffs seems to have carried considerable weight 
and authority. Their consultation was not just an inconsequential formality. If this were the 
case, the advisory role of the pontiffs in relation to the senate would seem arbitrary. Rather, 
the pontiffs functioned as a repository of religious knowledge which the senate could call 
upon in times of uncertainty. We might presume that such instances caused a great deal of 
religious anxiety amongst the general populace and the élite alike, thus the senators requested 
the advice of the priests to ensure they acted in accordance with religious lore. Throughout 
his speech, Cicero emphasises the sapienta (knowledge) (Cic. Dom. 1; 2; 33) and scientia 
(expertise) (Cic. Dom. 121; 138) of the pontiffs, which granted the priests considerable 
auctoritas (authority).
145
 As a subcommittee of the senate, the pontiffs utilised their specialist 
knowledge to relieve the senate of making a decision on a certain specialist areas of pontifical 
lore, and produced recommendations not likely to be overturned by that parent committee. 
However, the pontiffs never usurped the formal authority of the senate, and their decrees 
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The episode is arguably our most documented case example of the pontiffs being consulted in 
an official capacity by the senate, and certainly our most detailed example from Cicero’s 
lifetime. The pontiff L. Pinarius Natta, through his assistance in the dedication ceremony, 
was able to utilise his position to the advantage of his political ally and brother-in-law 
Clodius. Natta was thus able to have an impact on a noteworthy political issue without having 
yet even become a senator. However, in this case, the young novice was still subordinate to 
more powerful political figures, with Clodius as tribune pulling the strings and other senior 
political figures likely playing a part in his election to the pontificate. 
 
Given that the pontiffs were also able to override Natta’s role in the dedication ceremony 
through their recommendation to the senate, it would be reasonable to postulate that the 
collective might of the college was greater than that of a single little-known pontiff.
147
 
Collectively the pontifical college was able to flex its muscles as a subcommittee of the 
senate with considerable effect. The members of the college utilised their expertise and 
position in Roman society to confidently declare that the site of Cicero’s house could be 
returned sine religione, a decision that was partially motivated by political favour towards 
Cicero and resentment against Clodius. However, the influence of the pontiffs was kept in 
check by the central coordinating role played by the senate: the pontiffs had to first be 
summoned by the senate before initiating their inquiry, they had to provide an explanation for 
their decree, and the senate had to ratify their decree through a senatus consultum. The 
pontiffs were therefore ultimately accountable to the senate. The decisions of pontiffs were 
not laws in themselves, but decrees, effective only after they were supported by a senatorial 
majority. 
 
In light of these conclusions, the pontiffs were not granted overwhelming powers to interfere 
in Roman public affairs. The priests acted as guides to magistrates whom sought their 
assistance, and as advisors to the senate if summoned and consulted on matters that pertained 
to their expertise. The strict procedures in place for consultation of the pontiffs also limited 
the frequency of their involvement in public affairs. In fact, during the lifetime of Cicero 
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there are only two recorded instances of the pontiffs being consulted in an official capacity by 
the senate: on the Bona Dea scandal and on the dedication of the aedes Libertatis. In the case 
of the Bona Dea incident, Clodius was acquitted of sacrilegious behaviour through heavy 
bribery; thus the pontiffs’ assertion that he had committed a nefas went unpunished. And in 
the case of Cicero’s house, the pontifical decree could not prevent Clodius from launching 
fresh allegations in 56 that the hallowed site of Cicero’s house had been profaned through the 
nullification of his dedication (Cic. Har. resp. 1). The high-profile nature of these cases 
certainly gave the impression that the college was a learned and influential institution. 
However, the reality drawn from these late republican case examples was that their decrees 
only appear to have influenced the lives of private individuals (important individuals, but 
individuals nonetheless). In the lifetime of Cicero, the pontiffs never appear to have been 
summoned to question the fundamental mechanisms of the res publica; for example there are 
no records of the pontiffs challenging controversial legislation or the basis of an election. The 
case on Cicero’s house had significant repercussions for Cicero’s future, but in the grander 
scheme of things, did not shape the Roman political climate or make a substantial difference 
to the course of history. Although the advisory role of the pontiffs may provide some limited 
justification for why men so eagerly pursued this religious office, their limited direct ‘hard 
power’ forms only a small part of a bigger picture. Before we attempt, however, to 
investigate the final approach to why Roman aristocrats vied for priestly office, it is 














     
 
THE POLITICAL POWERS OF THE AUGURS 





Maximum autem et praestantissimum in re publica ius est augurum cum 
auctoritate coniunctum. neque vero hoc, quia sum ipse augur, ita sentio, sed 
quia sic existimare nos est necesse. 
 
But the greatest and most important authority of the State is that of the augurs, 
who are bestowed with great powers. However, I do not feel this way because 
I myself am an augur, but because we augurs are compelled by the facts to 
think it is so. 
Cic. Leg. 2.31. 
 
The auspices were signs sent from the gods – namely Jupiter (Cic. Leg. 20) – expressing 
divine approval or disapproval for any action at a given time. Heeding these signs was 
perceived as a way to preserve the favourable link between the Republic and the gods, 
ensuring Rome’s perpetual success at home and in the field of battle. Given the central 
importance of the auspices in the foundation of Rome, it is hardly surprising that they became 
a fundamental mechanism governing the decision-making processes in Roman legislative and 
electoral assemblies. As Livy tells us through the speech of Ap. Claudius Crassus 
Inregillensis (cos. 349), auspiciis bello ac pace domi militiaeque omnia geri (all things during 
peace or war, at home or abroad, were done only after consultation of the auspices) (Livy 6. 
41. 4-5).
148
 By the Late Republic, most instances of adverse omens being reported and 
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utilised to obstruct legislation or elections were carried out by magistrates with the right to 
consult the auspices (known as obnuntiatio).
149
 However, the augurs as experts on augural 
lore appear to have possessed ‘exclusive’ access to an archaic formula for reporting adverse 
omens known as alio die (declaring that business was to be conducted ‘on another day’), 
which it has been suggested carried more weight than a magistrates obnuntiatio. The augural 
college also acted collectively as a constitutional authority on the validity of legislation, 
elections or other public business suspected to have been carried out contrary to the will of 
the auspices. If there was any mistake in the process of consulting the auspices, known as a 
vitium, the augurs could be consulted and issue a decree in collaboration with the senate 
(much in the same way as the official inquiries carried out by the pontiffs). However, given 
the central importance of the auspices in Roman public life, the decrees of the augurs could 
have been more impressive than those of the pontiffs, with the power to invalidate legislation 
or election results. This chapter will aim to determine the extent to which the augurs of the 
Late Republic were perceived as powerful, and whether it was the allure of these powers that 
could have encouraged prospective candidates to pursue this religious office.  
 
The following analysis on the political influence of the augurs will investigate the apparent 
powers of the priests using the same method as the previous chapter, by separately analysing 
the powers of individual augurs and the powers of the collective augural college.
150
 Given 
that the ancient sources mention the augurs more frequently during the Late Republic than the 
pontiffs though, this section will examine several cases where the augurs seem to have 
exercised influence. This examination will start by outlining the historical development of the 
auspices and outlining the technical processes in place for consultation of the auspices; since 
without a sound appreciation of the importance that the auspices played in Roman public life, 
it would not be possible to understand the significant role played by the augurs. It is 
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important to acknowledge at the outset that holding office as an augur was not a prerequisite 
for being able to utilise the obstructive force of the auspices though, since most recorded 
cases of adverse omens were in fact carried out by magistrates who held no such priestly 
office. Thus through a brief overview of all seven recorded instances of magistrates utilising 
their right to obnuntiatio that occurred between 59 and 44, it will be possible to draw some 
firmer conclusions on the customary procedures for magistrates consulting the auspices, and 
on the role played by the augurs in this process. This section will also address the unique role 
afforded to individual augurs to utilise their position and knowledge to either assist a 
magistrate’s obnuntiatio or to persuade the senate to invalidate laws. Particular attention will 
be paid to the role of the consul and augur L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91), whose 
recommendation compelled the senate to invalidate a series of controversial laws carried by 
the tribune M. Livius Drusus (tr. pl. 91). 
 
The second section of this chapter will discuss the individual powers of the augurs to utilise 
their own ius nuntiationis (right to report omens), assessing their ability to utilise the ritual 
formula alio die to delay or potentially invalidate proceedings. Cicero’s constitutional treatise 
De Legibus, which discussed in theoretical terms the role of the augurs in his ideal Roman 
constitution, suggested that individual augurs had a veto on any public transaction through 
the declaration alio die (Cic. Leg. 2.31). However, the use of the archaic ritual formula by the 
augurs seems to have fallen into disuse by the Late Republic. The only definitive incident of 
an augur utilising this means of obstruction was the infamous case of M. Antonius (cos. 44) 
in the year of his consulship declaring alio die in an attempt to prevent the election of P. 
Cornelius Dolabella as consul suffectus (Cic. Phil. 2.80-4).
151
 Although Cicero undoubtedly 
exaggerated the power of the priestly college to which he himself belonged, the case study 
involving Antony is a fascinating one and worth detailed examination. 
 
The third section will discuss the combined authority of the augurs, determining the extent to 
which the augurs had the ability to collectively issue ‘binding’ decrees to nullify laws carried 
contrary to the auspices (contra auspicia). In his encomium of augury, Cicero begs to ask 
quid enim maius… est legem si non iure rogata est tollere, ut Titiam decreto conlegi… (What 
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power is greater… than the right [of augurs] to abolish a law if it was not carried in 
accordance with the auspices, as was the case when the Titian Law was annulled by a decree 
of the augurate? (Cic. Leg. 2.31). However, the competency of the augurs to influence debate 
on constitutionally dubious legislation was certainly not as straightforward as Cicero suggests 
here. From the limited evidence we possess during the Late Republic, it would appear that 
only in relatively exceptional circumstances were the augurs collectively summoned and 
asked to issue a decree on the validity of legislation. Since we only have scant references to 
the augurate issuing decrees in the Late Republic, the unprecedented long-distance 
‘obnuntiationes’ of Caesar’s consular colleague, M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59), and the 
ensuing debate among the augurs on the constitutional validity of Caesar’s legislation, will 
provide an interesting case study on the limitations of the augural college. Through a detailed 
analysis of this example, it will be possible to highlight how difficult it had become at the 
nadir of the Republic to initiate an official inquiry of the augurate, as the college became 
increasingly constrained and divided by the tense political climate. This discussion will 
suggest that by the time of Caesar’s dictatorship the augurs had effectively become a rubber-




3.2. The Science of Augury 
 
3.2.1. The origin of the augurs and their lore 
 
quo modo autem haec aut quando aut a quibus inventa dicemus? 
 
Again, how, when, and by whom, shall we say that our  
system [of Roman augury] was invented? 
Cic. Div. 2.80 
 
Any attempt to unravel the powers of the augurs in the Late Republic must start with a 
historical assessment of their function as priests. The earliest augurs and their lore remains 
something of a mystery to us, the origin of their augural science perhaps forever lost in time. 
Cicero was himself an augur and no doubt had access to augural records, yet, in his 
philosophical treatise De Divinatione, even he was unable to shed much light on the origin of 
the augural discipline. He was simply aware that the science predated the founding of Rome 
itself (Cic. Div. 1. 31-2, 107).
152
 Romulus was generally perceived not only as the founder of 
Rome, but the founder of the public auspices, on which the whole Roman state was said to 
depend (Cic. Rep. 2. 16, 26; Nat. D. 3.5; Livy 1.6.4-7.3; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.86).
153
 
Indeed, Romulus was often accredited with the creation of a state sanctioned college of 
augurs (Cic. Rep. 2.26). Initially the college was three in number with one chosen from each 
of the three ancient patrician tribes, the Ramnes, Titienses and Luceres (Livy 10.6.7-8). 
Dionysus of Halicarnassus recorded that Romulus instituted the significance of the auspices 
by decreeing that they should be observed by all his successors, and that no one should accept 
the title of king or any other magistracy until the gods had first given their sanction through 
the auspices (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.6.1).
154
 Dionysus also claimed that Numa Pompilius (the 
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second king of Rome between 715–673) was responsible for the formal induction of the 
augural college as part of his institutionalisation of Roman priesthoods (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
2.64.4), perhaps also increasing the number of augurs to five (Cic. Rep. 2.26; Livy 1.18; Dio 
Cass. 1.6.4). 
  
The influence that the earliest augurs had in public affairs is unclear. The legendary story of 
the augur Attus Navius opposing a proposal of L. Tarquinius Priscus (the fifth king of Rome 
between 616-579) would appear to indicate that the augurs once possessed great powers.
155
 
However, the story does not necessarily indicate that these priests were enormously 
influential, but merely implies that there was an ongoing power struggle between the 
authority of the state and augurs in regards to who possessed ultimate control over 
consultation of the auspices. That the king Tarquinius is humbled (and somewhat humiliated) 
whilst the augur vindicated is not evidence of the supreme power of the augurs, since the 
moral of this story – recorded by late republican writers – has a very obvious pro-republican 
message. Classicist and lexicographer William Smith suggested that the augurs were 
originally only employed as assistants in the consultation of the auspices, and that the kings 
probably retained the final say on the ability to discern the will of the gods.
156
 Smith notes 
that the dignity of the augurs gradually increased as they were employed at the inauguration 
of kings, and became depositaries of the augural science; however, the king still retained 
overruling access to the auspices.
157
 Eminent scholars such as Theodor Mommsen and Jochen 
Bleicken also indicated that the augurs of the Early Republic had an essentially passive role 
in comparison to the magistrates, as interpreters of the augural discipline rather than actually 
consulting the auspices themselves.
158
 Thus these two scholars suggested that it was the 
magistrates who first took on the major responsibility of consulting the auspices that the 
kings once possessed, not the augurs. This theory proposes that the augur’s nuntiatio (the 
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Another approach which is equally supported by a number of distinguished scholars, 
including the likes of Isaac Valeton, Stefan Weinstock and Kurt Latte, proposes an alternative 
view.
160
 These scholars supposed that, after the expulsion of the last king of Rome and the 
founding of the Republic, the augurs had a monopoly on the right to consult the auspices, and 
that it was not until the early fifth century that magistrates began to observe auspices 
themselves. Thus according to this theory members in the augurate were originally granted 
impressive powers to interfere in Roman public life. Given our lack of evidence on this early 
period in Rome’s history, however, it must be stressed that it is impossible to ascertain which 
of these approaches is correct.
161
 I would be inclined to accept the former view, that the 
magistrate’s use of the ritual formula obnuntiatio predated that of the augur’s use of alio die. 
One reason for this is because our earliest record of the augurs acting as a priestly authority 
on the auspices in the Early Republic depicts the augurate as a consultative body which 
issued rulings at the senate’s request, not as a religious body with exclusive access to the 
auspices (Livy 4. 31). According to Livy, in 426 a technical debate arose concerning whether 
a consular tribune was ritually qualified (had the correct kind of auspices) to nominate a 
dictator; augures consulti eam religionem exemere (the augurs were consulted and they 
removed the ritual obstacle) (Livy 4.31.4).
162
 The function of the augurs was to provide 
magistrates and the senate with the technical guidance necessary to make the ritually correct 
decision, since they were a body dedicated to understanding and interpreting messages sent 
from the gods. The dignity of the augurs gradually increased in consequence to them 
becoming the preservers and depositaries of this augural science. Eventually the augurs were 
present at popular assemblies not only in order to assist the presiding officer at their request 
(siquid usus poposcisset), but also to exercise their own independent right of declaration (ius 
nuntiationis), through their observation and interpretation of unsought omens (auspicia 
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3.2.2. The technical procedures for consultation of the auspices 
The auspices could be observed in several different ways. The earliest method was to 
examine the flight patterns or cries of birds (signa ex avibus).
164
 Most commonly though, and 
especially in the Late Republic, these signs came from the observation of celestial 
phenomena (signa ex caelo) such as thunder and lightning, the surest expression of Jupiter’s 
will. According to Cicero the augural annals proclaimed Iove tonante, fulgurante comitia 
populi habere nefas (When Jove thunders or lightens it is impious to hold an election) (Cic. 
Div. 2.42). In all other cases fulmen sinistrum (literally lightning on the left but in augural 
reality observed in the east) was the best of auspices favourable for all enterprises, public or 
private (Cic. Div. 2.43, 74).
165
 By the Early Republic, there was a crucial distinction between 
two methods for consultation of the auspices: auspicia impetrativa (impetrative signs) and 
auspicia oblativa (oblative signs).
166
 Impetrative signs were actively sought by the presiding 
magistrate of an assembly or other ritually qualified person before proceedings began.
167
 
Oblative signs were observed without being actively solicited, occurring suddenly and 
unexpectedly during a course of an action.
168
 The late fourth century AD grammarian M. 
Servius Honoratus makes this classification clear in his commentary of the Aeneid: auguria 
aut oblativa sunt, non poscuntur, sed casu eveniunt aut impetrative, quae optata veniunt 
(Omens are either oblative – not requested, but happen by chance – or they are impetrative, 
which appear after having been requested) (Serv. Dan. 6.190). 
 
The auspicia impetrativa were routinely carried out by the presiding magistrate of an 
assembly (usually the consul), or another qualified magistrate, before any public transaction 
took place. Great importance was placed on obtaining favourable auspicia impetrativa before 
legislative or electoral assemblies convened. As noted by Cicero: …exactis regibus nihil 
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publice sine auspiciis nec domi nec militiae gerebatur (after the expulsion of the kings, no 
public business was carried out at home or abroad without first consulting the auspices) (Cic. 
Div. 1.3). This was to ensure that the gods had granted permission for public business to be 
conducted on a given day. The augur’s role during this process was effectively submissive to 
the presiding magistrate. The magistrate would actively seek favourable omens; whilst the 
augur (or augurs) would only assist as advisors should the auspicating magistrate or the 
obstructing magistrate have the need for their expert advice.
169
 Customarily the presiding 
magistrate would observe the necessary favourable omens and business would commence as 
usual (so-called adnuntiatio), but occasionally, and especially towards the end of the Late 
Republic, the report of adverse omens (obnuntiatio) by another magistrate with the right to 
consult the auspices could cause public business to come to a halt.
170
 It may not have been 
uncommon for magistrates who were also augurs to report unfavourable omens through 
obnuntiatio more readily. The use of obnuntiatio by another qualified magistrate presented 
the presiding magistrate of an assembly three choices: 1) push ahead and ignore the report of 
adverse omens, which could to bring the validity of any subsequent business into question at 
a later date should the senate launch an inquiry (Jer. De vir. ill. 73.6-8; Cic. Leg. 2.31; Dom. 
40; Har. resp. 48); 2) abandon the day’s business, and continue to repeat the auspices each 
day (repetere auspicia)
171
 until the opposing party’s political support dwindled and they were 
forced to back down (this path often resulted in a gridlock during elections) (Cic. Att. 4.3.3-4; 
QFr. 3.3.2); or 3) heed the report and abandon the course of action that warranted the use of 
obnuntiatio by the obstructing magistrate (Cic. Phil. 2.99). From what ancient evidence 
survives, option two appears to have been the most popular, which is why obnuntiatio 
became recognised as a useful delaying tactic for magistrates to exploit. 
 
Only magistrates with spectio (the right to consult the auspices) were able to utilise the 
obstructive force of obnuntiatio, and this is fundamental in any attempt to deduce which 
group wielded the most influence through the consultation of the auspices. Qualified 
magistrates could declare se de caelo servare (literally that they were ‘to watch for something 
from the heavens’) the day before an assembly (typically by posting edicts in the Forum), and 
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could consult the auspices from midnight until dawn. It has been suggested that by the Late 
Republic the announcement se de caelo servare may have been enough to deter a presiding 
magistrate from holding an assembly the following day, since more often than not the 
magistrate watching the heavens could see, or could potentially fake obnuntiatio.
172
 However, 
if the presiding magistrate proved obdurate in his desire to hold an assembly, the omen 
watcher was still technically required to report the unfavourable sign by declaring obnuntiatio 
in person, on the day of the assembly before proceedings had begun. The declaration se de 
caelo servare may have entailed the threat of obnuntiatio, but it did not legally bind the 
presiding officer to delay an assembly. Only the declaration of adverse omens in person 
amounted to obnuntiatio.
173
 If a presiding magistrate ignored a binding declaration of adverse 
auspicia impetrativa by a qualified magistrate, as suggested by option one above, and as 
Bibulus and his supporters claimed Caesar had done in 59, or if there had been an honest 
mistake in the ritual process, then the legislation in question could be deemed vitiosus 
(ritually flawed) on the advice of the augurs at a later date, and be nullified or require re-
enactment by the senate. 
 
The exercise of obnuntiatio is further complicated by a complex hierarchical structure for the 
varying powers of those magistrates with spectio. It would appear that the consul as the 
highest magistrate was not bound to accept the report of obnuntiatio by a lower magistrate 
(and the praetor was not bound to accept the report of an aedile or lower magistrate, and so 
on).
174
 Officials with imperium (consuls, praetors and censors in that pecking order) were 
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said to possess maxima auspicia, whilst those of lower magistracies (such as aediles and 
quaestors) were called minora auspicia (Gell. NA 13. 15). To determine what is meant by 
minor magistratus, Aulus Gellius relies on the words of the late republican augur and author 
of a work de auspiciis, M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 53). Messalla noted that maxima 
sunt consulum, praetorum, censorum (the greatest [auspices] are those of the consuls, 
praetors and censors).
175
 This meant that it would be highly unlikely a minor magistratus 
would be able to obstruct an assembly in controversial circumstances through obnuntiatio, 
since higher magistrates (such as the consuls or praetors) were not bound to accept their 
observations. E. J. Weinrib (1970) convincingly challenged the long-held presumption that 
the lex Aelia permitted a consul to ‘obnuntiate’ against a tribune, instead arguing that the law 
permitted tribunes to ‘obnuntiate’ against one another.
176
 Furthermore by the Late Republic, a 
consul could certainly ‘obnuntiate’ against another a consul, as Bibulus did against Caesar in 
59, and a tribune could ‘obnuntiate’ against both a consul (Cic. Sest. 79, 83; Phil. 2.99; QFr. 
3.3.2; Att. 4.3.3-4; 4.17.4) and a censor (Cic. Att. 4.9.1). 
 
The second method of observing the auspices known as auspicia oblativa (unsought omens) 
was to witness and report an unfavourable omen during the course of an action. As Isaac 
Valeton articulately put it, the vinculum temporis (bond of time) was the only sure indicator 
that a particular sign referred to a particular action.
177
 The most common (and effective) 
negative auspicia oblativa during an assembly was the report of thunder or lightning, but 
could also be observed through dirae, which were a heterogeneous collection of ominous 
signs archived by the augurs and quindecimviri sacris faciundis.
178
 The observation of dirae 
could be especially effective at obstructing legislation or elections because they technically 
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vitiated an action that was in progress, not just the day on which the business was being 
conducted.
179
 By the Late Republic, the right of announcing a course of action to be an 
unfavourable auspicium oblativum belonged to all Roman citizens, and was not just confined 
to augurs or magistrates. However, the presiding magistrate retained the right to respect or 
ignore the announcement of these adverse omens, and so in some circumstances these signs 
were disregarded and a magistrate’s course of action continued.
180
 The augur’s observation of 
auspicia oblativa (known as nuntiatio) though was apparently of especial significance and 
carried a great deal of weight. This was supposedly a politically direct mechanism that these 
priests had at their disposal should they wish to intervene in public affairs. The practical 
application of these powers will be reviewed in due course. First it is necessary to review 
several cases of obnuntiatio by magistrates during the Late Republic, and to examine the role 
played by the augurs in these instances.  
 
3.2.3. Magistrates and Obnuntiatio (59-44) 
In the fifteen year period between 59 and 44, there were at least seven instances of 
magistrates exercising, or attempting to exercise, their magisterial right to report the 
observation of unfavourable auspicia impetrativa through obnuntiatio. This compares with 
just two cases (one of which is presumed) of augurs utilising their individual right to declare 
adverse omens. Obnuntiatio, however, was not a straightforward way for magistrates to 
obstruct public business, since four out of the seven recorded cases were either ignored or 
prevented through violence. By July 57, the use of obnuntiationes had become such a 
hindrance to public business that the senate had the capacity to issue a senatus consultum 
declaring that no one was to watch the heavens as a means of obstructing a particular action. 
Cicero, for example, claims that the senate carried such a decree to prevent individuals 
(namely Clodius and his supporters) from utilising the auspices to obstruct his recall from 
exile: 
 
                                                 
179
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Vel quod est postridie decretum… ne quis de caelo servaret, ne quis moram 
ullam adferret; si quis aliter fecisset, eum plane eversorem rei publicae fore 
idque senatum gravissime laturum, et ut statim de eius facto referretur. 
 
Or what was decreed on the next day [in the senate]… that no one should 
watch for signs from the heavens, nor try to delay proceedings; and that 
anyone who did otherwise would clearly be a destroyer of the Republic, and 
the senate would take the most grave view of such an act; and that the matter 
should immediately be referred to it for consideration. 
Cic. Sest. 129. 
 
It is difficult to know how much weight such a decree had and what the outcome would have 
been had a noncompliant magistrate chosen to ignore the block on obnuntiationes. Perhaps 
the senate would have referred the matter to the augural college to investigate any possible 
falsification of auspices and to remove the religio (impediment) from allowing Cicero’s 
return. The incident also clearly indicates the central coordinating role played by the senate, 
who could dictate when obnuntiatio was not appropriate and take action against 
nonconformists.
181
 It also represents a decision taken by a political body (the senate) 
concerned with exploitation of religious lore for private political ends. 
 
The first of the four cases of attempted obnuntiationes that occurred between 59 and 44, and 
one of the most infamous cases (which will be discussed in further detail in the final section 
of this chapter), was carried out by M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59). His long-distance 
obnuntiationes from his house in 59 were ignored by his consular colleague Caesar, and only 
succeeded in temporarily brining the validity of Caesar’s acta into question.
182
 In the second 
case, three tribunes (Cn. Domitius Calvinus, Q. Ancharius and C. Fannius) attempted to 
obstruct legislative assemblies and elections by declaring that they were watching the 
heavens in support of Bibulus in 59 and were also ignored (Cic. Vat. 16; Sest. 113). The next 
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instance occurred on 23
rd
 January 57, where it appears that a praetor (likely Ap. Claudius 
Pulcher the augur) attempted or at least considered declaring unfavourable omens at a 
legislative assembly. However, the assembly was broken up by violence before the praetor 
had the opportunity to make his declaration (Cic. Sest. 78).
183
 Finally, Cicero also alleged that 
P. Sestius (tr. pl. 57) as tribune a few weeks later in February 57 was intent upon declaring 
obnuntiatio at what appears to have been a legislative assembly of the comitia tributa, but the 
assembly erupted into a brawl and Sestius was supposedly lucky to have escaped with his life 
(Cic. Sest. 79, 83; Q.Fr. 2.3.6; Dio Cass. 39.7).
184
 Cicero’s portrayal of events in this final 
incident, however, seems skewed to suit his argument, since he is defending Sestius against 
the charge of maiestas. Clodius is thus depicted as the instigator of the violence, and Sestius 
as the brave defender of the Republic and preserver of the auspices. Nevertheless, it is quite 
possible that Sestius was equally to blame for the bloodshed, and perhaps that he was never 
intent upon declaring obnuntiatio. Cicero could have fabricated Sestius’ plan to utilise this 
sacrosanct means of obstruction in order to depict Sestius as the innocent victim in the attack. 
Faking a report of unfavourable omens had become an accepted means to obstruct the actions 
of a political rival in the Late Republic. 
 
The use of obnuntiatio by magistrates, however, was not always doomed to fail or be 
disrupted by violence. On three occasions influential magistrates with the backing of 
powerful allies successfully utilised obnuntiationes to obstruct election assemblies. On 19
th
 
November 57, the tribune T. Annius Milo, at the height of his popular backing, repeatedly 
obstructed the aedilician elections to prevent Clodius’ candidacy for the office (Cic. Att. 
4.3.3-4). Cicero’s letter to Atticus details the rather amusing circumstances of the incident, 
demonstrating the importance of the physical presence of the obstructor and stressing that the 
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report had to be made before proceedings began. The consul Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos 
(cos. 57), becoming frustrated by Milo’s use of obnuntiatio in the Campus Martius to 
postpone the elections, told Milo that he would need to make his report of unfavourable 
omens in person in the Forum where he would be taking the necessary auspices before going 
to the Campus to take the votes. Milo and his entourage accordingly arrived at the Forum 
before sunrise to serve the notice. However, they had been deceived; Metellus was already 
stealthily hurrying to the Campus to commence the voting before he could be obstructed by 
Milo. A cat-and-mouse chase ensued, but Milo managed to overtake Metellus and serve his 
notice in person before the voting began. The next day was a nundinae (market day) so no 
public business could be conducted on that day or the next; the elections were not held until 
two months later, on 20
th
 January 56 (Cic. Fam. 5.3.2).
185
 If Milo’s aim was to simply hold 
up the elections, he was successful; if his aim was to prevent Clodius’ election as aedile so 
that he could be liable for prosecution under charges of violence, he failed. This serves to 
illustrate the limited capacity of obnuntiatio to influence political proceedings in most cases. 
 
The second example involves the tribune (and augur) Q. Mucius Scaevola, who repeatedly 
declared obnuntiationes to hold up the consular elections from July until October 54: 
comitiorum quotidie singuli dies tolluntur obnuntiationibus, magna voluntate bonorum 
omnium (Each day of elections is being held up every day by obnuntiationes, to the great 
satisfaction of all good men) (Cic. QFr. 3.3.2).
186
 That Q. Mucius was politically motivated is 
clear from Cicero’s concluding remark, although what these motives were remains 
unknown.
187
 His ability to delay the consular elections for four months is impressive and may 
have derived in part from his status as an augur. His privileged access to knowledge 
concerning the auspices perhaps afforded him a unique position to dictate the ritual formula 
with confidence, and may have boosted his authority as a magistrate. Those magistrates 
without membership in the augurate which attempted to oppose him may have found it all the 
more difficult in light of his combined power and influence as both tribune and augur. 
Finally, in early 44 the tribune L. Antonius (tr. pl. 44) (brother of the consul and augur M. 
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Antonius) successfully utilised obnuntiatio to obstruct the censorial elections (Cic. Phil. 
2.99), which following Caesar’s assassination were never carried out. 
 
3.2.4. The skilled assistance of an augur 
These seven cases indicate that it was magistrates, not augurs, who in the Late Republic were 
most effective at utilising the auspices and exploiting religious lore for political gain. But this 
is not to say that the augurs did not have a role to play in such circumstances. The skilled 
assistance of an individual augur could be sought by the presiding magistrates of an assembly 
to assist in the interpretation of the auspices, providing authority to a magistrate’s 
declaration.
188
 According to Cicero, however, this advisory role of an augur was rarely 
utilised and came to be neglected by the end of the Republic: apud maiores nostros 
adhibebatur peritus, nunc quilibet (Our ancestors [in magistracies] used to consult experts 
[augurs], now they consult anyone) (Cic. Div. 2. 71). This is not to say that the augurs were 
never consulted. Varro preserved a vivid example of how a ‘good’ augur made himself 
available to bestow his wisdom as late as 54: comitiis aediliciis… Appium Claudium augurem 
sedentem invenimus in subselliis, ut consuli, siquid usus poposcisset, esset praesto (During 
the election of aediles [in 54]… we find Appius Claudius, the augur, sitting on a bench so 
that he might be on hand for consultation, if need should arise) (Varro, Rust. 3.2.2). This 
extract indicates that the augurs remained important because of their perceived role in society 





Two case studies from 100 and 91 also attest to the influence that a skilled, prominent augur 
could have in the senate’s decision to annul legislation. In 100 the validity of laws carried by 
the tribune L. Appuleius Saturninus (tr. pl. 100) was fiercely opposed by the prominent 
political figure and augur Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus (cos. 109).
190
 When Appuleius 
was carrying his agrarian bill in the assembly, those magistrates who attempted to obstruct 
the passage of the law were driven away from the platform through violence and perhaps 
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prevented from utilising obnuntiatio.
191
 According to Appian the masses then attempted to 
utilise their own right to observe auspicia oblativa by also announcing that thunder had been 
heard during the enactment of the bill (App. B. Civ. 1.30-1). Appulieus ignored these 
pronouncements and proceeded with the promulgation of his bill. When the laws were 
discussed in the senate, the consul and augur Marius clearly indicated that the laws had been 
carried per vim and when thunder had been announced, and so were not valid. Appuleius 
therefore demanded that all senators swear an oath upon the law, but Metellus refused, for he 
persisted that the law was non iure rogata (Cic. Sest. 101).
192
 As a prominent augur, Metellus 
would have been well equipped to ascertain a violation of augural law. As a result of his 
staunch opposition to Appuleius’ laws and reluctance to oppose the tribune by force, Metellus 
resigned from the senate and fled into voluntary exile. The laws of Appuleius were eventually 
annulled (or perhaps simply disregarded) by the senate after his very public and violent 
demise at the end of 100 (Cic. Leg. 2.14). To our knowledge this was the first law to be 
annulled by the senate on the grounds that it was contrary to the auspices. 
 
Another well-documented incident of an augur utilising his knowledge to considerable effect 
occurred in 91, when the consul at the time and augur L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91) 
convinced the senate to annul the laws of the tribune and pontiff M. Livius Drusus (tr. pl. 
91).
193
 The incident shows that Philippus, a prominent political figure and consul, could 
utilise his influence and social position as an augur (as Metellus did nine years earlier) to 
challenge the validity of laws suspected of being contra auspicia. Drusus, backed by the 
famous orator and pontiff L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95), initially enjoyed a great deal of 
support from the senate, especially for his proposal to transfer control of the courts from the 
equites to the senate (Livy Per. 70-1; Asc. Corn. 61A; Vell. Pat. 2.13). However, his attempts 
to appease the conflicting interests of the senate, the equestrian order, the Roman populace 
and the Italian Allies backfired and culminated in his downfall towards the end of his 
tribunate (Livy Per. 71). With growing unrest amongst non-Romans, Philippus accused 
Drusus of inciting allied unrest with his proposals for land reform in exchange for 
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enfranchisement of the Italians. Drusus’ proposal to grant Roman citizenship to the Italian 
Allies also met widespread opposition from the senate and the equestrians alike (Vell. Pat. 
2.13). Several allegations were levelled against the leges Liviae, amongst which was the 
suggestion that they had been carried contra auspicia latae (carried contrary to the auspices) 
(Asc. Corn. 61C) and in contravention of the lex Caecilia et Didia (Cic. Dom. 41).
 
Renowned 
expert on the augurs Jerzy Linderski believed that Philippus himself had tried to present an 
obnuntiatio to Drusus but was violently stopped, thus explaining why the laws were deemed 
contra auspicia.
194
 All that Cicero tells us though is that the laws were nullified by a decree 
of the senate (Cic. Leg. 2.14), consilio Philippi consulis et auguris (on the direction of 
Philippus, both consul and augur) (Cic. Leg. 2.31), not long before Drusus’ assassination. The 
annulment of these laws directly resulted in the outbreak of the disastrous Social War waged 
across Italy between 91 and 88.  
 
Unfortunately the ancient sources provide very little detail on the constitutional aspects of the 
procedure or how Metellus and Philippus utilised their roles as augurs to challenge the 
validity of the Livian laws. However, a few assertions can be drawn from the latter incident 
which suggests that Philippus in particular was able to exploit his position as a prominent 
member of the augural college to considerable effect. Cicero clearly felt that the incident 
demonstrated the influence of an individual augur’s opinion, given that he referenced the 
advice of Philippus in his great praise for the augurs in the constitutional treatise De Legibus 
(Cic. Leg. 2.31). Cicero’s account also juxtaposes the advice of an individual augur with the 
power of an augural decree: quod (sc. religiosius)… legem si non iure rogata est tollere, ut 
Titiam decreto conlegi, ut Livias consilio Philippi consulis et auguris? (And what [is more 
sacred than] the power of the augurs to nullify laws, which have not been carried in 
accordance with the auspices, as in the case of the Titian law, which was annulled by a decree 
of the augural college, or that of the Livian laws, which were annulled on the wise direction 
of L. Marcius Philippus, consul and augur) (Cic. Leg. 2.31). Thus Philippus’ advice as an 
individual augur was probably on the same legal level as a decretum conlegi (a decree of the 
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 However, it must be stressed that the recommendations of both Metellus and 
Philippus were not in themselves enough to repeal the Appuleian and Livian laws, since 
Cicero makes it quite clear that they were both rescinded uno versiculo senatus (by one verse 
of the senate) (Cic. Leg. 2.14; cf. Asc. Corn. 60-61C). Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that 
Metellus and Philippus were also the leading members of the opposition to the reforms 
proposed by Appuleius and Drusus. Their positions as augurs did not exist in a vacuum; their 
influence as priests complimented rather than determined their ability to oppose these laws. 
As both consul and augur, Philippus in particular was in a unique position as to act as an 
intermediary between the senate and the augurs. The following discussion will look in more 
detail at how the augurs retained their own ius nuntiationis (right to issue a declaration) and 
the ability to consult the auspices: the ritual formula alio die. The following section will focus 
on the extent to which the ritual formula alio die empowered the augurs of the Late Republic. 
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3.3. The Powers of an Augur 
 
3.3.1.  The ritual formula alio die 
 
Quid gravius quam rem susceptam dirimi, si unus augur 'alio <die>' dixerit? 
 
What is more important than the abandonment of any business having already 
begun, should a single augur declare ‘on another day’? 
Cic. Leg. 2.31. 
 
The augur’s declaration alio die (‘on another day’ – which was the priest’s equivalent 
formula for the observation of auspicium oblativum) appears to have been difficult for a 
presiding magistrate to ignore. Traditionally, scholars took the above passage of Cicero’s De 
Legibus at face-value and often overestimated the capacity of the augurs to intervene in 
political affairs through the ritual formula alio die. Distinguished classicists such as Theodor 
Mommsen, Isaac Valeton, William Warde-Fowler, Georg Wissowa and John Denniston all 
went so far as to conclude that the augurs of the Late Republic still in theory possessed a veto 
on every public transaction.
196
 However, these comments form only a small part of a much 
bigger puzzle, and to infer from them alone that priesthoods were – above all else – coveted 
because it granted impressive political powers would be a grave miscalculation. It was not 
necessarily that the announcement of an augur was legally binding on the presiding 
magistrate (as the above passage of Cicero suggests and countless scholars have implied), but 
to ignore it ran a greater risk for the action to be ritually vitiated by the senate later on (likely 
on the advice of the augural college). As the expert of augurs and augury Jerzy Linderski 
points out, the auspicia oblativa of the augurs were public acts afforded pre-eminence 
because the augurs possessed the special knowledge necessary to interpret the often 
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ambiguous meaning of these signs.
197
 Thus the observation of auspicium oblativum by an 
augur could delay an assembly until another day, or potentially nullify an action in progress if 
they declared the observation of dirae. However, given that there are only two case studies 
(one of which is not definitive) preserved in the ancient evidence of individual augurs 
utilising this ability to disrupt public business, it would appear that the formula alio die was 
only utilised in fairly exceptional circumstances by exceptional men during the Late 
Republic. The following discussion will review these two cases of alio die, and the extent to 
which the augurs involved – Cn. Pompeius Magnus and M. Antonius – were empowered. 
 
3.3.2.  Pompey’s obstruction of the aedilician elections in 55 
In 55 the consul and augur Pompey may have utilised the ritual formula alio die as augur to 
prevent M. Porcius Cato’s election to the praetorship (Plut. Cat. Min. 42; Pomp. 52). Pompey 
supposedly heard thunder in a clear sky and dismissed the election assembly. The 
terminology in Plutarch’s account is quite explicit: the unfavourable sign that Pompey 
apparently faked had appeared ‘suddenly’ (ἐξαίφνης) (Plut. Cat. Min. 42).
198
 Since Pompey’s 
announcement was also made after the first tribe had voted in the comitia praetoria (thus the 
day’s business was already well under way), the unfavourable auspicia would appear not to 
have been impetrativa.
199
 Thus the nuntiatio was likely oblativa, and announced by Pompey 
in his capacity as augur by declaring alio die.
200
 On this occasion, Pompey was able to 
impressively utilise his eminence as augur and prevent the election of Cato as praetor. 
However, Pompey was an immensely powerful figure by 55, working alongside his consular 
colleague and fellow triumvir Crassus who was presiding over the election assembly. It is 
therefore unlikely that Pompey’s augurate can be seen as the sole determining factor in the 
success of this religious obstruction. He simply utilised what means he had at his disposal to 
prevent the election of a political rival. The augural obstruction was perhaps initially 
favoured over other means of resistance to avoid violence. However, Pompey eventually 
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turned to more coercive tactics to prevent Cato’s election, including extensive bribery (Plut. 
Cat. Min. 42; Pomp. 52) and violence in the Campus Martius to stop the voting (Dio Cass. 
39.31-2, and Val. Max. 7.5.6). As a result of these factors combined, Pompey was able to 
ensure the election of a supporter for the triumvirs, the Caesarian tribune of 59, P. Vatinius 
(Livy Per. 105. 1-3). 
 
3.3.3.  Antony’s declaration ‘alio die’ in 44 
The second and more instructive instance of an augur utilising the ritual formula alio die was 
carried out by Mark Antony in 44, the year of his consulship with Caesar.
201
 In the Second 
Philippic – composed in October 44 and constructed as a fictional speech delivered to the 
senate on 19
th
 September 44 – Cicero alleged that Antony had fabricated unfavourable 
auspices in an attempt to prevent the election of P. Cornelius Dolabella as consul suffectus 
earlier that year (Cic. Phil. 2.79-84).
202
 As an augur himself, Cicero utilised his extensive 





 January, Caesar had declared in the senate that he would step down as 
consul later in the year so that he could embark on his Parthian campaign. Caesar then 
presented Dolabella as a worthy candidate to be elected consul suffectus, with a view to him 
taking his place as consul on his departure. However, Antony defied Caesar’s choice; he 
detested Dolabella and aspired to be sole consul in Caesar’s absence.
204
 According to Cicero, 
at that same meeting of the senate, Antony publically denounced Dolabella and stated that he 
would use his position as augur to obstruct his election (Cic. Phil. 2.80, 81, 83 99). On the 
day of the election in the Comitia Centuriata (not long before the Ides of March) Antony 
followed through with this promise. Once it appeared Dolabella had secured enough votes to 
                                                 
201
 Antony was elected augur in 50 to replace the deceased long-serving augur Q. Hortensius Hortalus (cos. 69) 
(Cic. Phil. 2.4; Fam. 8.14). He successfully campaigned for the augurate with the support of Caesar, defeating 
L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 54) in the election (Caes. BGall. 8.50.1-3).  
202
 The fullest modern discussion of this incident is the recent work of Santangelo (2013) 273-8. See also 
Denniston (1926) 144-9, 180-6; McDonald (1929) 168-71, 175; Weinstock (1937) 221-2 and Konrad (2004) 
182-5. 
203
 Cicero was elected augur before Antony in 53 or 52, replacing P. Licinius Crassus (younger son of the 
triumvir) who perished with his father at Carrhae (Plut. Cic. 36.1). Cicero was nominated to stand for election to 
the augurate by Hortensius and Pompey (Cic. Phil. 2.4), defeating C. Lucilius Hirrus (tr. pl. 53) in the election 
(Cic. Fam. 2.15.1; 8.3.1). Cicero also alleged that M. Antonius ran against him (or at least considered doing so) 
(Cic. Phil. 2.4). 
204
 On the enmity between Antony and Dolabella, see Huzar (1978) 25, 67-8, 74-5; and Cristofoli (2004) 209. 
Antony had been forced to divorce his second wife (and cousin) Antonia in 47 after she was accused of 




be elected, Antony claimed to have seen an unfavourable omen whilst the voting was in 
progress and declared alio die (Cic. Phil. 2.83, 4). Whether or not the assembly was dissolved 
by Antony’s utterance of alio die though is unclear. The following discussion on this incident 
and Cicero’s account will concern itself with three important issues: how Cicero challenged 
Antony’s philosophical views towards the function of the auspices; how Cicero compared the 
powers of the augurs and magistrates in relation to the auspices; and the impact of Antony’s 
declaration alio die. 
 
In Cicero’s diatribe against Antony, the orator deconstructs the method Antony deployed for 
his augural obstruction, utilising the incident as evidence for Antony’s lack of intellect and 
knowledge of augury: stupiditatem hominis cognoscite (see the stupidity of the man!) (Cic. 
Phil. 2.80). As Cicero reminds his audience, the augurs had the right to report the observation 
of auspicium oblativum, which occurred suddenly and unexpectedly during the course of an 
action; only the magistrates could perform a spectio, actively looking for auspicia 
impetrativa and reporting them to the presiding magistrate to halt proceedings before they 
began (Cic. Phil. 2.81). However, Antony had allegedly made clear his intention to prevent 
Dolabella’s action on the first day of his consulship. Cicero’s terminology in his interrogation 
is informative: Quisquamne divinare potest, quid vitii in auspiciis futurum sit, nisi qui de 
caelo servare constituit? (Who can divine what flaw there will be in the auspices, except he 
who has decided to watch the heavens?) (Cic. Phil. 2.81). In other words, how could Antony 
know that he was going to observe a sudden and unexpected adverse omen on the day of 
voting in his capacity as augur? Cicero accused Antony of confusing his capacity to consult 
the auspices as a magistrate with his responsibilities as an augur. Cicero further claimed that 
Antony had not even bothered to inspect the sky before declaring that he had observed an 
unfavourable omen on the day of the elections: Quid videras, quid senseras, quid audieras? 
(What had you seen? What had you sensed? What had you heard?) (Cic. Phil. 2.83). Thus 
Cicero accuses Antony of falsifying the auspices, and in doing so putting the Republic at risk 
of a great calamity: Ergo hercule magna, ut spero, tua potius quam rei publicae calamitate 
ementitus es auspicia, obstrinxisti religione populum Romanum… (Therefore, in truth, you 
have falsified the auspices, to your own great misfortune, I hope, rather than to that of the 
Republic; laying the Roman people under the obligations of religio) (Cic. Phil. 2.83). The 
following discussion will determine whether there is any substance to these accusations that 





Cicero’s first accusation, that Antony had confused his role as magistrate with his role as 
augur, completely misrepresents Antony’s means of obstruction, and likely exploited his 
imagined audience’s lack of knowledge on augury. Given that Antony had been an augur for 
over five years, he was likely well aware of the two basic methods for consultation of the 
auspices, and that auspices were either impetrativa or oblativa. The issue Cicero raised here 
can be better appreciated within the context of the philosophical debate on the prophetic 
reach of the augury. Cicero categorically asserted that Antony could not foresee unfavourable 
omens as an augur; however, there was in fact no clear consensus in the augurate on whether 
the auspices could predict the future and foresee unfavourable omens. In the philosophical 
treatise De Divinatione, Cicero refers to an ongoing debate on this very issue between two 
leading members of the augural college, Ap. Claudius Pulcher and C. Marcellus (Cic. Div. 
2.75).
205
 Appius believed that the auspices could be used to divine the future, whilst 
Marcellus determined that the auspices retained only an approbative function, affirming or 
denying the right of an action to take place at a given time.
206
 Cicero appears to betray his 
own views on the matter both in De Divinatione and his attack Antony, agreeing with the 
latter view that augury does not have the capacity to predict the future (Cic. Div. 2.75; Phil. 
2.81).
207
 However, Antony could easily have adopted the same view as the ‘Appian school’, 
that an augur could foresee an unfavourable omen. As Jerzy Linderski justly noted, ‘the 
augural doctrine… was not a monolithic theory and it allowed for divergent interpretations of 
even its essential tenants.’
208
 Thus by declaring early in his consulship as augur that the 
auspices would not allow Dolabella’s election, his report of unfavourable auspices on the day 
of the election proved his prediction to be right. Cicero therefore presents in his speech a 
partisan view of the method which Antony deployed in his augural obstruction.  
 
Cicero may have been on firmer ground with his second accusation that Antony had falsified 
the auspices (ementita auspicia) by faking his observation of an unfavourable omen on the 
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day of the elections.
209
 Although we do not know specifically what Antony reported having 
seen on the day of the election, given the number of people present at the assembly it is likely 
that this allegation was accurate. Cicero conceded in his speech that ementita auspicia still 
had to be heeded according to augural doctrine: ementitis auspiciis, quibus tamen parere 
necesse erat… (Falsified auspices, which were still necessary to obey…) (Cic. Phil. 2.88).  
This is supported by Cicero’s account of the tribune C. Ateius Capito’s repeated declaration 
of ‘faked’ dirae at the end of 55 (Cic. Div. 1.29-30; 2.84).
210
 As tribune Ateius allegedly 
made a false of report of dirae to prevent the consul Crassus from taking command of the war 
against the Parthians. Crassus ignored the reports of these signs, went to Syria, and met with 
death and destruction at Carrhae in 53. The augur Appius Claudius held the view that even 
faked auspices were binding, and thus could result in a catastrophe if they were not properly 
adhered to; Crassus’ defeat was testament to this conclusion.
211
 That is not to say that Appius 
condoned such blatant disregard of the auspices by Ateius or others, whose actions faking the 
observation of dirae effectively created an impending disaster. As Censor in 50, Appius 
expelled Ateius from the senate for falsification of the auspices. Antony was not shameless 
enough to fake the occurrence of dirae to prevent Dolabella’s election from ever taking place 
though, doing so could have resulted in undermining his integrity as augur.
212
  His declaration 
alio die quite literally was intent upon delaying the election until ‘another day’, or (as 
suggested below) was intent upon making Dolabella’s election ritually flawed.  
 
Cicero mocked Antony over his choice of procedure and suggested that it would have been 
‘much easier’ for him to utilise his magisterial prerogative of spectio as consul than it was for 
him to declare alio die as augur: istud, quod te sacerdoti iure facere posse dixisti, si augur 
non esses et consul esses, minus facere potuisses? Vide, ne etiam facilius (Could that 
obstruction, which you declared you had been able to carry out by the powers invested in you 
as a priest, not have been carried out even if you were only consul, instead of both consul and 
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augur? Perhaps you could even have carried it out more easily) (Cic. Phil. 2.81).
213
  However, 
Cicero appears to exaggerate how much easier it would have been to obstruct the elections 
through the consul’s right to obnuntiatio, given that a series of laws (the lex Aelia and lex 
Clodia de Obnuntiationes to name just two) dictated a strict formula for this process: quod 
[sc. se de caelo servare] neque licet comitiis per leges, et, si qui servavit, non comitiis habitis, 
sed priusquam habeantur, debet nuntiare (It is not permitted to watch the heavens during the 
elections by law; and if anyone has watched the heavens, he ought to formally declare his 
report not after the comitia has assembled, but before the elections have begun) (Cic. Phil. 
2.81).
214
 In other words the formal declaration se de caelo servare was required before a 
magistrate could utilise his right to obnuntatio, and he was required to report the adverse 
omen both before the elections  began and in person.
215
 By utilising alio die (which was 
perhaps quite a rare and unusual phenomena), Antony was also able to wait until the last 
possible moment to deploy his augural obstruction and was not restrained by an elaborate 
process. This enabled him to wait and see if Dolabella was going to be successful in his bid to 
become consul suffectus, and if Caesar was really intent upon allowing the election of a man 
under legal age.
216
 But there were also disadvantages to deploying his obstruction. Antony 
likely had to blatantly falsify unfavourable omens in the middle of an assembly, where many 
would have been in a position to deny that unfavourable omens had occurred.
217
 The question 
remains though: was Antony’s declaration alio die successful? 
 
Cicero’s account of Antony’s augural obstruction at no point definitively states whether or 
not the declaration alio die postponed or prevented the elections of Dolabella. According to 
Plutarch, the presiding magistrate of the election assembly (Antony’s co-consul Caesar) not 
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 Despite the assertions of Mommsen in RSR I. 109-14 and Greenidge (1893) 158-61, both curule magistrates 
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only acknowledged the report of unfavourable omens on the day of the election, but 
completely abandoned attempts to have Dolabella elected consul suffectus (Plut. Ant. 11).
218
 
However, Cicero’s assertion that Antony’s falsification of the auspices had ‘laid the people of 
Rome under the obligation of religio’ (obstrinxisti religione populum Romanum) (Cic. Phil. 
2.83) suggests that the presiding magistrate did in fact ignore Antony’s nuntiatio and that 
Dolabella was elected. Given that Cicero himself acknowledged even falsified auspices were 
binding (Cic. Phil. 2.88), there would have been no breach of religio if the presiding 
magistrate adjourned the assembly and heeded the observation of unfavourable omens. 
Cicero could only have suggested that the Roman people were implicated in a breach of 
religio had that there existed a vitiosus (ritual flaw) in the election of Dolabella, which only 
could have resulted from the presiding magistrate ignoring Antony’s attempted augural 
obstruction.
219
 Cicero hoped that the consequences of Antony’s false omens being ignored by 
Caesar would be confined to the falsifier of the auspices (or the presiding magistrate of the 
assembly) rather than falling on the whole res publica (Cic. Phil. 2.83). However – as the 
falsification of the auspices by Ateius previously indicated – there was a risk of calamity 
befalling the Republic.
220
 Antony’s obstruction as augur therefore failed to prevent 
Dolabella’s election, but perhaps that was never his intention. 
 
One recent scholar, Federico Santangelo, has convincingly argued that Antony knew he had 
no real chance of defying Caesar’s orders and preventing Dolabella’s election; instead he 
deployed his augural obstruction as a clever political stunt from which to launch an attack on 
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 See Denniston (1926) 149 for discussion on why Plutarch’s account is likely inaccurate. The account appears 
to result from confusion with Cicero’s assertion that Caesar had initially promised Dolabella the consulship of 
44 and then changed his mind (Cic. Phil. 2.79). However, this was a separate incident from Caesar’s decision to 
support Dolabella’s election as consul suffectus. 
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 It may not have been an idle hope that the magistrate in charge on the day of the elections suffer punishment 
for ignoring Antony’s falsified auspices; the presiding magistrate was none other than Caesar, and he was to be 




the validity of Dolabella’s constitutional position.
221
 By simply announcing alio die in the 
assembly, Dolabella was at Antony’s mercy. To remove this potentially fatal hurdle to his 
position as consul suffectus, Dolabella would have to come to an arrangement with Antony. 
Cicero avoids pressing this inquiry on the validity of Dolabella’s consulship too far in his 
Second Philippic, instead choosing to focus his attack on Antony’s flagrant disregard of the 
auspices. However, Cicero does suggest that the augural college to which he himself 
belonged may have been required to retrospectively determine whether Dolabella’s 
consulship was vitiosus and his actions as consul invalid: nolo plura, ne acta Dolabellae 
videar convellere, quae necesse est aliquando ad nostrum collegium deferantur (I will say no 
more, lest I should seem to be pulling to pieces the acts of Dolabella; which must inevitably 
sometime or other be brought before our augural college) (Cic. Phil. 2.83). According to 
Cicero, the validity of Dolabella’s election was what Caesar intended to discuss on the Ides of 
March in the senate (Cic. Phil. 2.88); it was evidently in the dictator's best interests to have 
the validity of the election formally vindicated and for Dolabella and Antony to be reconciled 
before his departure from Italy. After Caesar’s assassination, Antony realised that he needed 
Dolabella, and so used his augural obstruction as leverage to offer him complete recognition 
as consul in exchange for his support. Dolabella welcomed this opportunity and there was a 
spectacular rapprochement between the two, putting aside their personal enmity to form a 




3.3.4. Concluding remarks 
Both case examples of alio die by Pompey and Antony indicate that the augural prerogative 
could be utilised with varying degrees of success at election assemblies. Pompey’s use of the 
formula was initially successful, but he was eventually forced to resort to violence. Antony’s 
use of the formula was ignored, but this may have been his intention all along; there were far 
more serious long-term repercussions for the magistrates deemed to have been elected under 
flawed auspices. However, given the lack of ancient evidence on alio die, and that the only 
case studies of the ritual formula being utilised were by immensely powerful political figures 
who were also consuls at the time, it would be reasonable to conclude that the augurs 
exercised their right to nuntiationes infrequently and with a great deal of caution. It is 
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interesting to note that both cases of alio die obstructed election assemblies as opposed to 
legislative assemblies. Perhaps both Pompey and Antony favoured utilising their ability to 
declare unfavourable auspicia oblativa as augurs because it allowed them to wait until the 
last minute when the election results indicated that the candidate would secure the office they 
were a candidate for. Had the augurs acted in their capacity as consuls, by making it known 
that they were ‘watching the heavens’, they could have also increased the likelihood of 
violence in the build up to the election assemblies convening. The announcement se de caelo 
servare was an open invitation for opponents to attempt to prevent the auspicating magistrate 
from reaching the election assembly.
223
 The advantage of deploying alio die was that it was 
unexpected. A religious aspect should also be considered among the motives for deploying 
alio die. Despite both Pompey and Antony being consuls, using their position as augurs 
enabled them to mount a weightier opposition involving their priestly status and expertise. By 
deploying their obstruction as augurs, the two men could shift the controversy of the 
obstruction from a political level to a religious one.
224
 For Antony the augur, this shrewdly 
prevented the political fallout that came with opposing Caesar, and made the dispute on the 
validity of Dolabella’s election a matter of disagreement between augurs rather than a 
disagreement between consuls. 
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3.4. The Collective Powers of the Augurate 
 
3.4.1. An introduction to augural decrees 
 
Quid magnificentius quam posse decernere, ut magistratu se abdicent 
consules? ...quid, legem si non iure rogata est tollere ut Titiam decreto 
conlegi? 
 
What power is more impressive than being able to decide that consuls must 
resign their office? ... Or the right to abolish a law if it was not carried in 
accordance with the auspices, as was the case when the Titian Law was 
annulled by a decree of the augurate? 
Cic. Leg. 2.31. 
 
The collective authority of the augurate emanated from interpretations or decrees issued when 
doubts or difficulties arose concerning ius augurale (augural law).
225
 The enactment of such 
decrees was one of the most important functions of the college, and has often been perceived 
by scholars as a way for the priests to influence political proceedings. Our record of those 
augural decrees that pre-date the Late Republic superficially depict the priests as a supreme 
constitutional authority on all matters related to the auspices and augury.
226
 Examples 
recorded by Livy from the Early to Middle Republic clearly indicate that the augurs often got 
caught up in significant political conflicts of their time, from the Struggle of the Orders (Livy 
8.23.14-16) to infighting between political factions (Livy 22.33.8-34.11). Out of the fourteen 
cases recorded by Livy where the augurs were consulted, three nullified the elections of 
tribuni militum (Livy 4.7.3; 5.17.2; 10.47.1), another forced a censor to resign his office 
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 Livy records just fourteen (seven definite) case examples from the Early and Middle Republic (not including 
those involving military auspices in the field) where the augurs were consulted in an official capacity by the 
senate (i.e. consulti augures; iussos adesse; augurum decreto; vocati augures; augures responderunt), all of 
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(Livy 6.27.4-6), one invalidated the election of a consul (Livy 23.31.12-15), and another the 
election of plebeian aediles (Livy 30.39.8), whilst at least five resulted in the abdication of a 
dictator and his magister equitum (Livy 8.15.6; 8.17.4; 8.23.14-16; 9.7.14; 22.33.8-34.4; and 
perhaps 6.38.9). Only one recorded incident survives in Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita which 
resulted in the annulment of legislation (Livy 3.20.6). This may be indicative of the 
impressive authority that the college once possessed; however, it may also be indicative of 
how Livy idealised the role of the augurs in his history of Rome. The dignity of the augurs 
probably did gradually increase in consequence to the priests becoming the preservers and 
depositaries of the augural science as knowledge passed down to their successors. However, 
much like the pontificate, the augurate never possessed overarching powers, nor did they 
issue decrees without first being sanctioned to by the senate.
227
 The augural college acted as 
an advisory body to the senate, infrequently summoned to make a decision based on religious 
scruple which could in turn have a political impact on some controversial issue. This view 
will be reflected throughout the following discussion on the collective function and influence 
of the augurate during the Late Republic. 
 
Before scrutinising the case studies of decrees preserved by the ancient evidence though, it is 
necessary to discern the scope and nature of augural inquiries, and what their immediate 
function was within the framework of Roman religion. For our own purposes it makes sense 
to divide the decrees into two categories: 1) those issued independently by the augurs, which 
were essentially concerned with the disciplina auguralis (augural science) and had little to no 
bearing on any ongoing political crisis; and 2) those which came at the request of (or were 
reported to) the senate or influential magistrates, concerned with the application of ius 
augurale in public life and with seemingly impressive political consequences. The first type 
strictly speaking sought to establish, or to clarify, the theoretical tenets of augury, since it was 
a major duty of the college disciplinam tenere (to preserve the augural discipline) (Cic. Leg. 
2.20-1 cf. Div. 1.25).
228
 According to Cicero, the augurs used to routinely meet on the nones 
of each month for this very purpose, commentandi causa (for the sake of deliberation) (Cic. 
Amic. 7). However, this practice had fallen into disuse by Cicero’s own day (Cic. Div. 
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 Only one example of such a decree survives in our ancient evidence: Cicero refers to 
an incident where the augurs declared that during the consultation of military auspices 
omnem avem tripudium facere posse (any bird could make a tripudium) (Cic. Div. 2.73).
230
 It 
is impossible to conclude with any certainty whether these less intrusive decrees were more 
frequent than the inquiries initiated by the senate. Ancient historians quite naturally preferred 
to narrate the dramatic social and political struggles of the Republic, as opposed to detailing 
mundane decrees concerned with augural theory which provided little inspiration for the 
construction of a compelling historical narrative. Thus it is quite probable that there existed 
far more explanatory decrees, which sought to explain unclear notions in augural doctrine. 
 
The second type of decree was concerned with the ius augurale publicum. These occur more 
regularly in our ancient evidence and will be the primary focus of our discussion. They can 
be further divided into two distinct categories. First, there were those decrees that dealt with 
the occurrence of vitium (a ritual flaw violating augural rules already in place); in such 
instances a mistake in the augural formula had already been made and the decree was carried 
post actionem.
231
 These are by far the most frequent in our ancient sources; however, this is 
not necessarily because they were the most common, but because once again they appear to 
have had the greatest historical significance.
232
 These cases provide some good examples of 
augural decrees having an impressive influence on public affairs, since they almost always 
led to the annulment of legislation or more often the abdication of a magistrate. As we will 
see from a closer inspection of reconstructions in Livy and Cicero, however, formality and 
technical procedure appear to have given the senate the upper-hand in most of these cases. 
The second category featured decrees that sought to remove religio (a ritual pollution or 
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obstacle) in order to validate a new course of action which might seem ritually susceptible.
233
 
These types of decree are very infrequently mentioned by our ancient sources – only once by 
Livy (Livy 4.31.4) and twice by Cicero (Cic. Att. 9.9.3-4; 9.15.2) – yet this was probably a 
major official function of the college. Before any constitutional innovation could be carried 
out, the augurs were first obliged to remove the religio and ensure that the act was ritually 
valid. Although this might give the impression that the augurs acted as a constitutional check 
on all new courses of action, our discussion of the surviving case examples will suggest that 
by the Late Republic the augurate simply acted as a rubber-stamp committee, approving 
requests made by more influential political figures with little hesitation. The augural college 
never appears to have had the collective authority to deny requests from those magistrates 
anticipating the successful removal of religio. 
 
This discussion will first focus on the influence of the augurs through the three recorded 
augural decrees of the Late Republic. These decrees will be divided into two categories. The 
first will examine the only recorded decree that dealt with the occurrence of a vitium during 
the lifetime of Cicero: the decree that recommended the nullification of the lex Titia in 99. 
Cicero’s terminology clearly indicates the involvement of the augurs by declaring that the 
law was annulled decreto conlegi (by a decree of the college [of augurs]) (Cic. Leg. 2.31; cf. 
Obseq. 46). The two remaining case studies will look at the second category of augural 
decrees which sought to remove religio in order to validate a new course of action. Both case 
examples from the Late Republic of this kind of augural decree seemingly permitted a 
previously ritually unqualified magistrate to appoint a dictator, in the first instance allowing 
an interrex to nominate Sulla in 82 (Cic. Att. 9.15.2) and in the second allowing a praetor to 
nominate Caesar in 49 (Cic. Att. 9.9.3-4; 9.15.2). The aim of this discussion will be to 
understand the process for an official inquiry of the augurs, looking at how the college 
operated alongside the senate, how (if at all) it differed from the process for the consultation 
of the pontiffs, and the extent to which this process empowered the augurs. 
 
The second section will attempt to explain why the augural college became relatively inactive 
during the Late Republic (when compared to what appears to have been relatively high 
activity in the Middle Republic). In particular this section will look at why the college was 
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not consulted officially by the senate during perhaps the most notorious incident concerning 
alleged disregard of auspices: the attempted obnuntiationes of Caesar’s consular colleague, 
Bibulus. Lily Ross Taylor suspected that the augural college was constrained by the unstable 
political climate of the time.
234
 There also appears to have been a general division within the 
college itself. Following Caesar’s blatant disregard of the auspices, a number of augurs 
opposed to his regime did attempt to challenge the constitutional validity of his acta through 
a series of contiones. However, rifts within the augurate, as well as the college’s subordinate 
position to the senate and more powerful political figures, meant that the priests were never 
officially consulted on the validity of Caesar’s actions during his consulship. Thus the augurs 
appear to have had little scope to significantly influence political proceedings during the final 
years of the Republic when it really mattered. This section will first reconstruct the year’s 
events from the viewpoint of the augurs, who as a college may not only have been divided on 
political lines but also on the ritual correctness of Bibulus’ so-called obnuntiationes. The 
second half of this section will examine the attempt by a number of the augurs to influence 
this constitutional debate on the validity of Caesar’s acta at a series of contiones in 58 and 57, 
and the political effect that this debate had. 
 
3.4.2.  The repeal of the lex Titia decreto conlegi: augural decrees on vitia 
The first augural decree recorded from the lifetime of Cicero occurred in 99 and led to the 
annulment of the lex Titia. It is the only case from the Late Republic of a decree resulting 
from the occurrence of vitia, and one of just two recorded cases of legislation being annulled 
on the advice of the augurs (cf. Livy 3.20.6 in 460). The ancient evidence on the incident 
relies mostly on a passage of Cicero’s encomium of augury in the constitutional treatise on 
Roman law: De Legibus. He attempted to use this case to stress the overwhelming powers of 
the augural college (Cic. Leg. 2.31). However, given that Cicero must go back over fifty 
years to provide the only definitive reference to an augural decree repealing legislation from 
the Late Republic, it can be assumed he greatly exaggerated the powers of the augurate. 
When he stated that the augurs had the power to abolish (tollere) laws, it would appear he 
was referring to a power that the priests once possessed.
235
 If it were true, surely Cicero 
would have been able to provide either more recent examples of decrees, or at least have 
provided more than just one example of such a decree. This does not mean to suggest that 
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other decrees of the augurs did not exist. Cicero’s own threat to initiate an official inquiry of 
the augurs in 44 suggests that these decrees were relatively common practice (Cic. Phil. 
2.83). However, Cicero had to go back fifty years to find a case that illustrated his point that 
decrees of the augurs could have a significant impact when the stakes were high. The repeal 
of the lex Titia may well have been the only high profile case of an augural decree repealing 
controversial legislation from the lifetime of Cicero. 
 
The facts of the incident surrounding the repeal of the lex Titia are sketchy. The tribune Sex. 
Titius proposed an agrarian reform similar to the measures proposed a year earlier by the 
tribune L. Appuleius Saturninus (tr. pl. 100).
236
 Iulius Obsequens in his Book of Prodigies 
indicated that two ravens fought in the air above during the legislative assembly, which the 
haruspices suggested was a prodigium (Obseq. 46). Titius proceeded to ignore the report of 
unfavourable omens, which were reported either through an attempted obnuntiatio from 
qualified magistrates, or through auspicia oblativa reported by multiple witnesses at the 
legislative assembly.
237
 Given accusations that the law had been carried in defiance of the 
auspices, the senate referred the matter to the augural college, which produced its 
recommendation in the form of a decree (Cic. Leg. 2.31). Much like the pontiffs, it appears to 
have been customary practice for the senate to launch an official inquiry of the augurs; the 
augurs do not appear to have had the capacity to issue decrees on the validity of legislation or 
elections of their own accord.
238
 The advice of the augurs was that the lex Titia was non iure 
rogata (not carried correctly) (Cic. Leg. 2.31); the priests probably pointed out that the 
fighting of crows above an assembly belonged to the category of dirae. But the augural 
decree was not in itself sufficient to render a law inoperative. The senate still had to ratify the 
college’s recommendation by carrying a specific decree quae lex lata esse dicatur, ea non 
videri populum teneri (which said although the law was passed, it is not binding on the 
people) (Asc. Corn. 68C).
239
 Much like the Appuleian laws and the Livian laws, which were 
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repealed by the senate on the advice of individual augurs, Cicero makes it quite clear that it 
was uno versiculo senatus (one verse of the senate) (Cic. Leg. 2.14) that repealed the lex 
Titia, not the advice of the augurs. In fact, we do not know of a single law that was annulled 




Some scholars tended to assume that the collective advice of the sacerdotal colleges through 
the promulgation of decreta was binding on the senate, and that the senatus consultum was a 
mere legal technicality.
241
 However, Cicero’s account on the repeal of the lex Titia, the 
pontifical decree on Cicero’s house discussed in chapter one and the terminology in Livy’s 
accounts of priestly advice all make clear the involvement of the senate. Even if the recorded 
evidence in Livy throughout republican history suggests that the senate always accepted the 
recommendations from the augurate and the pontificate, the senate still theoretically had the 
final say, and it was with them that the effective power of this decision-making process 
lay.
242
 The senate also had the ability to pick and choose when they referred issues to 
particular priestly college, and this formal process especially hindered the effectiveness of the 
augurs during the Late Republic, given that the augurate had once been such a politically 
influential body. Livy’s accounts throughout republican history indicate that the augurs never 
initiated their own inquiry, the priests were called (vocati) (Livy 23.31.13), consulted 
(consulti) (Livy 4.31.4; 8.23.14), or a question was referred to them (ad relatum est) (Livy 
45.12.10).
243
 This does not mean to suggest that a decree of the augurs was unimportant or 
worthless; once the senate had instituted an augural inquiry it would seem inconceivable for 
them to not act upon their advice. However, it was the senate that played the central co-
ordinating role, and on their authorisation that the augurs had the capacity to flex their 
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relation to the decress of the pontifical college. 
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 As argued by North (1990b) 589-90 and Beard (1994) 730-1; cf. the cautious restraint of Linderski (1986) 
2154-5; 2159-62.  
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 The possibility cannot be ruled out that Livy was projecting the procedures that were in place by the Late 




3.4.3. The nomination of Sulla and Caesar as dictators: augural decrees removing religio 
A particularly thorny technical issue, which the augurs were repeatedly consulted on and had 
major political repercussions throughout the republican era, was determining who was 
ritually qualified (had the correct kind of auspices) to appoint a dictator.
244
 In 426 the 
consular tribune A. Cornelius wished to nominate Mam. Aemilius Mamercinus dictator for a 
third time as the commonwealth plunged into despair: odisse tribunos, poscere dictatorem 
(the consular tribunes were detested, and the people demanded a dictator) (Livy 4.31.4). 
Although a religious impediment prevented Cornelius from being able to nominate a dictator, 
the augurs were able to remove this technical difficulty through an augural decree: et cum ibi 
quoque religio obstaret ne non posset nisi ab consule dici dictator, augures consulti eam 
religionem exemere (and when a religious impediment was met, since only a consul could 
nominate a dictator, the augurs were consulted and removed the religious impediment to the 
ceremony) (Livy 4.31.4). Whether or not consular tribunes (an office also held by plebeians) 
had the auspices to nominate a dictator was obviously perceived as a question for the augurs 
to decide. The college’s decision here could have had major repercussions for the status of 
plebeian magistrates in relation to their access to the auspices, and so provided a platform 
from which the augurs appear to have exerted political influence in public affairs.
245
 
Evidently, in what could be seen as a landmark case for the plebs, the augurate was able to 
argue that consular tribunes did in fact possess full consular imperium and hence auspicium, 




During the Late Republic, both Sulla and Caesar were faced with a similar problem in their 
respective nomination as dictators. This leads to a discussion of the remaining two augural 
decrees of the Late Republic. Evidently the ceremony of nominating a dictator was a 
controversial act that would come under close scrutiny, with Livy recording at least five of 
dictators being forced to resign their office after being found vitio creatus (Livy 8.15.6; 
8.17.4; 8.23.14-16; 9.7.14; 22.33.8-34.4; and perhaps 6.38.9). In a letter to Atticus on 17
th
 
March 49, Cicero intimated that Caesar, who had requested an audience with him, was 
canvassing the support of augurs in a bid to secure a valid nomination as dictator (Cic. Att. 
                                                 
244
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this complicated technical issue with a decent overview of the current scholarship. 
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 Versnel (1970) 358 n. 2 disputed whether a dictator’s auspicia were superior to a consul’s, however, as 




9.9.3-4). Cicero even suspected that Caesar was intent upon having carried an augural decree 
which would permit a praetor to nominate him: aberit non longe quin hoc a me decerni velit 
neque sit contentus Galba, Scaevola, Cassio, Antonio, τότε μοι χάνοι εὐρεῖα χθών
247
 (Before 
long he will be demanding my vote in an augural decree; he will not be content with the 
support of [my fellow augurs] Ser. Sulpicius Galba, Q. Mucius Scaevola, Q. Cassius 
Longinus, and M. Antonius. Then let the wide earth gape and swallow me) (Cic. Att. 9.9.3-4). 
From Cicero’s understanding of augural theory, which according to him was enshrined in the 
ritual books of the augurs, a magistrate with minor imperium could not create a magistrate 
with maius imperium (Cic. Att. 9.9.3). Thus there does not appear to be any known case of a 
praetor conducting consular elections, let alone the nomination of a dictator. Cicero’s 
approach to augural doctrine is shared by his fellow augur M. Valerius Messala (Rufus), who 
wrote extensively on the subject in his work de auspiciis. However, Messala was unable to 
find anything more authoritative than the brief commentary of C. Sempronius Tuditanus (cos. 
129), the late republican historian.
248
 Cicero’s (and Messala’s) line of argumentation here, 
which stressed the authority of custom and mos maiorum, is probably exaggerated and should 
be taken with a grain of salt; it was not necessarily that a praetor was forbidden from 
nominating a dictator, but that such a method of appointment was unprecedented, or at least 
highly unusual. Therefore, Caesar required a decree of the augurs if he wanted his nomination 
as dictator to be carried out sine religione (without contravening augural lore) and to be 
perceived by the senate, the people and the gods as legitimate. 
 
In another letter to Atticus dated 25
th
 March, Cicero’s confirms his suspicions of Caesar’s 
machinations: volet enim, credo, senatus consultum facere, volet augurum decretum 
(rapiemur aut absentes vexabimur), vel ut consules roget praetor vel dictatorem dicat; 
quorum neutrum ius est. sed si Sulla potuit efficere ab interreges ut dictator diceretur et 
magister equitum, cur hic non possit? (For he [Caesar] will, I believe, want a decree of the 
senate, as well as a decree of the augurs (we shall be hurried off to Rome or harassed out) to 
permit a praetor to hold consular elections and nominate a dictator, neither of which is 
constitutional. But if Sulla was able to secure nomination as dictator by an interrex, why 
should Caesar not be able to?) (Cic. Att. 9.15.2).
249
 Both Caesar and Sulla followed tradition 
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 Sulla was appointed dictator in 82 by the interrex and flamen Martialis L. Valerius Flaccus (Cic. Leg. agr. 




by having enacted legislation (the lex Aemilia and lex Valeria respectively) which legally 
authorised their nomination as dictators. However, what was highly unusual, and required 
affirmation through a decree of the augurs, was that this legislation expressly named 
magistrates who could be deemed as ritually unqualified to perform this ceremony (a praetor 
and an interrex). As noted by Linderski, ‘a law could remove legal obstacles, but not 
religious doubts.’
250
 Thus Caesar got his decree, and Cicero, despite his personal protests, 
voted that there was no religio in the ritual procedure.  
 
Modern historians who accuse the two dictators of acting against leges et mos often overlook 
the fact that both Caesar and Sulla went to great lengths to ensure their appointments were 
not in contravention of any law, human or divine. Although a direct line of comparison can 
be made between the annalistic case of 426 and the dictiones of 82 and 49 from a technical 
perspective, the augurs certainly appear to have had less influence in the two late republican 
case examples. Rather than acting on their own initiative, the priests were summoned (as 
Cicero was) or kindly asked (as Caesar’s supporters were) by immensely powerful political 
figures of their time to fulfil an important, albeit somewhat staged, formality. The augural 
college acted as a rubber-stamp committee, with little independent initiative and under the 
thumb of more senior influential political figures such as Sulla or Caesar. However, perhaps 
we cannot safely rely on these two case examples as evidence of the dwindling political 
relevance of the augurs in the Late Republic, given that these incidents were under 
exceptional circumstances in the lead-up to two of Rome’s most powerful political figures 
assuming Rome’s highest unofficial magistracy. It is possible that cases existed where the 
augurs were faced with a similar problem, but they were not forced into rendering a verdict 
one way or another. The following discussion will review why else the influence of the 
augurate was constrained in the Late Republic, and examine why the priests appeared to be 







                                                                                                                                                        
Linderski (1986) 2183-4, asserts that not only did Sulla have legislation carried through the centuriate assembly 
enabling him to become dictator, but he also (like Caesar) procured a decree of the augurs. 
250




3.4.4.  The validity of Bibulus’ heaven-watching in 59 
 
Non Bibulo quiddam nuper sed Caesare factum est; 
nam Bibulo fieri consule nil memini. 
 
In Caesar's year, not Bibulus’, an act took place of late; 
for naught do I remember done in Bibulus’ consulate. 
Suet. Iul. 20. 2. 
 
Given that there is scant evidence of augural decrees from the Late Republic, the following 
discussion will utilise a case study involving the augurs that is perhaps the most documented 
case of the auspices being utilised for political gain. In 59, the infamous year of Caesar’s first 
consulship, the magistrate’s right to watch the heavens and declare obnuntiatio was both 
exploited and ignored on a seemingly unprecedented scale, causing a great deal of political 
controversy and religious anxiety.
251
 Through a discussion of this incident, it may be possible 
to theorise why the augural college was relatively ineffective and rarely consulted during the 
last decades of the Republic. This section will aim to establish specifically why the college 
was not consulted officially by the senate on the validity of attempted obnuntiationes by 
Caesar’s consular colleague Bibulus, especially in light of the fact that the college was 
consulted forty years earlier under similar circumstances leading to the annulment of the lex 
Titia (Cic. Leg. 2.31). Lily Ross Taylor suspected that the augural college was constrained by 
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 This episode has been continually discussed by scholars, but rarely from the viewpoint of the augurs. Perhaps 
one of the more entertaining descriptions (and most accessible to non-specialists of Roman religion) of the years 
events, including some commentary of augural formula in layman’s terms, is Tatum (2008) 66-70 (although 
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15-6; Sumner (1963) 352-3; Weinrib (1970) 401-2, 405-6, 415-6; Mitchell (1986) 172-6; Tatum (1990) 189-90; 
and (4) more recent discussions which attempt to re-work the narrative of the episode in a way that is not 





the unstable political climate of the time.
252
 There also appears to have been a general 
divisiveness within the college itself. Following Caesar’s blatant disregard of the auspices, a 
number of augurs opposed to his regime did attempt to challenge the constitutional validity of 
this acta, which culminated in a series of contiones. However, the following argument will 
suggest that rifts within the augurate, as well as the college’s subordinate position to the 
senate and more powerful political figures, meant that the priests were never officially 
consulted on the validity of Caesar’s actions during his consulship. Thus the augurs appear to 
have had little scope to significantly influence political proceedings during the final years of 
the Republic. First though this section will provide some much needed narrative for what 
transpired in 59.  
 
One of Caesar’s first actions as consul was the proposition of an agrarian bill (Att. 2. 3. 3).
253
 
The conservative faction, led by Bibulus and Cato, perceived the bill as a means to amass a 
disturbing level of popular support and so they sought to obstruct Caesar’s bill by any means 
at their disposal. Initially Bibulus stalled the passage of the law in the comitia tributa by 
declaring ἱερομηνίαι (or supplicationes), placing moveable festivals only the consul could set 
on comitial days (Dio Cass. 38.6.1).
254
 Growing impatient though Caesar eventually set a day 




 Bibulus then turned to 
the auspices as a means of obstruction and issued edicts se de caelo servare (that he would 
watch the heavens) the day before Caesar’s assembly. Caesar was not discouraged though 
and refused to take notice of Bibulus’ heaven-watching, making his way to the Temple of 
Castor on the morning of the 29
th
 as planned. Bibulus therefore made his way to the Forum 
with his three henchmen in the tribunate, Cn. Domitius Calvinus, Q. Ancharius, C. Fannius 
(Cic. Vat. 16; Sest. 113), to follow through with the procedurally necessary declaration of 
adverse omens in the Forum in person. However, when Bibulus and his entourage arrived 
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Pompey’s veterans were there waiting for them. Violence ensued and Bibulus was forcibly 
prevented from declaring obnuntiatio before Caesar’s legislative assembly began.
256
 Bibulus 
and his supporters still managed to force their way into the Temple of Castor though, whilst 
Caesar was presiding over his assembly. Bibulus then attempted to exercise his right 
intercedere (to veto).
257
 Caesar was not impressed by this political sideshow though, and so 
his ruffians (perhaps led by the tribune P. Vatinius) forcibly ejected Bibulus from the temple 
(Plut. Pomp. 48. 1 tells us he had a bucket of excrement dumped on him for his trouble) 
whilst his tribune supporters received blows (Dio Cass. 38.6.1-4; Suet. Iul. 20; Plut. Pomp. 
48). 
 
Bibulus, clearly a little worse for wear, decided to retire to his house and carry out his augural 
obstructions through edicts only for the rest of the year, declaring every day of public 
business that he was watching the heavens (se de caelo servare) and that Caesar’s actions 
were in contravention of the auspices (Suet. Iul. 20; Dio Cass. 38.6.5; Cic. Att. 2.16.2; 2.20.4; 
Dom. 40). Bibulus may have attempted to leave his house and serve notice of his 
obnuntiationes in the procedurally correct manner on several occasions (Cic. Att 2.16.2), 
however, according to Cicero, Caesar’s puppet in the tribunate P. Vatinius prevented him 
from doing so by show of force (Cic. Vat. 22).
258
 Bibulus’ non-stop and long-distance attempt 
to declare obnuntiatio appears to have no place in the strict rules of augural law though and 
was in itself an unprecedented abuse of the auspices, perhaps no better than Caesar’s 
response to flout and ignore him. Many scholars presume that the public response to this 
whole episode entailed unquestionable support for Caesar and his bill throughout the year; 
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 Cic. Vat. 22: M. Bibulum foro, curia, templis, locis pulbicis omnibus expulisses, inclusum domi contineres 
(You drove M. Bibulus from the Forum, the senate-house, the temples and from all public places, and you kept 




after all it was considered good sport to spit on the senate.
259
 However, comments in Cicero’s 
letters indicate that by July, following the enactment of Caesar’s second even more audacious 
agrarian law (the lex Campana) in May, the tables had turned in Bibulus’ favour:  
 
Scito nihil umquam fuisse tam infame, tam turpe, tam peraeque omnibus 
generibus, ordinibus, aetatibus offensum, quam hunc statum qui nunc est, 
magis mehercule quam vellem, non modo quam putarem. Populares isti iam 
etiam modestos homines sibilare docuerunt. Bibulus in caelo est, nec qua re 




The truth is that the present regime (the triumvirate) is the most infamous, 
repugnant, and equally offensive to all classes and ages of men that there ever 
was, more than I could wish, by Hercules, let alone could have thought. These 
popular politicians have taught even quiet folk to hiss. Bibulus is in high 
praise; I do not know why, but they laud him as though he were ‘the man who 
by singly delaying restored the state to us all.’  
Cic. Att. 2.19.2. 
 
This popular sentiment against Caesar, and in support of Bibulus’ edicts issuing decrees se de 
caelo servare, was also exhibited during gladiatorial games, where the triumvirs were 
overwhelmed by the hisses of the crowd, and in the theatre, where an actor at the Games of 
Apollo Diphilus made fun of Pompey to the crowd’s great amusement (Cic. Att. 2.19.3). 
Cicero also tells us that Bibulus’ edicts had become so popular and agreeable to the general 
populace that no one could get past the crowd of eager readers in the Forum where they were 
posted (Cic. Att. 2.21.4). 
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 Grey-Fow (1990) 180 rather poetically writes that ‘Cato and his friends lauded Bibulus’ esoteric 
obstructionism; Caesar ignored it, and the people thought it ridiculous.’ He argues that Bibulus, acting as a 
bulwark of traditional conservatism, had proved totally ineffective, and with the ability of hindsight this 
conclusion seems reasonable enough. 
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 Shackleton Bailey (1999) I. 190-1: this is a famous line of Ennius’ Annals, 370 describing Fabius Cunctator 
(the ‘delayer’), who defeated Hannibal in the Second Punic War by avoiding pitched battle. ‘Cunctator’ 
gradually exhausted Hannibal’s army through a long war of attrition. There is a subtle jibe against Bibulus here, 




The augurs up until this point are scarcely even mentioned by the ancient sources, a 
demonstration in itself that it was magistrates, not the augurs, that more commonly had the 
capacity to utilise the auspices for political gain. However, a number of prominent augurs 
expressed their thoughts on Bibulus’ heaven-watching throughout 59. Many conservative 
members utilised their priestly status to support the actions of Bibulus, and probably helped 
to manipulate public opinion against Caesar. Dio tells us that one of the fiercest recalcitrants 
to the law was the augur Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60), who alongside Cato refused to 
take the oath of obedience to Caesar’s first agrarian bill (Dio Cass. 38.7.1).
261
 Another 
distinguished augur, L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74), also initially demonstrated his support for 
Bibulus (Suet. Iul. 20; Dio Cass. 38.7.5; Plut. Pomp. 48.1-3; Cat. Min. 31.5).
262
 Other stern 
conservatives of the augurate that likely utilised their knowledge on the technicalities of 
augural lore to rally public opposition against Caesar included M. Valerius Messalla (Rufus) 
(cos. 53), C. Claudius Marcellus (pr. 80), Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54) and perhaps Q. 
Hortensius Hortalus (cos. 69). We might also imagine that Caesar had supporters in the 
augurate attempting to justify his decision to ignore Bibulus’ heaven-watching, including the 
augurs Pompey (perhaps as president of the augurs), Caesar’s cousin L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 
64), perhaps Ser. Sulpicius Galba (pr. 54) and probably Pompey’s son-in-law C. (Faustus) 
Cornelius Sulla (quaes. 54).
263
 The augurs were utilised by these rival factions and hence 
divided public opinion in their responses, thus may have been able to use this situation as a 
means to accrue political significance. A passage from Cicero’s cross-examination of P. 
Vatinius in 56 also supports the notion that a number of augurs were collectively opposed to 
Caesar and Vatinius’ disregard off the auspices in 59: initioque tribunatus tui senatui 
denuntiaris tuis actionibus augurum responsa atque eius conlegi adrogantiam impedimento 
non futura? (And at the very beginning of your tribuneship, did you not give notice to the 
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 This must have been in relation to the first agrarian law in January, not the lex Campana of May, since 
Metellus Celer had died by late April 59 (Cic. Att. 2.6.2). Metellus Celer’s resistance to the law compares to that 
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 According to Suet. Iul. 20 Lucullus was so outspoken in his opposition that Caesar threatened him with 
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senate that the responses of the augurs and the arrogance of that college should be no obstacle 
to your proceedings?) (Cic. Vat. 14).  
 
In 58, following Bibulus’ exceptional attempts at long-distance obnuntiationes from his 
house, it would appear that there was a need for clarification of the correct procedure for the 
magistrates to utilise their right of spectio. Bibulus’ unprecedented heaven-watching resulted 
in a constitutional conundrum which desperately required reform. Should Bibulus’ edicts that 
he was ‘watching the heavens’ throughout Caesar’s acta be validated, then this posed the 
alarming prospect of disgruntled magistrates or tribunes being able to paralyse government 
without having to so much as leave their house. Therefore Clodius’ lex de obnuntiatione may 
have been a sensible reform designed to prevent the government from being crippled by the 
announcement se de caelo servare, explicitly stating that the announcement of unfavourable 
omens needed to be announced in person to the presiding magistrate at an appointed time and 
place.
264
 However, if this was the function of Clodius’ law, then the following discussion will 
make clear that the measure was not retrospective, since the validity of Caesar’s actions as 
consul were persistently challenged by his rivals up until the start of the civil war in 49 (Suet. 
Iul. 30). 
 
This brings us to a somewhat confusing incident purported to have taken place later in 58 
(perhaps June or July) whereby Clodius, in his capacity as the tribune, brought forward to a 
meeting Bibulus and a number of augurs opposed to Caesar’s legislation:  
 
 
tu M. Bibulum in contionem, tu augures produxisti, te interrogati augures 
responderunt, cum de caelo servatum sit, cum populo agi non posse, tibi M. 
Bibulus quaerenti se de caelo servasse respondit. 
 
You [addressing Clodius] brought forward Bibulus and a number of augurs 
into an assembly; you questioned the augurs, and they responded that when a 
magistrate was observing the heavens it was not possible to carry out public 
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business in the assembly of the people; you questioned Bibulus, and he 






Given that one of those actions during Caesar’s consulship was a lex curiata that saw Clodius 
adopted into a plebeian gens, it is likely that Clodius had cut some sort of a deal with Bibulus 
and his supporters to ensure that his tribunate remain inviolable. Cicero tells us that the 
augurs were prone to expressing these views on particularly technical matters related to 
augury at contiones (public meetings) (Cic. Dom. 39); this may even have been part of the 
process that was followed prior to the senate initiating an official inquiry of the augurs, who 
would then issue a decree on the ritual correctness of a particular action.
266
 However, as 
noted by Linderski, in contionem producere is very different from ad collegium referre.
267
 
Cicero does not mention any senatorial investigation, nor does he say that the senate referred 
the validity of laws in Caesar’s consulship to the augural college. Instead, Clodius assembled 
Bibulus and number of individual augurs (not the collective college) to address a public 
meeting, responding to questions put to them by himself and perhaps his brother, the augur 
Appius Claudius (Cic. Dom. 40). As individuals, those augurs who were inimici of Caesar 
expressed their personal opinions only, which did not constitute an official responsum of the 
college.  
 
Many scholars have often been baffled in their attempts to work why Clodius appeared to 
turn his back on Caesar and align himself with the Bibulus and his supporters; after all, 
Clodius owed his adoption into a plebeian gens (and hence his whole tribunate) to Caesar and 
Pompey, who both presided over the adoption ceremony, the former as pontifex maximus and 
the latter as augur 59 (Cic. Dom. 41; Att. 2.9.1; 2.12.1).
268
 More recent discussions on the 
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 Lenaghan (1969) 174 describes the incident as ‘the most puzzling thing that Clodius did.’ Traditional 




event have suggested that this attack on Caesar was in fact a political trick, never seriously 
intent to nullifying Caesar’s laws, but intent upon issuing a warning to Caesar.
269
 If this was 
the case then Clodius’ plan worked: Caesar never re-enacted his legislation, these contiones 
repositioned Clodius closer than ever to the Bibulus and his supporters (whose support would 
ensure his right to serve as tribune was inviolable), and the proposal of Cicero’s supporters to 
see the great orator return was for the meantime thwarted. Without getting too caught up in 
the political hype of the episode though, it is worth observing the role played by the augurs in 
this series of contiones. The incident provides an example of how a select few augurs (with a 
political agenda) were able to express their views on the technicalities of augury and 
manipulate both public opinion, and perhaps even convince senators that Caesar’s laws 
during his consulship were contra auspicia.
270
 However, the augurs cannot be perceived as 
powerful because of this incident. The involvement of a select few augurs through these 
contiones only came about because Clodius wanted to issue a political threat against Caesar; 
thus the whole incident was simply a public demonstration in which Clodius utilised those 
augurs opposed to Caesar in order to make a point. Whether these augurs knew this already 
cannot be ascertained, but even if they did, they may have still valued the opportunity to 
express public condemnation against Caesar’s laws. And given that Bibulus supposedly 
                                                                                                                                                        
another example of Clodius’ irresponsible and opportunistic behaivour verging on complete madness: see Nisbet 
(1939) 105; Drumann and Groebe (1964) II. 238-9; and Gelzer (1969) 102. 
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 See Pocock (1924) 59-65; (1926) 181-2; Linderski (1985) 222-4; (1986) 2208-11; and Heikkila (1993) 139-
141. Most recently Tatum (1999) 172-4 has provided perhaps the most compelling reconstruction. He has 
suggested that originally Pompey (who was at odds with Clodius the time) – and a number of supporters for 
Cicero’s return from exile – floated a proposal that Caesar re-enact all the actions of his consulship bar the 
adoption of Clodius into a plebeian gens (Cic. Prov. cons. 45-6). This would render Caesar’s laws immune to 
the attacks from his opponents that they were vitiosus (ritually flawed), and invalidate Clodius’ entire tribunate, 
allowing Cicero to return and for Pompey to remove Clodius as a threat. The proposition was likely pitched in 
such a way that it benefitted Caesar, who may have been seriously considering supporting the proposal given the 
enduring constitutional debate on the validity of his acta. Clodius, realising his position required re-assessment, 
therefore aligned himself with the Bibulus and his supporters, on the condition that they uphold the lex curiata, 
by which Clodius had been made a plebeian. He then called together this series of contiones at which Bibulus 
and a number of augurs were present, and issued a threat to Caesar: if he considered supporting the proposal to 
invalidate his tribunate, then Clodius would attempt to refer the validity of Caesar’s laws to the augurate. 
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 As noted by Heikkila (1993) 140-1, there appears to have been at least a solid basis for these augurs 
challenge the validity of Caesar’s first agrarian law, given that Bibulus’ attempted obnuntiatio had been 
obstructed by violence. Such an occurrence was probably nothing new given the similar circumstances in 91 
when M. Livius Drusus (tr. pl. 91) ignored the report of adverse omens resulting in an augural decree nullifying 
his legislation. However, for these augurs to argue that Caesar’s subsequent legislation violated the auspices 
because Bibulus continued with his spectio during his house arrest is quite controversial. Contra Linderski 




started to challenge the validity of Clodius’ adoption ceremony (Cic. Dom.40), it is entirely 
possible that Bibulus and his supporters were also using Clodius. 
 
Even if the validity of acta carried in Caesar’s consulship was officially referred to the 
college of augurs though, there were too many constitutional hurdles to accomplish the 
annulment of all of Caesar’s laws. The senate would first be required to refer the issue to the 
augurate, then the augurs would have to reach some sort of unanimous decision, and finally 
the senate would have to choose whether or not to act on this priestly advice.
271
 Taylor also 
raises an interesting point relating to the incident in her discussion on the frequent 
manipulation of the state religion in the Late Republic: that in the fifties there was a lack of 
unity amongst members of the augurate.
272
 On the one side there would have been those 
supporters of Caesar led by Pompey, on the other there would have been those conservative 
supporters of Bibulus who spoke out against validity of Caesar’s laws at the contiones. 
Therefore, even if the validity of Caesar’s acts and Bibulus’ heaven-watching was referred to 
the augurate, the college may have risked being embarrassed by their inability to form a 
consensus on the issue. This may in part explain why the senate never referred the matter to 
the augurate, since those augurs who supported Caesar would have ultimately blocked any 
attempts for the college to collectively call into question Caesar’s laws, regardless of their 
religious assessment of the problem. 
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 Beard (1990) 40-3; and North (1990b) 584-5. 
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The many case studies explored throughout this chapter provide a great deal of insight on the 
frequent manipulation and utilisation of the auspices throughout the Late Republic. Cicero 
himself shrewdly saw the auspices as a means of political control and given he was himself 
an augur, continuously stressed (and exaggerated) their importance (Cic. Leg. 2.21; 3.11; 
3.27; Div. 1.95; Sen. 23). In just a fifteen year period (between 59 and 44) the ancient 
evidence preserves at least seven occasions where magistrates exercised their right to 
obnuntiatio in order to obstruct public business, and two cases of augurs utilising their 
individual right to declare alio die. It was evidently magistrates though, not the augurs, who 
had the most influence when it came to making use of the obstructive force of the auspices. 
Not once does the ancient evidence refer to an augur utilising the auspices that was not also 
holding a major magistracy at same the time. Even when the augurs utilised their own 
specialised ius nuntiationis, they did so whilst holding the consulship; and it took political 
figures with the stature of Pompey and Antony to deploy this archaic method of obstruction. 
For the most part, individual augurs exercised a limited advisory role, and were generally 
responsible for assisting magistrates in the interpretation of auspices by providing technical 
guidance in response to specific inquiries. On occasion a prominent political figure that was 
also an augur (for example the consul and augur L. Marcius Philippus) could utilise their 
specialist knowledge of augury and high profile to recommend a course of action, but even 
then it was still up to the senate to choose whether this course of action was appropriate. 
Furthermore, given the central importance of the auspices in Roman public life, it may be 
reasonable to suggest that individual augurs were both more frequently and more effectively 
able to utilise their knowledge to influence public affairs than individual pontiffs. 
 
After closer examination, Cicero’s suggestion that the augurate had the power to abolish laws 
can similarly be exposed as an exaggeration. Like the pontifical college, the augurate only 
had the capacity to recommend to the senate the annulment of laws, and even then, this was 
after the issue had been referred to them by the senate. Thus the senate played the central 
coordinating role in this consultation process, and nothing obligated them to follow the 
advice of the augurs. Given the constitutional importance of the auspices in Roman public 
life though, it would once again be reasonable to postulate that the potential scope of the 
augural decrees and ‘hard power’ of the augurs was more far-reaching than that of the 




making decisions that affect the private lives of individuals, those of the augural college had 
the capacity to nullify controversial legislation or could challenge the validity of a prominent 
magistrate’s election. In his commentary of Cicero’s De Legibus, Roy Dyck also raises an 
interesting point in relation to Cicero’s comments that the augurs were maximum et 
praestantissimum (best and greatest) (Cic. Leg. 2.31).
273
 According to Dyck, this suggestion 
that the augurs were supreme may not simply have related to their superior knowledge of the 
auspices, but to their supremacy when compared to the other major priesthoods. Thus 
membership in the augurate may have been more valued and readily sought after than 
positions in the pontificate because the augurs had a greater scope to influence important 
public affairs. However, the discussion of the series of contiones in 58 on the validity of 
Caesar’s laws demonstrates the difficulty of initiating an official inquiry of the augurs. On 
this occasion there was no formal request for a ruling from the senate because they had good 
political reasons for such inaction. Given that the augurate was also divided between 
supporters of Caesar and supporters of Bibulus on a genuinely controversial religious 
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THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIESTHOODS AND 
MAGISTRACIES  
 






Cum multa divinitus, pontifices, a maioribus nostris inventa atque instituta 
sunt, tum nihil praeclarius quam quod eosdem et religionibus deorum 
immortalium et summae rei publicae praeesse voluerunt, ut amplissimi et 
clarissimi cives rem publicam bene gerendo religiones, religiones sapienter 
interpretando rem publicam conservarent. 
 
Gentlemen of the pontifical college, many divinely inspired expedients of 
government have been devised and instituted by our ancestors; but none of 
these were wiser than their intention that the same men should both oversee the 
worship of the immortal gods and the interests of the state, so that the citizens 
of the greatest distinction and the brightest fame might both preserve religion 
by wise administration of the Republic, and preserve the state by their wise 
interpretation of religion. 
Cic. Dom. 1. 
 
Cicero’s opening address to the pontifical college in 57 made clear the intrinsic link between 
membership in a priestly college and the prospect of accomplishing a distinguished senatorial 
career. Although his remark was partly designed to be a gracious compliment to the pontiffs 
(since they were about to decide the fate of his Palatine house), the statement appears to have 
been an accurate depiction of how Roman priesthoods were distributed amongst some of the 




association between attaining priesthoods and achieving political success, a phenomenon 
institutionalised by their distant ancestors for the purpose of expediency. Naturally the best 
men to preserve and interpret religio were those same wise men that protected the interests of 
the res publica as statesmen. However, in many cases these priests were not co-opted after 
having served their illustrious senatorial careers, but before they ever held a higher 
magistracy. In some cases, these priests were even co-opted before being admitted into the 
senate. Thus out of the work of two scholars, David E. Hahm and Georg J. Szemler, has 
emerged another approach to the priesthoods: that serving in one of the major priesthoods 
was primarily utilised as means to assist the political ascent of young and upcoming 
nobiles.
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 This suggestion that attainment of priesthoods could be utilised as a springboard 
for political advancement may provide a more compelling answer in our attempt to work out 
why men became priests in the Late Republic, and will be the basis of the following 
discussion. 
 
This chapter will first examine patterns drawn from statistical data in the work of Hahm and 
Szemler, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of their respective arguments. Utilising the 
prosopographies of T. R. S. Broughton, Georg Szemler and Jörg Rüpke, this section will also 
compile and analyse data (which is contained in Appendix I) on the interaction between 
priesthoods and magistracies. The aim will be to validate the hypothesis that being a member 
of the pontificate or augurate increased an individual’s chances of becoming consul, and this 
was the chief reason for becoming a priest. Unfortunately, since the dates of co-optation for 
many priests are uncertain, precision is impossible here. However, these estimates will 
venture further into scholarly guesswork than Szemler was ever prepared to go. There 
certainly appears to be a link between membership in the pontificate or augurate and the odds 
of serving a successful magisterial career, and this point merits further discussion. This 
section will also address some of the problems that prevent us from concluding a clear cause 
and effect relationship between priesthoods and attaining higher magistracy, including: the 
incomplete priest lists, the limited ancient evidence (particularly on the tenure of 
priesthoods), and how the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc complicates the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the statistical data available. 
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Finally, the void that the work of Hahm and Szemler have left relatively open for the last 
forty years will be addressed: namely why the acquisition of major priesthoods increased a 
young nobiles chance of reaching the consulship. The first two chapters have already 
ascertained that the pontiffs and augurs cannot be perceived as constitutionally powerful in 
relation to the senate and magistrates, lacking what we might call ‘hard power’. This leaves 
open to question what opportunities membership in a priestly college could offer that might 
aid the campaign of a young and upcoming politician for higher magistracy and social 
prestige, what we might call ‘soft power’. This approach is briefly touched on by Hahm.
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This ‘soft power’ could be harnessed by a priest to eventually generate public support and in 
turn provide crucial votes in the Comitia Tributa and Comitia Centuriata when campaigning 
for magistracy. This section will suggest that social utility of the two major priesthoods was 
established foremost through displays of amicitia between members of the colleges. This 
section will therefore explore some of the ways that members of these sodalities could 
display their strong sense of devotion and loyalty towards one another, from their initial 
nomination as priest by fellow members, to the resulting acts of friendship carried out after 
co-optation. These positions also importantly increased a young political hopeful’s public 
profile through appearances at public ceremonies. These solemn displays of pious duty had 
value in their own right as the public perception towards the young men that attained the title 
of priest was shaped by their interactions as a priest in the public eye. Becoming a priest in 
one of the great colleges could be seen as means for a young man to distinguish himself as 
amplissimum et clarissimum civis (a citizen of the greatest distinction and the brightest fame) 
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4.2. Prosopographical Analysis of Priesthoods 
 
4.2.1. Introducing the work of David E. Hahm and Georg Szemler 
The earliest examples of statistical analyses exploring the connections between these 
priesthoods and magistracies were carried out by Hahm (1963) and Szemler (1972). This 
discussion will therefore start by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their respective 
arguments, which will provide the basis from which to launch a new inquiry into the 
connection between priesthoods and magistracy. The illuminating statistics of Hahm’s article 
were drawn from a fifty year period during the Middle Republic, between 218 and 167, for 
which we have relatively complete membership lists. He established both the average age of 
co-optation for various priesthoods and the fraction of those that went on to attain the 
consulship, noting a causal relationship between the membership in a major priestly college 
and the chances of reaching a higher magistracy.
276
 He also inferred that the two great 
priestly colleges tended not to co-opt men who had already held the consulship; instead they 
preferred to select young men under the age of thirty-six, who had not yet attained a higher 
magistracy.
277
 Thus, since a large majority of the augurs and pontiffs received priesthoods at 
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 See Bardt (1871) 37; RSR II.18-73; Taylor (1942a) 385-412. Hahm (1963) 73-85 was the first to take these 
ideas a step further with the presentation of statistical evidence. 
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 Hahm (1963) 76: notable examples from this period of priests co-opted at a young age include the two augurs 
L. Quinctius Flamininus (cos. 192) (FS 2877), who was less than twenty years of age at co-optation (Livy 
25.2.2); and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (cos. 177) (FS 3009), who was only admodum adulescens when elected 
augur in 204 (Livy 29.38.7); Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (suff. cos. 162) was also adulescens when elected 
pontiff in 172 (Livy 42.28.13). However, despite the remarks of Mommsen in RSR II.32, it was not customary to 
co-opt pueri. 
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 The assertion of Hahm (1963) 76 that the augurate was the more popular college because the average age of 
the augurs at co-optation was younger than that of the pontiffs (a statistic which is impossible to ascertain), and 
that they were more likely to become consuls, is on much shakier ground. He speculatively based his estimate 
for the average age at co-optation on the average number of years a member served as a priest (twenty in the 
pontificate compared to twenty-nine in the augurate); this was not in fact indicative of the age a priest was co-
opted though, since a number of other factors could explain why these augurs on average served longer. 
Opportunism and good luck would have played a big part in determining which college a member was co-opted 
into, since a vacancy had to be created by the death of a serving member before co-optation could occur. One 
could imagine that existing members had a short-list of candidates in mind ready for when a vacancy opened up, 
but changes in the political climate would routinely have affected this short-list. Prospective priests could be 
forced to wait years, even decades, for a vacancy to open up. As noted by North (1990c) 533-4, during the Late 






Szemler attempted to expand upon the work of Hahm by formulating prosopographical lists 
for eight different priesthoods during the whole republican period.
279
 His work sought to 
examine how common it was for the attainment of priesthoods, including membership in the 
pontificate and augurate, to precede the attainment of a major magistracy (the praetorship or 
consulship). Szemler’s ‘results’ came to a similar conclusion as Hahm: possibly 63.8% of 
pontiffs and 55.3% of augurs (certainly 48.9% of pontiffs and 47.4% of augurs) entered their 
priesthoods before the attainment of a higher magistracy (with another 12.8% of pontiffs and 
26.3% of augurs not reaching any higher magistracy).
280
 Thus his statistical findings 
proposed that roughly 78.8% (certainly 67%) of the known pontiffs and augurs, whose tenure 
of office he attempts to estimate, were presumably co-opted relatively young, in or before 
their thirties and before their attainment (or campaign for) higher magistracy (see fig. i).
281
 
Not all members of major priesthoods reached higher magistracy though, with a total of 
18.8% failing to reach the praetorship. Co-optation or election to priestly office was less 
likely to follow a major magistracy though, since Szemler estimated this to have been the 
case for just 21% of pontiffs and augurs. In these rarer cases, priestly office was generally 
perceived as a reward granted to senior political figures for their great service to the res 
publica.
282
 However, Szemler concluded from these statistics that priesthoods were more 
commonly utilised as a training ground to groom prospective consuls.  
 
Despite the problems with Hahm’s and Szemler’s presentation of statistical data (since 
neither attempt to extrapolate percentages from their data), the basic premise for their 
argument stands strong, and deserves more merit than recent discussions on priesthoods have 
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 Szemler (1972); for a fair review of Szemler’s work, see Broughton (1975) 383-7. Wiseman (1973) 266 is 
not wrong though when he notes that Szemler’s prosopography offers no defining advance on the work of 
Broughton in MRR; however, his comments that ‘it should never have been published’ and that ‘you can leave 
S.’s book to the oblivion where I am afraid it belongs’ were unduly harsh. There is value in Szemler’s work, and 
what he was trying to do. 
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 See Fig. i. in Appendix I, drawn from Szemler (1972) 182-90; these data do not include the nineteen pontiffs 
and sixteen augurs where he argues that available evidence is either inconclusive or unsatisfactory. These 
percentages are not actually presented in the results of Szemler, but are drawn from the work he has done. 
281
 One tentatively infers that most of those co-opted before higher magistracy were relatively young, since if we 
accept the lex Villia annalis as a point of departure for estimating age, they must have been in their thirties or 
younger. See Szemler (1972) 191. 
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 As was the case for the augur Cicero (cos. 63) (FS 3290) and the pontiff C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76) (FS 
2996). The pontiff L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 54) (FS 1478), despite being co-opted after his consulate, 







 Therefore, this section will first aim to validate the hypothesis that being a priest 
increased an individual’s chances of becoming consul, with a focus on a twenty-five year 
period in the Late Republic from 74 to 50. The goal here is not to re-present all of the 
prosopographical work on the identification of priests; Broughton, Szemler, and more 
recently Rüpke provide more than enough evidence on this. Instead, this section will present 
statistical data (utilising these three modern works) in two innovative ways. Firstly I will 
present the number of pontiffs and augurs in the twenty-five year period between 74 and 50 
that reached the consulship, including an estimate of how many were co-opted before 
reaching a specific higher magistracy.
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 Secondly, using the statistical data I will then 
reverse the perspective of Szemler’s results; thus instead of attempting to work out how many 
priests became consuls, I will estimate what proportion of the consuls in the twenty-five year 
period from 74 to 50 were already pontiffs or augurs on their election.  
 
4.2.2. The interaction of priesthoods and magistracies between 74 and 50 
The summary of statistical data in Appendix I may come across as quite dry and tedious, but 
the final figures drawn from Rüpke provide some compelling evidence to corroborate the 
theories of Hahm and Szemler.
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 Szemler is only willing to estimate that 32.6% (certainly 
23.3%) of the pontiffs and augurs between 74-50 attained membership in their respective 
priesthoods prior to reaching higher magistracy (see Fig. ii). However, Rüpke’s astute 
guesswork approximates a resounding 74.4% (certainly 51.2%) of these priests were co-opted 
before reaching higher magistracy (see Fig. iii).
286
 Despite many of Rüpke’s estimates for the 
dates of co-optation remaining speculative, his work is a huge advance on the work of 
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 For example North (1990b) 588-9 references Szemler’s work in passing and Scheid (1993) 62-3 makes very 
little of these attempts to draw conclusions from statistical data. 
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 This is a similar approach to Szemler (1972), but will instead focus on the last years of the Republic, utilising 
the recent prosopographical lists in Rüpke (2008), and estimating exactly which office of the cursus honorem 
the priest was co-opted before (not just dividing them into higher and lesser magistracies). 
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 See Table i and ii in Appendix II for a list of the pontiffs and augurs from 74-50 and estimates (marked by 
prob.) and more certain dates (marked by X) approximating at what stage of their political career a priest was 
co-opted. 
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 Rüpke (2008) 628 does not accept the augurate of a C. [?] Coelius Caldus, grandson to the consul of 94 (FS 
1285), instead supposing that the grandfather was co-opted both decimvir and augur. Contra Szemler (1972) 150 
who includes the younger Caldus as an augur in his priest lists. Rüpke also argues ex silentio that M. Aurelius 
Cotta (cos. 74) (FS 826) was an augur, because his older brother C. (cos. 75) (FS 823) was pontiff, and a second 
younger brother L. (cos. 65) (FS 824) was co-opted quindecimvir, an appointment that was ‘beneath him’. 




Szemler, Broughton and Bardt, with some quite compelling arguments to support his data.
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Rüpke estimates that seventeen of the known twenty-four pontiffs (70.8%) and twelve of the 
nineteen known augurs (63.2%) between 74 and 50 (a total of 67.4% of these priests) reached 
the praetorship after attaining their priestly office; whilst fourteen pontiffs (58.3%) and ten 
augurs (52.6%) (a total of 55.8% of priests) reached the consulship as priests.
288
 This 
statistical data, which has been generated from Rüpke’s prosopography, greatly strengthens 
the long-held hypothesis that these priests tended to be co-opted before they reached higher 
magistracies, and before they distinguished themselves in the political arena.  
 
Certain examples of priests being co-opted before serving as quaestor and entering the senate 
(between 74 and 50) include the pontiffs: C. Iulius Caesar (cos. 59) (FS 2003), co-opted in 73 
and serving as quaestor in 69; P. Mucius Scaevola Cordus (monet. 70) (FS 2481), who may 
never have entered the senate; L. Pinarius Natta (FS 2711), who died early in 56 (Cic. Att. 
4.8a.3); and probably both M. Valerius Messalla (cos. 61) (FS 3411) and Q. Servilius Caepio 
Brutus (pr. 44) (FS 3058). The augurs that were certainly co-opted before entering the senate 
include F. Cornelius Sulla Felix (quaest. 54) (FS 1388) and P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther 
(quaest. 44) (FS 1354) (Dio Cass. 39.17.1); whilst L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 64) (FS 2007), M. 
Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 53) (FS 3417), and P. Licinius Crassus (quaest. 55) (FS 2234) 
were probably all co-opted before serving as quaestors. Even amongst those priests that did 
not become consuls, two pontiffs and an augur were at least candidates for the consulship: the 
pontiff P. Sulpicius Galba (pr. 66) (FS 3186) was candidate in 63, another pontiff M. 
Aemilius Scaurus (pr. 56) (FS 528) withdrew his candidacy in 53; whilst the augur Ser. 
Sulpicius Galba (pr. 54) (FS 3191) ran in 49. The augur L. Marcius Philippus (pr. 44) also 
served as consul suffectus in 38. 
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 For example, Rüpke (2008) 117 formulates a compelling list of the six pontiffs and six augurs that were co-
opted following Sulla’s enlargement of membership in these colleges in 81 (Livy per. 89), drawn from Sulla’s 
most loyal supporters. Therefore, the pontiffs co-opted were probably M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73) (FS 
3234), M’. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 67) (FS 432), M. Valerius Messalla (Niger) (cos. 61) (FS 3411), Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Creticus (cos. 69) (FS 981), Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus (cos. 77) (FS 514), and C. Aurelius 
Cotta (cos. 75) (FS 823), whilst the augurs co-opted were likely Sulla himself (FS 1390), L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 
64) (FS 2007), M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 53) (FS 3417), L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74) (FS 2248), C. 
Claudius Marcellus (pr. 80) (FS 1204), and Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60) (FS 980). These were all men 
that Szemler (1972) 182-6 had refused to speculate on the date of co-optation for, but Rüpke’s argument enables 
us to hazard a reasonable guess, and permit a firmer conclusion on whether they became priests before or after 
holding a major magistracy. In fact, out of these proposed twelve men co-opted in 81, eleven had not yet held 
the praetorship.  
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Many of the cases where priests did not reach the consulship, as was the case for sixteen out 
of these forty-three men (37.2%), could also be explained by early death. We certainly notice 
a decrease in the number of priests that became consuls from those junior members co-opted 
between 74-50. This need not have been because the indirect political value of these 
priesthoods was diminishing, but was more likely caused by the premature death of several 
priests, especially during the Civil War (49-45). Thus men that otherwise may have become 
consuls were prevented from doing so. Of the eight pontiffs that failed to reach the 
consulship, five were probably killed:  P. Sulpicius Galba (pr. 66) (FS 3186), who is 
identified with the Galba put to death by Caesar’s mutinying soldiers in 47 (Plut. Caes 51.2); 
C. Fannius (pr. 49/8?) (FS 1610), whom Cicero assumed had died in the aftermath to the 
Battle of Pharsalus in about November 48 (Cic. Att. 11.6.6); L. Pinarius Natta (FS 2711), who 
appears to have died in 56 just two years after becoming pontiff (Cic. Att. 4.8a.3); Brutus (pr. 
44) (FS 3058), who was consul designate for 42 prior to the assassination of Caesar, but 
committed suicide after defeat at the Battle of Philippi in 42 (Livy Per. 124); and C. 
Scribonius Curio (tr. pl. 50) (FS 2997), who died in 49 during the defeat of one of Caesar’s 
armies in Africa (Caes. BCiv. 2.42.4). It is also assumed that the pontiff M. Aemilius Scaurus 
(pr. 56) (FS 528) lost his priestly office after his exile in 52 (App. B. Civ. 2.24). Of the eight 
augurs that failed to reach the consulship, four died relatively young: C. (Faustus) Cornelius 
Sulla Felix (quaest. 54) (FS 1388), who was killed in 46 after the Battle of Thapsus (Caes. 
BAfr. 95; Livy Per. 114); P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (quaest. 44) (FS 1354), who is 
thought to have died in 42 after the Battle of Philippi; Q. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 49) (FS 
1105), who died in 47 during his return from Spain (Caes. BAfr. 64.3; Dio Cass. 42.16.2); and 
P. Licinius Crassus (quaest. 55) (FS 2234), who was killed by the Parthians in the Battle of 
Carrhae in 53 (Plut. Crass. 25.7). Therefore, 56.3% of those sixteen priests that did not 
become consuls (or 20.9% of all forty three priests) may have been denied the opportunity to 
become consul due to premature death. 
 
By reversing the perspective of the previous set of statistics, it is also possible to estimate 
how many of the fifty consuls between 74 and 50 were pontiffs or augurs. Out of the fifty 
consuls that served in the twenty-five year period from 74 to 50, eight were pontiffs (16%) 
and ten (20%) were augurs. Thus 36% (or roughly one in every three) of these consuls were 
priests on their election to the consulship. Only two of the consuls that served in office during 




was elected augur in 52, and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 54) (FS 1478), who was 
supposedly already a pontiff in 49.
289
 Since we only know the identity of 80.3% of the 
pontiffs and 65.6% of the augurs during this period from the lists of Rüpke, we need to allow 
room for error in this estimate. Therefore, with complete priest lists, we could expect that the 
number of priest-consuls to rise even higher. Considering that there were only ever thirty of 
these priests at one time, it is still quite impressive that these men could so frequently find 
themselves serving as consuls. Between 74 and 50, there were also five censuses carried out 
(in 70, 65-64, 61, 55, and 50), thus ten men became censors (although only one lustrum was 
carried out in 70).
290
 One of these ten censores, one was an augur, three were pontiffs and two 
are unknown, thus at least 40% of the censors were also priests. Furthermore, out of the three 
interregna (held in 55, 53 and 52), amongst the six interreges we know of, five were pontiffs 
(83.3%); although, three of these interregna were served by the same pontiff M. Valerius 
Messala Niger (cos. 61) (FS 3411).
291
 There certainly appears to be a trend that patrician 
pontiffs made viable candidates for the higher magistracies of censor and interrex. 
 
The fact that nearly three-quarters of the augurs and pontiffs between 74 and 50 appear to 
have received their priesthoods early in life, before earning any great distinction for 
themselves, indicates that priestly office was not normally regarded as an honour or reward 
for outstanding public achievement after serving a successful magisterial career. This may 
have been the case for a select few priests, including the pontiff C. Scribonius Curio and the 
augur Cicero, the latter becoming a priest ten years after his consulship and whose 
circumstances as a novus homo were particularly unusual.
292
 However, these rarer case 
examples do not negate the long-held presumption of Hahm and Szemler that the status of 
priests appears to have been utilised as a tool for political ascent. There is, however, one 
major unyielding flaw with this attempt to draw a causal link between membership in a major 
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priestly college and success in politics: the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Given 
that a majority of these priests were nobiles from established ancient Roman families, it is 
possible that their success in the world of politics was already highly likely (if not 
guaranteed) before they ever became priests. Thus it is worth questioning how dependant 
these priests were on their membership in the pontificate or augurate to have a successful 
magisterial career. In a society where candidates for magistracy were insistently judged by 
their heritage, membership in a college could have been perceived as a mere scout badge for 
a young political hopeful to add to countless other social accolades.
293
 Unfortunately, there is 
no way of categorically resolving this problem. The only way to refute such a claim would be 
to determine the value of these priesthoods, and show how these offices enabled young 
nobiles to enter the political sphere. The construction of a public profile and identity was 
imperative to the success of these young men starting out in politics, thus priesthoods should 
be understood as a platform for those too young to enter the senate to get a head start in 
canvassing popular and senatorial support. After all, it was impossible to obtain any of the 
senior positions of the cursus honorum without being ‘well known’ through one’s public 
appearances, and without having attained a high profile through cultivating a network of 
amicita.
294
 The practical social utility of priesthoods will therefore be the focus of our final 
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4.3. The Social Utility of Priesthoods:  
A productive entrée into élite society 
 
4.3.1. Introduction: defining the importance of amicitia 
 
Sed tamen qui sunt amici ex causa iustiore cognationis aut adfinitatis aut 
sodalitatis aut alicuius necessitudinis, iis carum et iucundum esse maxime 
prodest. 
 
Still, it is very helpful to be on close and agreeable terms with those who are 
friends on more genuine grounds, that is, through claims of kinship or 
marriage, fellowship in a religious fraternity, or some other bond. 
 
Q. Cic. Comm. Pet. 16 
One way of viewing these priestly colleges – especially for those young men about to embark 
on a political career – is as fraternities, striving to preserve the exchange of amicitia between 
colleagues. Given the exclusive nature of the colleges, breaking into their ranks afforded 
members the opportunity to rub shoulders with some of the most prestigious and politically 
important members of the aristocracy, including men who had already served distinguished 
careers as consuls. The following discussion will analyse how the surviving ancient evidence 
supports this claim, demonstrating how strong ties of amicitia could form between members 
in these priesthoods. The co-optation and nomination process in itself fostered a system of 
exclusivity and collegiality that endured for much of the republican era. Furthermore, the 
regular attendance of opulent inaugural banquets, and other exclusive gatherings for the 
priests, gave members ample opportunity to come into contact with one another. We also 
have examples of priests securing political alliances by nominating new members, through 
marriages, some instances of priests defending one another in trial, and (amongst the augurs) 
the dedication of works on augural law to a members. There also appears to have been a 
seemingly deliberate age gap between members in a particular college; this may have been 
the result of senior members taking young and upcoming political hopefuls under their wing. 
The discussion will finish by exploring how these friendships could translate into political 




This section will focus heavily upon the Commentariolum Petitionis, a didactic treatise in the 
form of a letter supposedly written to Cicero by his younger brother Quintus. The work acts 
as a guide to aid Cicero’s campaign for the consulship in 64, and as suggested by the 
introductory quote, demonstrates how a candidate might rely on his close connections with 
and support from eminent friends in sacerdotal colleges.  
The ideal of amicitia is of course an abstract concept, not easily defined, especially in a 
Roman context.
295
 The word embodies a much wider range of understanding than our 
common use of the word ‘friendship’ denotes, encompassing those whom we today might 
refer to as a network of colleagues, political allies, or business associates. Whatever the 
nature or varying degree of amicitia within these priestly colleges though, such an exchange 
would almost certainly have benefitted those young prospective praetors and consuls being 
groomed for political success. Priesthood was greatly valued in this context especially for its 
life-long membership, which naturally secured life-long ties of amicitia.
296
 There is limited 
evidence to clearly suggest the ways that these colleagues in a priestly college might 
demonstrate their sense of devotion and amicitia to one another. It is also impossible to prove 
that membership in the same priestly college was the primary factor behind such acts of 
amicitia; since these men were all amongst the upper most stratums of the élite, they would 
regularly come into contact anyway. However, utilising what evidence there is, the following 
section will explore some of the tactful yet efficacious ways that members of these sodalities 
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4.3.2.  Nominatio pro beneficio 
 
Qua in cogitatione et cooptatum me ab eo in conlegium recordabar, in quo 
iuratus iudicium dignitatis meae fecerat, et inauguratum ab eodem; ex quo 
augurum institutis in parentis eum loco colere debebam. 
 
I remembered that it was he [Q. Hortensius Hortalus] who first introduced me 
into the augurate, after his judgement had deemed me worthy of the office 
upon oath, and by that same man I was inaugurated. From that time, by the 
customs of the augurate, I had to respect and honour him as a parent. 
Cic. Brut. 1. 
The system of co-optation which prevailed until 104 endeavoured to ensure that existing 
members only co-opted those not at odds with any one already in the college; this system 
both fostered new friendships and utilised old ones. As noted earlier, in a letter to his fellow 
augur Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54) (FS 1226), Cicero even reminisced that in days gone by 
it was not customary for the augurs to co-opt an inimicus of anyone in the college, 
irrespective of the wishes of the majority: 
 Quid... amplissimi sacerdota collegium, in quo non modo amicitiam violari 
apud maiores nostros fas non erat, sed ne coptari quidem sacerdotem licebat, 
qui cuiquam ex collegio esset inimicus? 
And what of our exalted place in the highest priestly college, in which our 
ancestors not only deemed it impious to breach friendship, but also that no 
priest could be co-opted if he was on terms of enmity with any existing 




This procedure ensured that these priesthoods, like exclusive clubs, became fraternities; thus 
co-optation was less about any especial pious or religiously suitable characteristics that a 
candidate possessed, but was more dependent on being close with existing members in a 
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 Likewise, Sulla’s re-establishment of the co-optation process, and the 
increase in membership of the great priestly colleges, were intent upon rewarding his most 
loyal supporters already connected by ties of amicitia. Towards the end of the Late Republic, 
however, divisions within the colleges (even the augurate) started to become more apparent, 
split between those of the old ‘nobility’ and supporters of the triumvirs.
299
 That Cicero and 
M. Antonius were colleagues in the augurate at the height of their very public attacks against 
one another in 44 is further indication of the enmity that could exist in the augurate. The idea 
behind this rule which could blackball candidates was probably to avoid personal rivalries 
getting in the way of important decisions of the state religion, ensuring impartial decision-
making when debating on matters of religious significance. However, the ideal of amicitia, 
although not always adhered to, could still be an alluring perk of religious office, an 
important tool to be utilised especially by those up-and-coming politicians looking to 
establish themselves in the world of affairs. 
During the popular election of priests, the nomination procedure that was in place continued 
to ensure that amici of an existing members would be co-opted. Members of a college 
retained the exclusive right to nominate those candidates that could compete in the comitia 
sacerdotum. These nominations could also naturally be used as opportunities for existing 
members to grant beneficia (favours) to those nominated; such was the case when Caesar 
nominated P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57) (FS 1353) as pontiff. On pleading for his 
life after being forced to surrender Corfinium to Caesar during the civil war, Lentulus 
supposedly reminded him of their former friendship and acknowledged Caesar’s important 
role in his co-optation as pontiff: veteremque amicitiam commemorat Caesarisque in se 
beneficia exponit; quae erant maxima: quod per eum in collegium pontificum venerat (and he 
reminded Caesar of their former friendship, acknowledging that the favours to him were very 
great: that it was through his interest that he had come to be admitted into the college of the 
pontiffs) (Caes. BCiv. 1.22).
300
 The best example of such a nomination forming a true act of 
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amicitia, however, is the nomination of Cicero as augur by Q. Hortensius Hortalus (cos. 69) 
(FS 1914) in 53 (Cic. Brut. 1; Phil. 2.4). Cicero describes Hortensius’ generous act, and even 
tells us that it was customary for a newly elected augur to respect his nominator as he would 
his own father: ex quo augurum institutis in parentis eum loco colere debebam (and so from 
that time by the customs of the augurate I had to respect and honour him as a parent) (Cic. 
Brut. 1).
301
 Since Cicero was co-opted in the twilight of his career after having served as 
consul, such a friendship did not benefit his political ascent as such; however, as a novus 
homo Cicero had managed to break into a fiercely aristocratic and snobbish institution, a feat 
which would benefit his young son Marcus when he too became a priest. Such an act of 
friendship through a nomination would evidently have been a great advantage to those 
younger members starting out in politics. For example, the nominator of P. Licinius Crassus 
(quaest. 55) (FS 2234) clearly would have felt that the talented youngest son of the triumvir 
was a man of great promise. 
It was also not unusual for influential fathers (especially those already holding priesthoods) to 
actively seek out nominations for their sons to the great colleges.
302
 The pontiff P. Cornelius 
Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57) (FS 1353) must have already secured his son of the same name’s 
(FS 1354) nomination for the vacant augurate in 57 (and been extremely confident of his 
success) before he was adopted into the plebeian gens of the Manlii Torquatii to make him 
eligible for office (Dio Cass. 39.17).
303
 Another pontiff P. Servilius Isauricus Vatia (cos.79) 
(FS 3072), the father of P. Servilius Isauricus (cos. 48) (FS 3067), in light of his important 
senatorial position, probably also played an influential role in the nomination and subsequent 
selection of his son as an augur in the 60s. Furthermore, the triumvir M. Licinius Crassus 
must have been instrumental in the nomination of his two sons, Marcus (FS 2233) and 
Publius (FS 2234), who were inducted into the pontificate and augurate respectively.
304
 In 50, 
                                                                                                                                                        
habuerat, quod in petitione consulatus erat sublevatus (in that after his praetorship [with his help] he had been 
appointed to the governorship of Spain; in that he had been assisted by him for his pursuit for the consulate) 
(Caes. BCiv. 1.22). 
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just two years after becoming an augur, Cicero was already being asked by M. Calpurnius 
Bibulus (cos. 59) to nominate his son L. Calpurnius Bibulus (pr. 36) for the vacancy created 
by the death of Hortensius: …de auguratu fili sui scripsit ad me; in quo ego misericordia 
commotus, et quod semper amicissimus Bibulo fui, dedi operam ut ei quam humanissime 
scriberem (He wrote to me about an augurate for his son; at which I was moved by pity, and 
because I was always very friendly to him, I tried to write to him in the kindest possible way) 
(Cic. Fam. 2.17.6).
305
 Cicero himself even asked M. Iunius Brutus (pr. 44) (FS 3058) to 
nominate his own son Marcus (suff. cos. 30) (FS 3291), aged just twenty-one, as pontiff in 
May 43: Ciceronem nostrum in vestrum conlegium cooptari volo (I wish for my son Marcus 
to be co-opted into your college) (Cic. Ad Brut. 1.5.3). Marcus was not co-opted on this 
occasion, but would eventually become a pontiff before his suffect consulate in 30 (App. B. 
Civ. 4.220-221).
306
 Thus the ambition of a son to become a priest in one college whilst the 
father was still in another college was quite traditional. Fathers were always eager to give 
their sons the best possible start to a political career, and what better start than to gain 
membership in one of these highly exclusive gentlemen’s clubs. 
Although L. Calpurnius Bibulus’ candidature for the augurate failed again in 43, a letter 
recommending the young man manages to capture the relationship that could form between 
nominee and nominator. In July, it was once again Cicero who was persuaded to nominate 
Lucius to run for the augurate, but this time by the pontiff M. Iunius Brutus (pr. 44) (FS 
3058):  
Eam nominationem a te petimus. neque coniunctiori dare beneficium quam 
nos tibi sumus neque digniorem nominare potes quam Bibulum. 
We beseech you to nominate him. You cannot grant a favour to someone 
closer than I am to you, nor can you nominate a more worthy candidate than 
Bibulus. 
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Whether or not Cicero agreed is not made clear, however, this letter suggests that nominating 
the favoured candidate of a political ally was regarded as a means dare beneficium (to do a 
favour). This may be suggestive of the kind of wheeling-and-dealing that so often could have 
occurred behind the scenes during the nomination process.
308
 Thus the ability to nominate in 
itself was undoubtedly a perk of religious office. Brutus’ appeal also epitomises the attitude 
that senior members in the colleges would probably hold towards these younger nominees, as 
Brutus requests Cicero to make Bibulus his protégé:  
Bibulum noli dimittere e sinu tuo, tantum iam virum ex quanto, crede mihi, 
potest evadere qui vestris paucorum respondeat laudibus  
Do not send Bibulus away from your bosom, a man already of such calibre 
that – believe me – may develop to respond in your eulogies of the élite!  
Cic. Ad Brut. 1.7.2. 
A snapshot of membership in the pontificate of 57 also serves to illustrate a seemingly 
deliberate age gap between members.
309
 Cicero lists all the pontiffs that attended the inquiry 
regarding his house in September 57 in his second speech before the college de Haruspicum 
Responsis (Cic. Har. resp. 12).
310
 Drawn from this list and prosopographical work, at least 
six of these pontiffs were of the jeunesse dorée, having not yet reached a higher magistracy 
(the praetorship) and likely in their thirties (or younger) on co-optation or election, including: 
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Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nascia (tr. pl. or quaest. 59) (FS 986); C. Fannius (tr. pl. 
59) (FS 1610); M. Aemilius Lepidus (pr. 49) (FS 508); M Aemilius Scaurus (pr. 56) (FS 
528); M. Licinius Crassus (Pleb.) (quaest. 54) (FS 2233); and L. Pinarius Natta (Pat.) (FS 
2711).
311
 Evidently the priestly colleges appear to have been split between senior political 
figures who had already completed their glittering magisterial careers and those junior 
politicians who had yet to reach their peak. This may have enabled long-serving senior 
members to mentor the young political novices who they nominated, taking them under their 
wing and training them in their priestly duties and beyond. The recurring theme here is the 
nomination of a young and upcoming political figure, a man showing great promise, from an 
illustrious family, combined with the expectation that his nominator will to aid his political 
ascent and make him his protégé.
312
 
4.3.3.  Cenae augurales 
Members of the priestly colleges – the augurate in particular – routinely convened at closed-
doors events, such as meetings or inaugural banquets for newcomers.
313
 Such regular 
gatherings would have provided the perfect opportunity for members of the colleges to 
mingle with their colleagues and cultivate lasting bonds of amicitia. Inaugural banquets 
would also serve as a perfect opportunity for successful candidates to show gratitude to their 
nominators. At Hortensius’ inaugural banquet, fattened peafowl was introduced as a new 
delicacy (Varro Rust. 3.6.6).
314
 Such a flamboyant demonstration of wealth was clearly intent 
upon impressing his colleagues in the augurate, yet it also indicates the need of these 
snobbish figure-heads to uphold the elitist traditional values of the college. An extravagant 
menu for another inaugural feast held in 70 is again preserved by Macrobius, which included 
such exotic treats as sea-urchins, raw oysters, cockles, mussels, jellyfish, fattened hen, sows’ 
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udders, loin of roe-deer, boars’ cheek, ducks, boiled water-fowl fattened fowl wrapped in 
dough, and hares (Macrob. Sat. 3.13.10-12).
315
 Cicero also informs us of another cena 
auguralis at the house of Lentulus at which fungos helvellas (flavoured mushrooms) were on 
the menu (Cic. Fam. 7.26.2). In spite of the sumptuary laws enacted in the Late Republic, 
prohibiting certain foods at banquets, Cicero complains of how he still managed to get ill: in 
eas cum incidissem in cena augurali apud Lentulum, tanta me διάρροια adripuit ut hodie 
primum videatur coepisse consistere (Having fallen victim to these in the augural banquet at 
the house of Lentulus [presumably the augur P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57) (FS 
1353)
316
], I was seized with a violent diarrhoea, which, I think, has been checked today for 
the first time) (Cic. Fam. 7.26.2). On the one hand this creates an unsavoury picture of the 
augurate, whose members were perhaps more concerned with elaborate shows of wealth than 
providing any meaningful contribution to the res publica. However, it also indicates the 
important social aspect of the colleges, facilitating the formation of a tight network of 
powerful men who routinely met at these opulent banquets; it would also be hard to imagine 
that political issues were completely ignored as a topic of conversation at such gatherings.
317
  
4.3.4.  Amici ex causa adfinitatis 
Another way of securing a closer association with another priest was through marriage 
alliances between families. Within the augurate of 50 at least four politically aligned 
marriages bound augurs together: Valeria, the sister of M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 53) 
(FS 3417), was the fifth wife to the dictator Sulla; Aemilia, Sulla’s stepdaughter, was forced 
to divorce the pontiff M’. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 67) (FS 432) to wed the augur Pompey; 
Claudia, the daughter of Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54) (FS 1227), married the eldest son of 
Pompey in ca. 56; and Pompeia, the daughter of Pompey, was betrothed to the son of Sulla, 
Faustus (FS 1388) (Suet. Iul. 27.1; Plut. Pomp. 47.4). Another four marriage alliances 
connected members within the pontificate: as already noted, the pontiff M’. Acilius Glabrio 
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been some other celebration that took place after the co-optation of Cicero as augur 52. 
317
 As noted well by Liebeschuetz (1967) 82, the pontiffs would also have conducted inaugural banquets (hence 
Macrob. Sat. 3.13.10) and held banquets after a public sacrifice. Taking part was not necessarily a morally 
uplifting experience, and as Liebeschuetz points out, it was not thought to bring the guest into spiritual 
communion with the divinity, as is the case with Christianity where bread and wine represent the body and 
blood of Christ. Rather the diners’ feeling of human community might be heightened by the solemn nature of 




was originally married to Sulla’s step daughter Aemilia, the sister of the pontiff M. Aemilius 
Scaurus (pr. 56) (FS 528); Scaurus was himself married to Mucia, daughter of the pontifex 
maximus Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) (FS 2478); M. Licinius Crassus, son of the triumvir, 
was married to a Caecilia, daughter of the pontiff Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69) 
(FS 981);
318
 and L. Pinarius Natta (FS 2711) may have been married to Iulia, a sister (or 
niece) of the pontifex maximus Caesar.
319
 These connections, although by no means a 
decisive result of friendships formed in the colleges, still serve to illustrate the close family 
bond that many of these priests came to share through marriage alliances. 
4.3.5. The dedications of esoteric texts on augural lore 
The augurs also regularly composed and dedicated texts on augural lore (and law) to their 
fellow members. We have evidence that at least five works were dedicated by those members 
that made up the college between 81 and 45. Fragments survive of augural texts by L. Iulius 
Caesar (cos. 64) (FS 2007) (in Festus, Macrobius, and Priscian), M. Valerius Messalla Rufus 
(cos. 53) (FS 3417) (Gell. NA 13.15.3), Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54) (FS 1227), who 
dedicated a work with pointed political assessments of obnuntiationes and the auspices to 
Cicero in 51 (Cic. Fam. 3.4.2),
320
 and even Cicero, whose work de auguriis was dedicated in 
recompense to Appius.
321
 C. Claudius Marcellus also appears to have authored at least one 
text on augural lore, hence his debate with Ap. Claudius over the nature of divination and the 
ability of the augurs to predict the future (Cic. Div. 2.35, 75; Leg. 2.13, 32-3). By dedicating 
these texts to one another, the augurs were paying tribute to their colleagues and 
acknowledging their ties of amicitia. Cicero outwardly considered Appius’ dedication as 
suavissimus (very kind) and viewed it as a testament to their ‘close relationship’ and how 
much he supposedly valued their amicitia (Cic. Fam. 3.4.1).
322
 He even lists their 
membership in the augurate, alongside their mutual friendship with Pompey (Appius’ father-
in-law) and Brutus (Appius’ son-in-law), as justification for their close attachment to one 
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 See Parrish (1977) 630-1, who suggests that this marriage led to M. Licinius Crassus’s co-optation into the 
pontificate. 
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 Münzer (1920) 326 (sister); Taylor (1942a) 396-7 (niece or great-niece). 
320
 This work may form the basis of Appius’ opinion on C. Ateius Capito’s falsification of the auspices during 
Crassus’ departure for his campaign against Parthia in 55: see Cic. Div. 1.29-30. Fragments of his writings 
appear in Festus, Gloss. Lat. 214.14-20 L, 382.10-13 L. 
321
 Evidence for Cicero’s de auguriis stems from Cic. Div. 2.76 and Fam. 3.9.3. Sadly the fragments that survive 
of the work are so exiguous that we are not able to uncover the work’s scope or purpose. On the remains of the 
work see Wardle (2006) 7. 
322




another: conlegique coniunctio praesertim tam honorifice a te approbata non mediocre 
vinculum mihi quidem attulisse videtur ad voluntates nostras copulandas (And, lastly, our 
membership of the same college, especially since it has been so honourably received by you, 
seems to me to have cemented a bond of no ordinary strength, securing a union of mutual 
affection between us) (Cic. Fam. 3.4.2).
323
 The highly technical nature of the works also 
enabled the augurs to write and speak in their own exclusive language, heightening the sense 
of social cachet that came with attainment of membership. Cicero himself expresses an 
eagerness to become familiar with the intricacies of the ius augurale, so that he might learn 
the secrets of the priests: …cognitionem iuris auguri consequi cupio (I am most eager to gain 
knowledge of augural law) (Cic. Fam. 3.9.3). 
4.3.6. Caesar’s ascent and the importance of his early priesthoods  
The experience of Caesar (FS 2003), who acquired numerous priesthoods throughout his 
career, also highlights the importance of these religious offices as a means to cultivate lasting 
amicitiae and as tools for political ascent.
324
 Caesar had already attained membership 
amongst the salii before he reached twenty, and in 84, L. Cornelius Cinna (cos. 87-4) 
instigated Caesar’s appointment as flamen Dialis (Suet. Iul. 1.1-2).
325
 The young and 
ambitious Caesar obviously saw great value in becoming a priest, perceiving the office as a 
means to boost his chances of success in politics. However, following the restructuring of the 
priestly colleges after Sulla’s victory and return to Rome in 82, whereby the dictator granted 
priesthoods to his most loyal supporters, Caesar (who was both a Marian and supporter of 
Cinna during the civil war) was forced to abandon his flaminate.
326
 The technical grounds 
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 Appius appeared to have been intent upon writing a series of works on augural lore to go with the work he 
had already dedicated to Cicero (Cic. Fam. 3.9.3; 3.11.4). 
324
 On Caesar’s role holding numerous priestly offices (including a saliate, flaminate, pontificate, his election as 
pontifex maximus and augurate) see Taylor (1941) 118; (1942a) 403; Badian (2009) 19-22; Gruen (2009) 23-8; 
Wardle (2009) 100-11. 
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 Uncertainty obtrudes in attempts to work out whether Caesar had actually completed the appointment 
process. The discrepant terminology of Suetonius (destinatus: which Badian (2009) 16 clearly reads as 
appointed; whereas it can also be translated as ‘destined’ and is by no means conclusive) and Velleius (creatus: 
created) may be reconciled by an acknowledgement of the formal terminology: nominatus (nominated), captus 
(a formal ceremony where the pontifex maximus authorised the selection of a candidate), and inauguratus 
(another formal ceremony held by the augurs). Caesar was probably nominated by the pontiffs for the office, 
captus by the pontifex maximus (cf. Gell. NA 1.12.13-16), but was perhaps never formally inaugurated (as 
suggested by Linderski (1995) 554-5, (2007) 636-7); see Rüpke (2008) 734 for a discussion. 
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 Vanggaard (1988) 75-6 goes so far as to suggest that there was a gentilician cult association between the 
Cornelii and the flaminate, thus Sulla may have felt that a Iulii had no place in this priestly office. Suetonius 




deployed by the pontifex maximus Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) (FS 2478) (at the behest of 
Sulla) to reject Caesar’s appointment are not clear. However, Caesar desperately attempted to 
appeal the decision through a provocatio ad populum. Before an assembly dominated by 
Sulla’s supporters, he lost the argument, and with it his religious office (Plut. Caes. 1). 
Despite the numerous taboos that might obstruct a conscientious flamen Dialis from success 
in politics, Caesar evidently saw value in this religious office and fought hard to avoid 




Caesar’s shrewd cunning and his ability to cultivate a network of eminent contacts ensured 
that he would survive this setback and bounce back. As a result he was admitted to the 
pontifical college in absentia in 73, taking the place of his deceased cousin and Sullan 
benefactor C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75) (FS 823) (Vell. 2.43.1).
328
 Such an appointment could 
not have been possible without the support of aristocratic members in the pontificate, thus 
Matthias Gelzer proposed that the pontiffs Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus (cos. 77) (FS 
514) and Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cos. 79) (FS 3072) probably nominated Caesar.
329
 
Unfortunately no evidence survives on any activity which Caesar engaged upon in his 
capacity as pontiff; however, his circumstances in the lead-up to his co-optation probably 
represent a fairly common pattern. As a young political hopeful aged just twenty eight (or 
thirty) with strong family connections, and his early success in the military sphere, Caesar 
was eager to cultivate lasting contacts amongst the nobility. His subsequent election as 
pontifex maximus was a much more remarkable achievement.
330
 In 63, at just thirty-seven (or 
nine), and not even of praetorian rank, he was purportedly elected with an overwhelming 
margin, successfully defeating two considerably older and more eminent candidates, P. 
Servilius Isauricus (cos. 79) (FS 3072) (Plut. Caes. 7.1, 3) and Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78) 
(FS 2308) (Cic. Nat. D. 1.79; Sall. Cat. 49.2). Ancient commentators assumed that lavish 
bribery plunged Caesar into heavy debt in his campaign for the office, giving rise to the mock 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cinna, which could have been perceived as a demonstration of Caesar’s diehard loyalty to his Marian political 
heritage (Suet. Iul. 1.1-2). 
327
 For a list of some of these taboos, see Gell. NA 10.15. 
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 According to Badian (2009) 19, to be elected in absentia was marked as a formidable achievement. 
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 Gelzer (1968) 25; cf. Weinstock (1937) 30-1 who suggests that Caesar’s mother Aurelia and ‘her political 
friends’ greatly aided his campaign for this religious office. 
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 Although by no means unprecedented: Caesar was not the first to be elected over older and more seasoned 
contenders. As far back as 212, P. Licinius Crassus Dives (cos. 205) (FS 2235), who had not yet even attained 
the aedileship, defeated two rivals who held the consulships twice and censorship once, a striking achievement 
(Livy 25.4.2-4); and in 180 M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 187) (FS 507) obtained a majority of votes over much 




heroic scenes of him declaring to his mother on the eve of the election that he would either 
return to her as pontifex maximus, or not at all (Plut. Caes. 7.1-3; Suet. Iul. 13; cf. Dio Cass. 
37.37.1-3). Caesar was now the titular head of the college of pontiffs, an office normally 
reserved for senior members of Rome’s aristocratic families. The position granted an 
immense amount of distinction and prestige, and Caesar would have relished in the social 
advancement that came with the attainment of the office, such as promptly being able to shift 
his residence from the rather unfashionable Subura district to the official residence of the 





4.3.6.  The Commentariolum Petitionis: the good priest canvasses 
These examples of friendship between priests evidently had value in their own right, but 
these bonds could also be instrumental when a member was campaigning for political 
office.
332
 The Commentariolum Petitionis (Handbook of Electioneering), which was (or 
pretends to be) composed by Cicero’s brother Quintus in the lead up to Cicero’s campaign for 
the consulship of 63, provides some insightful commentary on how amicitia could assist a 
candidate’s campaign for magistracy.
333
 According to the author, amicitia should be utilised, 
and flaunted, as a means to canvass support: deinde <fac> ut amicorum et multitudo et 
genera appareant; habes enim ea quae <qui> novi habuerunt (Then make sure that you 
show off both the multitude and variety of your friends; for how many ‘new men’ have had 
as many friends as you have?) (Q. Cic. Comm. Pet. 3). A friend is described as quisquis est… 
qui ostendat aliquid in te voluntatis, qui colat, qui domum ventitet (anyone who has shown 
                                                 
331
 A detailed discussion on the role and capabilities of the pontifex maximus is beyond the scope of this project. 
Needless to say, becoming a pontiff (as opposed to an augur or a quindecimvir) had the advantage of being able 
to run for this more prestigious office of chief priest of the college. The pontifex maximus certainly had some 
impressive powers, with some political clout, but scholars have often tended to overestimate his influence i.e. 
RKR 509-14; Bleicken (1957) 345-66, and most recently the misleading work of Thomas (2005) 119-40. See 
instead the assessment of North (1990b) 584, 612-3 who argues that the pontifex maximus  had some limited 
disciplinary powers, including the right to impose fines on priests and to recall them to their religious duties 
(subject to an appeal to the people), but the priest acted more as a titular head of the college than a supreme 
functionary. See also Szemler (1972) 77-9. 
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 Only Hahm (1963) 82-3 and Jocelyn (1966) 97 really touch on this point, but not in any detail. The lack of 
discussion on this point stems from the difficulty in proving such a theory and the need to read between the lines 
to infer that friendships aided the political campaign for office. 
333
 I would be inclined to accept the authenticity of the work: see Tatum (2007) 117. The rejectionist view, 
embraced by Anglophone regions in particular, stems from the Loeb edition of the work by Henderson (1972) 
741-746; cf. Nisbet (1961) 84-7. For the sake of my argument though, it is not essential to accept the 
authenticity of the work; even if it is a forgery, then it is still useful in attesting some of the strategies that could 




you good will, or who seeks your company, or who is accustomed to coming to your house) 
(Q. Cic. Comm. Pet. 16). The author even appears to hint that membership in priesthoods (or 
any other religious fraternity) ought to be counted as a bond of friendship that is built upon 
more genuine grounds: tamen qui sunt amici ex causa iustiore cognationis aut adfinitatis aut 
sodalitatis aut alicuius necessitudinis, iis carum et iucundum esse maxime prodest (Still, it is 
very helpful to be on close and agreeable terms with those who are friends on more genuine 
grounds, that is, through claims of kinship or marriage, fellowship in a religious fraternity, or 
some other bond) (Q. Cic. Comm. Pet. 16).
334
  
A recent article by W. Jeffrey Tatum provides some compelling commentary and analysis of 
the Commentariolum Petitionis, dividing a canvass for the consulship into two fundamental 
aspects: 1) gaining the support of friends, and 2) gaining the support of the people (Q. Cic. 
Comm. Pet. 16).
335
 In the first instance, utilising the assistance of colleagues in a priestly 
college that a candidate was on good terms with could have been an accepted means to gain 
support and momentum when canvassing for the consulship. With the support of 
distinguished members of these collegia, whose majesty would have added needed lustre to a 
candidate’s public image, the consul elect that was a priest stood a clear chance of being 
successful in his campaign for political office. These friendships would not only have been 
useful when campaigning for a magistracy though, but also when a member needed help 
carrying a certain bill or course of action in the senate. This may have been the case when 
Cicero requested that Appius Claudius vote in favour of a supplicatio in honour of his 
military triumph (Cic. Fam. 3.9.4). A member may also feel obliged to defend a colleague 
who was on trial, thus the great orator and augur Hortensius successfully defended his 
colleagues M. Valerius Messalla (in 51) and Appius Claudius (in 50) on the charge de 
ambitu.   
 
In the second instance, priesthoods could also have been a means for a prospective consul to 
cultivate a public profile given his regular appearance at number of religious ceremonies 
throughout the year. The case studies involving the pontiffs and augurs in the first two 
chapters may not have granted these priests overwhelming direct political powers, however, 
the value of their presence at these occasions may have been in the indirect power the priests 
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 Henderson (1972) 762, n. a, suggests that the term here is used in the proper sense of a religious or social 
club, cf. Q. Cic. Comm. Pet. 19 where the term implies a ‘gang’. 
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accrued. Through attending a public ceremony, whether it be the dedication of a shrine or a 
public meeting of the augurs, the actions of a priest ‘appeared’ to have an impact on political 
affairs and were at least ‘perceived’ to be powerful and important by members of the 
public.
336
 Utilising membership in a priestly college in a public arena though these public 
appearances may also have been a means to reconcile the traditional expectations of the 
canvass with the requirements of aristocratic sensibilities, given the disdain that was held 
towards ‘popular’ appeals to the people. However, popular appeals through religious 
ceremony may have become an acceptable means to gain the support of the people, since the 
candidate could argue that his campaign for magistracy was sanctioned by his close 
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 Szemler (1971) 114 states that ‘the priestly colleges constituted special groups of permanent functionaries 
whose lifelong terms potentially permitted them to exercise an impact upon society through their state and 
society-connected duties.’ His remarks needless to say refer to the ‘hard power’ of these priests discussed in the 
first two chapters, however, I would argue that this statement is more accurate when referring to the ‘soft power’ 






The prosopographical analysis discussed in the first half of this chapter (and thankfully 
confined to Appendix I) indicates that there exists a strong correlation between attaining a 
seat in the pontificate or augurate and subsequently achieving a successful magisterial career. 
Statistics drawn from  Rüpke estimate that seventeen of the known twenty-four pontiffs and 
twelve of the nineteen known augurs between 74 and 50 reached the praetorship after 
attaining their priesthood; whilst fourteen pontiffs and ten augurs reached the consulship as 
priests. However, the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc suggests that this pattern may 
not be a result of membership in a priestly college; it could have existed because many priests 
were already chosen from the ranks of the most prestigious families in Rome, and as a result 
were already destined for greatness.  However, this cannot have been the case for all priests 
in the Late Republic, given the unpredictable nature of the elections and the increasing 
importance of patronage from influential political figures already discussed in chapter one. 
 
This discussion has compiled and analysed some interesting ways that men could form 
lasting bonds of friendship in a priestly college, making some observations on the exclusive 
and snobbish ways that men in these offices often behaved. Thus membership in the 
pontificate or the augurate became an accepted means of social advancement, especially for 
those young members starting out on the competitive road to political success. Through the 
many case studies discussed, most members of these priesthoods from the Late Republic 
appear to have demonstrated their friendship to one another through benefaction, nominating 
an underling for membership and hoping to take them under their wing. Gaining amicitia 
with some of the most powerful men in the Roman nobility was an important perk of this 
office which allowed young prospective consuls to utilise the office as a mean to accrue a 
great deal of indirect influence. Cicero’s brother in his handbook on electioneering even 
stressed the importance of these kinds of friendship when campaigning for the consulship. 
The benefactor Cicero must have also enjoyed getting so much attention given that he had the 
capacity to nominate other priests, another perk of office. In many ways this approach to 
these priesthoods complements the discussion in the first chapter, which illustrated the kind 
of importance that the Romans placed on these baubles of office. This discussion now looks 






      
 
This study of the priesthoods has demonstrated the many practical ways that positions in the 
pontificate and augurate were valued and could be utilised by members of the Roman élite, 
making it possible to formulate a number of reasons for why men became priests. The first 
chapter demonstrated how two key factors, ancestry and patronage from powerful political 
figures (with a varied and changeable degree of importance), were often prerequisites for 
membership. However, while this approach might explain how a priest was chosen ahead of 
someone else, it does not clearly illustrate the practical value of these offices. What is evident 
from this discussion is that vacancies in these priesthoods tended to be filled by men who 
were fortunate enough to be born into the most celebrated and aristocratic families of Rome. 
This should not be taken to imply that priesthoods were ‘hereditary’ though; the changes to 
the selection process for priests throughout the Late Republic and matters of ‘supply and 
demand’ meant that no candidate could take pursuit of membership for granted. In many 
ways the exclusivity of these priesthoods, and the fact that prospective members might have 
to wait years for a vacancies to open up, could have made it even more difficult to become a 
pontiff or augur.  
 
The constitutional ‘hard powers’ of these priests, discussed in the second and third chapters, 
on the surface appeared to be impressive. The Late Republic was a time when the republican 
‘constitution’ was coming under increasing pressure as with Roman expansion, and so the 
élite governed more and more by exploring the lacunae in the existing sets of rules and 
customs. Therefore priestly counsel appears to have become indispensable for giving 
somewhat audacious institutional and governmental innovations a semblance of legitimacy. 
In the case of the shrine consecrated on the site of Cicero’s house, a young lone pontiff of 
little political significance was able to utilise his position to make a name for himself, and the 
collective college of pontiffs was able to reverse a seemingly binding religious ceremony. 
The augurs are conceived by Cicero to have possessed even more impressive control over 
matters of government; for example, he suggests that an individual augur could halt business 
by simply uttering ‘alio die’, and that the augurate had the collective authority to quash 
public acts not carried in accordance with the strict rules of augury. However, the lack of 
institutional separation between those who held political office and those who held religious 




case examples discussed tend to highlight how the constitutional powers of these priests was 
often diffused by the central religious authority of magistrates and the senate, who retained an 
undeniable pre-eminence in temporal matters.  
 
Collectively, the priestly colleges were valued for their expertise and so were occasionally 
summoned by the senate to offer advice that could influence an important political outcome 
(for example the decision to restore Cicero’s house to him or the repeal of the lex Titia). 
However, the pontificate and augurate are both shown to have effectively acted as 
subcommittees of the senate – influential when called upon, but not powerful in relation to 
the senate. In many cases the role of individual priests was to dictate or prescribe the prayer, 
to offer counsel on religious procedure to magistrates, or simply to attend a ceremony; but 
given that most of the priests were also statesmen, they also often exercised religious 
functions as magistrates. In some cases then we see these priests combining their role as 
priest with their authority as magistrates, allowing them to skilfully outmanoeuvre a rival 
magistrate that was not a priest. Good examples of such circumstances are evident from the 
previous discussions on the augurs L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91), Pompey, Q. Mucius 
Scaevola (tr. pl. 54), and Mark Antony, who all found ways to combine the authority of their 
priesthoods with their powers as magistrates to considerable effect. Thus individual priests 
could occasionally intervene in the life of the city in discreet but efficacious ways. Although 
these powers were limited, this approach to priesthoods forms a compelling explanation for 
why these positions were so highly valued.  
 
Furthermore, as we have seen in the fourth chapter, these priesthoods for the most part 
appeared to offer a productive entrée into elite society, especially for younger members of 
aristocratic families. The statistical evidence compiled in Appendix I and discussed in the 
chapter confirmed that there exists a pattern between holding a place in the pontificate and 
the augurate and reaching higher magistracies. Proving that this pattern is causal though is 
not easy, especially in light of the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc which begs to ask 
how many of these men would have reached the consulship without their priesthoods. This 
discussion therefore demonstrated some of the ways that priesthoods could translate into ‘soft 
power,’ and how membership could assist young aristocrats’ chances of success in the 
Roman public life. Thanks to the priests’ lifetime tenure and the particular ways in which 
they were selected, membership in a priestly college was a way of securing life-long ties with 




gentlemen’s clubs, provided networking opportunities as well as social and intellectual 
cachet. The office could also help to develop a young man’s public image and perceived role 
within Roman society. 
 
Broadly speaking, the lack of separation between church and state is a distinct Roman feature 
that persistently reoccurs as a theme throughout this project, and is an area of this project that 
could be discussed further. This overlap impacted on many of the conflicts of the Late 
Republic discussed in this thesis, which saw some particularly cynical and ruthless 
individuals like Clodius, Caesar, and Mark Antony push the political exploitation of religious 
‘loopholes’ further than ever. The advent of the Civil War and the rise of the Principate make 
it difficult to know whether the existing system might have withstood such examples of 
cynical exploitation seen in the 50s and 40s. Such incidents were nothing new to the Romans 
though, and need not indicate any decline in Roman religion. One should not discredit or 
undermine the vibrant ‘market’ that existed in Roman religion, which was a dynamic system 
constantly adapting, as opposed to the dead and fossilised system presented by some scholars. 
The senate, as the central co-ordinating religious authority, and the magistrates, with their 
vested imperium, usually knew how to utilise the mechanisms in place to handle such 
conflicts. As seen in chapter two, Clodius was especially creative, orchestrating his own 
adoption into a plebeian gens with the help of Caesar as pontifex maximus and Pompey as 
augur to enable his tribunate, and then calling on the pontiff Natta, his own brother-in-law, to 
assist in an audacious dedication ceremony on the site of Cicero’s house. The case of 
Caesar’s consulship similarly demonstrates how strong personalities and high political stakes 
often resulted in religious ceremony being utilised for personal political gain.  
 
All three approaches discussed in this thesis were factors that could shape the reasons for a 
candidate’s pursuit of priestly office. Much depended on the given conditions and the 
individual in question. The personal ambitions of Cicero’s pursuit of the augurate for 
example would be distinct from what motivated the young sons of Crassus or adolescent son 
of P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57) to pursue membership. Therefore, whilst the 
discussed approaches contain vestiges of feasible interpretation, any generalised acceptance 
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 The statistical data estimates what stage of the cursus honorem a pontiff or augur had reached by the time they were co-opted or elected as priest. Some priests have 
conclusive markers for when they were co-opted (marked by X), some have both estimates (marked by prob.) followed by conclusive markers (X), and others remain 
speculation (prob.) with conclusive ancient evidence not corroborating their co-optation until after serving in their highest magistracy (evid.). In the latter cases, the evidence 
indicates that they were not co-opted until after serving as consul, but it is in fact more likely that they were co-opted much earlier. 
FS # Pontiff Bef Q. Bef Aed. or Trib. Bef Pr. Bef. Cos. Not Cos. Aft. Cos. No or lesser Mag.
985 Q. CAECILIUS METELLUS PIUS (Cos.  80) - - Prob. X - - -
3072 P. SERVILIUS VATIA ISAURICUS (Cos. 79) - Prob. - - - Evid. -
2308 Q. LUTATIUS CATULUS (Cos . 78) - - Prob. - - Evid. -
514 MAM. AEMILIUS LEPIDUS LIVIANUS (Cos.  77) - - - Prob. - Evid. -
823 C. AURELIUS COTTA (Cos.  75) - - Prob. X - - -
3234 M. TERENTIUS VARRO LUCULLUS (Cos.  73) - - Prob. X - - -
981 Q. CAECILIUS METELLUS CRETICUS (Cos.  69) - - Prob. X - - -
432 M. ACILIUS GLABRIO (Cos.  67) - - X - - - -
3411 M. VALERIUS MESSALLA (Niger) (Cos.  61) Prob. - X - - - -
2128 D. IUNIUS SILANUS (Cos.  62) - X - - - - -
2003 C. IULIUS CAESAR (Cos . 59) X - - - - - -
2481 P. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA CORDUS (Monet.  70) - - - - X - Prob.
3186 P. SULPICIUS GALBA (Pr.  66) - Prob. X - X - -
986 Q. CAECILIUS METELLUS PIUS SCIPIO NASICA (Cos. 52) - X - - - - -
1610 C. FANNIUS (Pr. 49/8?) - X - - X - -
508 M. AEMILIUS LEPIDUS (Cos. 46) - X - - - - -
1353 P. CORNELIUS LENTULUS SPINTHER (Cos. 57) - - Prob. X - - -
528 M. AEMILIUS SCAURUS (Pr. 56) - Prob. X - X - -
2233 M. LICINIUS CRASSUS (Q. 54) X - - - X - -
2996 C. SCRIBONIUS CURIO (Cos. 76) - - - - - X -
2711 L. PINARIUS NATTA - - - - X - X
3058 Q. SERVILIUS CAEPIO BRUTUS (Pr. 44) Prob. - X - X - -
2997 C. SCRIBONIUS CURIO (Trib. 50) - X - - X - -
1478 L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS (Cos. 54) - - - - - X -
Totals Probably out of 24 4 11 17 14 N/A N/A 2




Table ii: Rüpke’s (2008) list of augurs from 74-50 
 
 
FS # Augur Bef Q. Bef Aed. or Trib. Bef Pr. Bef. Cos. Not Cos. Aft. Cos.
2007 L. IULIUS CAESAR (Cos.  64) Prob. - X - - -
2248 L. LICINIUS LUCULLUS (Cos.  74) - Prob. - - - Evid.
1204 C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS (Pr. 80) - - Prob. - X -
3417 M. VALERIUS MESSALLA (Rufus) (Cos. 53) Prob. - X - - -
826 M. AURELIUS COTTA (Cos. 74) - - - Prob. - Evid.
2756 CN. POMPEIUS MAGNUS (Cos. 70) - - - Prob. - Evid.
1914 Q. HORTENSIUS HORTALUS (Cos. 69) - Prob. - - - Evid.
980 Q. CAECILIUS METELLUS CELER (Cos. 60) - Prob. X - - -
1227 AP. CLAUDIUS PULCHER (Cos. 54) - - X - - -
3067 P. SERVILIUS ISAURICUS (Cos. 48) - - Prob. - - Evid.
1388 C. (Faustus) CORNELIUS SULLA FELIX (Q. 54) X - - - X -
1354 P. CORNELIUS LENTULUS SPINTHER (Q. 44) X - - - X -
2380 L. MARCIUS PHILIPPUS (Pr. 44) - X - - X -
1105 Q. CASSIUS LONGINUS (Pr. 49) - X - - X -
2234 P. LICINIUS CRASSUS (Q. 55) Prob. - - - X -
3191 SER. SULPICIUS GALBA (Pr. 54) - - Prob. - X -
3290 M. TULLIUS CICERO (Cos. 63) - - - - - X
2480 Q. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA (Trib. 54) - Prob. - - X -
669 M. ANTONIUS (Cos. 44) - X - - - -
Totals Probably out of 19 5 9 12 10 N/A N/A




ii. Statistical analysis on priest lists 
 
Rüpke (2008) has identified twenty-four pontiffs and nineteen augur that served as priests 
between 74 and 50.
338
 Before making any deductions from the statistical data drawn from Table i 
and Table ii, it is worth noting two major problems with our priest lists. Firstly, they are 
incomplete. On average Rüpke (2008) identifies 12.04 out of 15 pontiffs (80.3%) and 9.84 out of 
15 augurs (65.6%) for each year of this twenty-five year period. Therefore, since we only know 
the identity of 72.9% of these priests, it is impossible to be sure that the remaining 27.1% 
followed the same trends concerning magisterial success and relative age of co-optation.
339
 The 
second problem is that in most cases, the date of co-optation for many priests is based loosely 
upon scholarly guesswork rather than conclusive ancient evidence. In fact, for this twenty-five 
year period, we only know the exact year of co-optation for six out of forty-three priests.
340
 Two 
lists of pontiffs (in Macr. Sat. 3.13.11 and Cic. Har. Resp. 12), enable us to roughly estimate the 
year of co-optation for a further seventeen out of twenty-four pontiffs, however, our dates for the 
co-optation of the remaining pontiffs and many augurs is based purely on speculation.
341
 In 
Szemler’s attempts to work out whether a priest was co-opted before or after holding a major 
magistracy, he very cautiously refused to draw conclusions for 40% of the priests that served 
between 74 and 50 (twelve out of the twenty-four pontiffs and five out of nineteen augurs).
342
 
Rüpke (2008), however, is much more willing to make educated guesses for the tenure of all 
forty-three priests, and provides fairly convincing estimates for all 40% of those priests which 
                                                 
338
 See Tables i & ii. All these estimates are drawn from the annual lists in Rüpke (2008) 120-8. 
339
 Since we know of twenty-four pontiffs during this period, and 80% of the members in the annual pontifical lists 
of Rüpke (2008) 120-8, there are about six pontiffs we probably cannot identify; since we know of nineteen augurs 
during this period and 65.6% of the members in the annual augural lists of Rüpke (2008) 120-8, there are perhaps 
roughly ten augurs we cannot identify. This mathematical estimation is by no means perfect, because the number of 
priests we know and the gaps in our lists cannot combine to provide an exact answer for how many priests remain 
unidentified; however, it does provide us with a way of making an estimate. 
340
 1) Caesar (FS 2003) co-opted pontiff in 74/3; 2) L. Pinarius Natta (FS 2711) elected pontiff in 58 (Cic. Dom. 
118); 3) C. Scribonius Curio (trib. 50) (FS 2997) elected pontiff in 51 (Cic. ad fam. 2.7.3; 2.15.1); 4) P. Cornelius 
Lentulus Spinther (Q. 44) (FS 1354) elected augur in 57 (Dio 39.17.1); 5) Cicero (FS 3290) elected augur in 52 (see 
seasoned argument in Linderski (1972) 190-200); and 6) M. Antonius (cos. 44) (FS 669) elected augur in 50 (Caes. 
Gall. 8.50.1-3). 
341
 See the brilliant work of Taylor (1942) 385-412, who combines these two lists to make some deductions on the 
year of co-optation for many pontiffs. The first list, recorded by the pontifex maximus Q. Metellus Pius and 
preserved by Macrobius, dates from before 69 and is a list of attendees at a dinner celebrating the inauguration of L. 
Cornelius Lentulus Niger (Pr. 61) (FS 1351) as flamen Martialis (Macr. Sat. 3.13.11); the second list derives from 
Cicero’s address to members of the pontifical college at the meeting held on September 57, concerning the validity 
of the shrine to Libertas constructed on the site of his house (Cic. Har. Resp. 12). 
342
 See Fig. ii Szemler (1972) 182-6 simply marked the dates of these priests as ‘inconclusive / cannot decide’ and 




Szemler (1972) ruled inconclusive.
343
 In fact, Szemler (1972) was only prepared to conclude that 
ten out of forty-three priests (five out of twenty-four pontiffs and five out of nineteen augurs) – 





The cautious approach of Szemler (1972) is not unjustified, considering that ancient evidence 
makes it near impossible to confirm when a priest was co-opted. However, Szemler’s 
unwillingness to make educated guesses greatly weakens his hypothesis that priesthood preceded 
higher magistracy; there also are some methods for working out more precisely when a priest 
was co-opted that he fails to recognise. As noted by Rüpke (2008), in 81, Sulla’s enlargement of 
membership added six new members to each of these two great priestly colleges, and it would be 
acceptable to assume that these places were rewarded to his most loyal supporters (Liv. per. 89). 
This allows us to speculate who these men were, thus permitting a firmer conclusion on whether 
they were co-opted before or after holding a major magistracy. Out of the proposed twelve men 
co-opted in 81, at least eleven had not yet held the praetorship, eleven men that Szemler had 
refused to estimate any co-optation date for. The statistical data that comprises Table i and Table 
ii are essentially constructed from the work of Rüpke, and estimates what stage of the cursus 
honorem a pontiff or augur had reached by the time they were co-opted or elected as priest. 
Some priests have conclusive markers for when they were co-opted (marked by X), some have 
both estimates (marked by prob.) followed by conclusive markers (X), and others remain 
speculative (prob.) with conclusive ancient evidence not corroborating their co-optation until 
after serving in their highest magistracy (evid.). In the latter cases, the evidence indicates that 
they were not co-opted until after serving as consul, but it is in fact more likely that they were 
co-opted much earlier.  
 
Utilising the prosopography of Rüpke (2008), between 74 and 50 the estimates of Table i and ii 
determine the following statistical data: four out of the twenty-four pontiffs (16.7%) and five out 
of nineteen augurs (26.3%) (thus nine out of forty-three priests: 20.9%) may have become priests 
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 Rüpke (2008) 120-8. 
344
 Szemler (1972) 182-6: he speculated that a further five priests may have been co-opted before reaching higher 
magistracy (three pontiffs and two augurs) for this period, with six (two pontiffs and four augurs) co-opted in youth 




before entering the senate and becoming quaestor. Eleven out of twenty-four pontiffs (45.8%) 
and nine out of nineteen augurs (47.4%) (thus twenty out of forty-three priests: 46.5%) may have 
been co-opted before serving as aediles or tribunes. Seventeen out of twenty-four pontiffs 
(70.8%) and eleven out of nineteen augurs (57.9%) (thus twenty-eight out of forty-three priests: 
65.1%) that reached the praetorship may have been selected as priests before serving as praetors. 
And finally, fourteen out of twenty-four pontiffs (58.3%) and ten out of nineteen augurs (52.6%) 
(thus twenty-four out of forty-three priests: 55.8%) that reached the consulship appear to have 
been priests before becoming consuls. Another two pontiffs (8.3%) and one augur (5.3%) (thus 
three out of forty-three priests: 7%) became priests after serving as consuls, whilst two pontiffs 
(8.3%) are presumed to have never become senators (thus two out of forty-three priests: 4.7%). 
Eight pontiffs (33.3%) and eight augurs (42.1%) (thus sixteen out of forty-three: 37.2%) did not 
attain the consulship. Thus, going on Rüpke’s estimates, twenty out of twenty-four pontiffs 
(83.3%) and thirteen out of nineteen augurs (68.4%) (thirty-three out of forty-three priests in 
total: 76.7%) probably attained their place in their respective college before reaching a higher 
magistracy (either the praetorship, or if reached, the consulship). This estimate is a marked 
difference from the seven out of the twenty-four pontiffs (29.2%) and seven out of nineteen 
augurs (36.8%) (thus fourteen out of forty-three priests: 32.6%) that Szemler (1972) speculated 
were co-opted prior to higher magistracy. 
 
The more assured estimates of Rüpke (2008) between 74 and 50 (based on surer evidence and 
marked by X in Table i and Table ii) generates the following statistical data: at least two out of 
the twenty-four pontiffs (8.3%) and two out of nineteen augurs (10.5%) (thus four out of forty-
three priests: 9.3%) were selected before entering the senate and becoming quaestor. Six out of 
twenty-four pontiffs (25%) and three out of nineteen augurs (15.8%) (thus nine out of forty-three 
priests: 20.9%) were selected before serving as aediles or tribunes. Ten out of twenty-four 
pontiffs (41.7%) and six out of nineteen augurs (31.6%) (thus sixteen out of forty-three priests: 
37.2%) that reached the praetorship were selected before serving as praetors. And finally, eleven 
out of twenty-four pontiffs (45.8%) and five out of nineteen augurs (26.3%) (thus sixteen out of 
forty-three priests: 37.2%) that reached the consulship were selected before becoming consuls. 
Another five pontiffs (20.8%) and five augurs (26.3%) (thus ten out of forty-three priests: 




pontiff (4.2%) (thus one out of forty-three priests: 2.3%) is thought to have never become a 
senator. Thus, going on Rüpke’s more readily verified estimates, fifteen out of twenty-four 
pontiffs (62.5%) and six out of nineteen augurs (31.6%) (thus twenty-one out of forty-three 
priests: 48.8%) attained their place in their respective college before reaching a higher 
magistracy (either the praetorship, or if reached, the consulship). Once again, this estimate is a 
marked improvement on the five out of the twenty-four pontiffs (20.8%) and five out of nineteen 
augurs (26.3%) (thus ten out of forty-three priests: 23.3%) that Szemler (1972) concluded were 
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